The role of priors in Bayesian models of perception
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In a recent opinion article, Pellicano and Burr (2012) speculate about how a Bayesian architecture might explain many features of autism ranging from stereotypical movement to atypical phenomenological experience. We share the view of other commentators on this paper (Brock, 2012; Friston et al., 2013; Van Boxtel and Lu, 2013) that applying computational methods to psychiatric disorders is valuable (Montague et al., 2012). However, we argue that in this instance there are fundamental technical and conceptual problems which must be addressed if such a perspective is to become useful. \n \nBased on the Bayesian observer model (Figure 1), Pellicano and Burr speculate that perceptual abnormalities in autism can be explained by differences in how beliefs about the world are formed, or combined with sensory information, and that sensory processing itself is unaffected (although, confusingly, they also speak of sensory atypicalities in autism). In computational terms, the authors are suggesting that the likelihood function is unaltered in autism and that the posterior is atypical either because of differences in the prior, or because of the way in which prior and likelihood are combined. The latter statement is problematic because within the framework of probability theory, the combination of these two components is fixed as determined by Bayes' theorem: they are multiplied. Put simply, a mathematically consistent Bayesian model cannot accommodate a perceptual abnormality in autism that is due to the way in which belief and sensory information, i.e., prior and likelihood, are combined. Furthermore, if sensory processing is mathematically represented as a likelihood function (as it typically is within Bayesian models), then changes in the prior cannot lead to changes in sensation, as the authors claim (they can only lead to changes in perception).
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Cites
When the world becomes ‘too real’: a Bayesian explanation of autistic perception
Pellicano, E., & Burr, D. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.009 · Cited by 1,156 · cited 1×
“In a recent opinion article, Pellicano and Burr (2012) speculate about how a Bayesian architecture might explain many features of autism ranging from stereo-typical movement to atypical phenomenological experience.”
BackgroundMotion illusions as optimal percepts
Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., & Adelson, E. H. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0602-858 · Cited by 1,076
Vision in autism spectrum disorders
Simmons, D. R., Robertson, A. E., McKay, L. S., Toal, E., McAleer, P., & Pollick, F. E. (2009) · Vision Research · doi:10.1016/j.visres.2009.08.005 · Cited by 827 · cited 1×
“The primary phenomenon that the authors cite in support of their hypothesis—a reduced susceptibility in autism to some illusions (Happé, 1996)—has not been replicated more recently (Hoy et al., 2004; Mitchell and Ropar, 2004; Milne and Scope, 2008; Simmons et al., 2009).”
BackgroundMontague, P. R., Dolan, R. J., Friston, K. J., & Dayan, P. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.018 · Cited by 809
Illusions, perception and Bayes
Geisler, W. S., & Kersten, D. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0602-508 · Cited by 249 · cited 1×
“This is why Bayesian statistics were adopted in modeling of perception; they offer an optimal solution to exactly the problem that any perceptual system faces—inferring the hidden causes of its sensory measurements under uncertainty (Geisler and Kersten, 2002)—and can therefore serve as a benchmark.”
BackgroundA predictive coding perspective on autism spectrum disorders
van Boxtel, J. J. A., & Lu, H. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00019 · Cited by 210
Alternative Bayesian accounts of autistic perception: Comment on Pellicano and Burr
Brock, J. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.10.005 · Cited by 173 · cited 2×
“Typically, Bayesian models start with three unknowns—prior, likelihood, and cost function—and atypi-calities might therefore be due to any of these components (also see Brock, 2012).”
BackgroundOn hyperpriors and hypopriors: comment on Pellicano and Burr
Friston, K. J., Lawson, R., & Frith, C. D. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.11.003 · Cited by 151
Cited by
Precise minds in uncertain worlds: Predictive coding in autism.
Van de Cruys, S., Evers, K., Van der Hallen, R., Van Eylen, L., Boets, B., de-Wit, L., & Wagemans, J. (2014) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0037665 · Cited by 885
Hallucinations and strong priors
Corlett, P. R., Horga, G., Fletcher, P. C., Alderson-Day, B., Schmack, K., & Powers, A. R. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.12.001 · Cited by 534
Self-citationTeufel, C., Subramaniam, N., Dobler, V., Perez, J., Finnemann, J., Mehta, P. R., Goodyer, I. M., & Fletcher, P. C. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1503916112 · Cited by 308
Self-citationBolis, D., Balsters, J., Wenderoth, N., Becchio, C., & Schilbach, L. (2017) · Psychopathology · doi:10.1159/000484353 · Cited by 204
Hallucinations as Top-Down Effects on Perception
Powers, A. R., Kelley, M., & Corlett, P. R. (2016) · Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.bpsc.2016.04.003 · Cited by 138
Metadata
- Authors
- Teufel, C., Subramaniam, N., & Fletcher, P. C.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 25-25
- ISSN
- 1662-5188 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965462187
- Cited by
- 26
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 2.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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