Cited by 112Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesNeurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 80 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 4 are not checked yet; none of the 58 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting Under Acute Stress: The Role of Trait Perceived Stress

Open access

Abstract

Delay discounting refers to the reduction of the value of a future reward as the delay to that reward increases. The rate at which individuals discount future rewards varies as a function of both individual and contextual differences, and high delay discounting rates have been linked with problematic behaviors, including drug abuse and gambling. The current study investigated the effects of acute anticipatory stress on delay discounting, while considering two important factors: individual perceptions of stress and whether the stressful situation is future-focused or present-focused. Half of the participants experienced acute stress by anticipating giving a videotaped speech. This stress was either future-oriented (speech about future job) or present-oriented (speech about physical appearance). They then performed a delay discounting task, in which they chose between smaller, immediate rewards, and larger, delayed rewards. Their scores on the Perceived Stress Scale were also collected. The way in which one appraises stressful situations interacts with acute stress to influence choices; under stressful conditions, delay discounting rate was highest in individuals with low trait perceived stress and lowest for individuals with high trait perceived stress. This result might be related to individual variation in reward responsiveness under stress. Furthermore, the time orientation of the task interacted with its stressfulness to affect the individual's propensity to choose immediate rewards. These findings add to our understanding of the intermediary factors between stress and decision-making.

Checked 2026-11-11 · 4 references not checked yet

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

In a 2 × 2 acute stress and time-orientation experiment with 113 male participants, the interaction between acute stress and trait perceived stress predicted delay discounting rate. Under stress, low trait perceived stress was associated with steeper delay discounting, while high trait perceived stress was associated with less delay discounting.

Key findings

  • Acute stress interacted with trait perceived stress to predict delay discounting rate: ΔR² = 0.06, ΔF(1, 108) = 6.71, p = 0.016; delay discounting was highest in low-PSS individuals under acute stress and lowest in high-PSS individuals under acute stress.
  • The same interaction did not predict probability discounting rate: ΔR² = 0.01, ΔF(1, 108) = 0.230, p = 0.19.
  • Time orientation and acute stress interacted to affect immediate reward bias: F(1, 112) = 56.63, p < 0.001; immediate reward bias was highest in future-oriented stress and present-oriented non-stress groups, and lowest in future-oriented non-stress and present-oriented stress groups.
  • Across all groups, greater cortisol increase from T1 to T2 was associated with steeper delay discounting (lower AUC): r = −0.19, p < 0.05.

Methods

  • 120 males were randomly assigned to four groups in a 2 × 2 design: acute stress vs. non-stress and future vs. present time orientation; final analysis included 113 participants (mean age = 20.46 years, SD = 3.74) after exclusions.
  • Participants completed a computerized delay and probability discounting task with adjusting-amount trials, plus the Perceived Stress Scale, PANAS, BIS-11, a working memory task, and salivary cortisol at T1 and T2.
  • Main analyses used moderated multiple regression with mean-centered PSS, dummy-coded acute stress, and time orientation, followed by confirmatory ANOVAs and correlations; delay discounting was indexed by area under the curve (AUC).

Limitations

  • The paper states that only males were included, so results should not be generalized to the general population without future studies examining gender differences.
  • The paper states that time-orientation groups differed in ways beyond time orientation (e.g., listing positive future events vs. listening to music; physical-appearance speech vs. future-job speech), and that immediate reward bias was less reliable than AUC and correlated with the number of choices faced (r = 0.609, p < 0.001).
  • The paper also states that the AUC measure cannot distinguish effects on the discount parameter from effects on utility functions or time perception, and that sleep habits were not assessed.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00251

Cites

76 of 80 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

18 tests recomputed · 0 with the reported and recomputed p on opposite sides of .05

Figures

Figure 1 Timeline for procedure.
Figure 1 Timeline for procedure.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Mean delay discounting rates for individuals with PSS scores 1 standard deviation above and below the mean, stratified by stress manipulation group (Stress, Non-stress; N = 113). There is a significant interaction of acute stress manipulation and trait perceived stress level on delay discounting rate (AUC). Higher AUC values indicate lower delay discounting rates (i.e., more later/larger rewards chosen). When no stress is present, participants with differences in trait perceived stress make similar choices on the delay discounting paradigm. When faced with an acute stressor, subjects with high PSS scores discount rewards at a lower rate, and subjects with lower PSS scores exhibit increased discounting.
Figure 2 Mean delay discounting rates for individuals with PSS scores 1 standard deviation above and below the mean, stratified by stress manipulation group (Stress, Non-stress; N = 113). There is a significant interaction of acute stress manipulation and trait perceived stress level on delay discounting rate (AUC). Higher AUC values indicate lower delay discounting rates (i.e., more later/larger rewards chosen). When no stress is present, participants with differences in trait perceived stress make similar choices on the delay discounting paradigm. When faced with an acute stressor, subjects with high PSS scores discount rewards at a lower rate, and subjects with lower PSS scores exhibit increased discounting.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Means of immediate reward bias (i.e., percentage of immediate options chosen) for each group (Future Stress, Future Non-stress, Present Stress, Present Non-stress). There is a significant interaction between time orientation manipulation and acute stress manipulation on this variable [N = 112; F(1, 111) = 56.63, p < 0.001], showing that future orientation increases choices for immediate reward when the stressor is present, but decreases immediate reward bias when the stressor is absent.
Figure 3 Means of immediate reward bias (i.e., percentage of immediate options chosen) for each group (Future Stress, Future Non-stress, Present Stress, Present Non-stress). There is a significant interaction between time orientation manipulation and acute stress manipulation on this variable [N = 112; F(1, 111) = 56.63, p < 0.001], showing that future orientation increases choices for immediate reward when the stressor is present, but decreases immediate reward bias when the stressor is absent.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

