The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Budget Deficits
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD Countries
Alesina, A., Perotti, R., Giavazzi, F., & Kollintzas, T. (1995) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344590 · Cited by 764
Self-citationWhy Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
Alesina, A., Campante, F. R., & Tabellini, G. (2008) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.1006 · Cited by 754
Self-citationGlobal Capital and National Governments
Mosley, L. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615672 · Cited by 617
Metadata
- Authors
- Alesina, A., & Perotti, R.
- Venue
- Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund
- Published
- 1995-03
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0020-8027 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124542543
- Cited by
- 694
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 42.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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