The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Effect of Incentive Contracts on Learning and Performance
Open accessAbstract
This paper reports the results of an experiment that examines how incentive-based compensation contracts compare to flat-wage compensation contracts in motivating individual learning and performance. I use a multiperiod cognitive task where the accounting system generates information (feedback) that has both a contracting role and a belief-revision role. The results suggest that incentives enhance performance and the rate of improvement in performance by increasing both: (1) the amount of time participants devoted to the task, and (2) participants' analysis and use of information. Further, I find evidence that incentives improve performance only after considerable feedback and experience, which may help explain why many prior one-shot decision-making experiments show no incentive effects. Collectively, the results suggest that incentives induce individuals to work longer and smarter, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will develop and use the innovative strategies frequently required to perform well in complex judgment tasks and learning situations.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Chenhall, R. H. (2003) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00027-7 · Cited by 3,237
Bonner, S. E., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2002) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00052-6 · Cited by 966
Self-citationMapping management accounting: graphics and guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research
Luft, J., & Shields, M. D. (2003) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(02)00026-0 · Cited by 642
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Pradhan, R. K., & Jena, L. K. (2017) · Business Perspectives and Research · doi:10.1177/2278533716671630 · Cited by 534
Handbook of Management Accounting Research
(2009) · Handbooks of Management Accounting Research · doi:10.1016/s1751-3243(07)x0001-4 · Cited by 508
Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting
Sprinkle, G. B. (2003) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00058-7 · Cited by 453
Self-citationBonner, S. E., Hastie, R., Sprinkle, G. B., & Young, S. M. (2000) · Journal of Management Accounting Research · doi:10.2308/jmar.2000.12.1.19 · Cited by 401
Self-citationTheorizing Contingencies in Management Control Systems Research
Chenhall, R. H. (2006) · Handbooks of Management Accounting Research · doi:10.1016/s1751-3243(06)01006-6 · Cited by 345
The Balanced Scorecard: The Effects of Assurance and Process Accountability on Managerial Judgment
Libby, T., Salterio, S. E., & Webb, A. (2004) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2004.79.4.1075 · Cited by 317
Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Newman, A. H. (2008) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.4.893 · Cited by 295
Grafton, J., Lillis, A. M., & Widener, S. K. (2010) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2010.07.004 · Cited by 291
Towry, K. L. (2003) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.4.1069 · Cited by 287
Blaskovich, J. L. (2008) · Journal of Information Systems · doi:10.2308/jis.2008.22.1.27 · Cited by 81
Beck, G., Farkas, M., Wheeler, P., & Arunachalam, V. (2020) · Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change · doi:10.1108/jaoc-08-2017-0070 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Sprinkle, G. B.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2000-07-01
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 299-326
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2120859987
- Cited by
- 254
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 23.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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