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Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets
Open accessAbstract
This paper investigates whether management ownership structures and large non-management blockholders are related to firm value across a broad sample of firms from emerging markets. I find that firm values are lower when control and cash flow rights of a firm's management group are separated, which indicates that the private benefits of control are reflected in the price paid by non-controlling shareholders. My results also suggest that large non-management blockholders can reduce these private benefits. The separation of management group ownership and control has a significantly more negative relation to value in countries with low shareholder protection, whereas large non-management blockholders have a significantly more positive relation. These results imply that private control benefits are discounted even more by minority shareholders where external shareholder protections are weak and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute for these missing institutional governance mechanisms.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lins, K. V.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2003-03
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 159
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125701181
- Cited by
- 1,178
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 152.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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