46 Own result · 15 Check pending · 13 Own interpretation · 12 No full text of the sources · 9 Own method · 8 Not checked yet · 5 Sources not found · 3 No basis given

Verify all 26 references — free account

Show all 55 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 24
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 45
56 of 56
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The future-oriented and present-oriented speech topics successfully induced future versus present time orientation.

    “Although time orientation was not the only factor that differed between the two conditions, we did not want to make the time orientation manipulation transparent to subjects, nor did we wish to include a new manipulation that might not have been effective in inducing stress.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The PSS administered at the beginning measures a stable trait perceived stress that is not altered by the acute stress manipulation.

    “In the present study, we administered the PSS in order to measure participants’ general perception of life events as stressful. This trait perceived stress might represent an important intermediary factor in the relationship between acute stress and delay discounting; likewise, acute stress may mediate the relationship between trait perceived stress and delay discounting.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The time orientation manipulation successfully induced the intended time orientation (future vs present) in participants.

    “The aim of the current study was to investigate the effects of acute stress on delay discounting, while controlling for the potential confound of time orientation.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Excluding the 26 participants for whom the q-exponential function could not be fitted did not bias the group comparisons.

    “After excluding these subjects, a one-way ANOVA revealed no group differences in the consistency parameter q (F = 0.513; p = 0.679) or in the discounting parameter kq (F = 0.487; p = 0.692).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The immediate reward bias index is a less reliable measure than AUC.

    “However, in this staircase procedure, it is important to bear in mind that the immediate reward bias index is a less reliable measure than AUC.”
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Statistics that don’t add up

Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.

4 of 4

Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 108) = 6.71reported p = .016 · recomputed p = .011

    “F(1, 108) = 6.71, p = .016”

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 107) = 5.29reported p = .007 · recomputed p = .023

    “F(1, 107) = 5.29, p = .007”

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 109) = 1.8reported p = .15 · recomputed p = .183

    “F(1, 109) = 1.80, p = .15”

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 108) = 0.23reported p = .19 · recomputed p = .632

    “F(1, 108) = 0.230, p = .19”

  • ConsistentF(1, 110) = 5.17reported p = .025 · recomputed p = .025

    “F(1, 110) = 5.17, p = .025”

  • ConsistentF(1, 110) = 8.99reported p = .003 · recomputed p = .003

    “F(1, 110) = 8.99, p = .003”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 5.188reported p = .025 · recomputed p = .025

    “F(1, 112) = 5.188, p = .025”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 1.36reported p = .25 · recomputed p = .246

    “F(1, 112) = 1.36, p = .25”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 3.63reported p = .06 · recomputed p = .059

    “F(1, 112) = 3.63, p = .06”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 0.37reported p = .55 · recomputed p = .544

    “F(1, 112) = 0.37, p = .55”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 0.55reported p = .46 · recomputed p = .460

    “F(1, 112) = 0.55, p = .46”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 1.25reported p = .27 · recomputed p = .266

    “F(1, 112) = 1.25, p = .27”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 0.41reported p = .53 · recomputed p = .523

    “F(1, 112) = 0.41, p = .53”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 0.47reported p = .5 · recomputed p = .494

    “F(1, 112) = 0.47, p = .50”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 0.88reported p = .35 · recomputed p = .350

    “F(1, 112) = 0.88, p = .35”

  • ConsistentF(1, 112) = 56.63reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 112) = 56.63, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(1, 111) = 55.82reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 111) = 55.82, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(1, 111) = 56.63reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 111) = 56.63, p < .001”

18 of 18

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

3 of 3

Citations

Cites

Show all 79 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Henry J. P. (1980). “Present concept of stress theory,” in Catecholamines and Stress: Recent Advances, eds Usdin E. Kvetnansky R. Kopin I. J. (New York: Elsevier/North-Holland), 557– 571
  2. Izawa S. Sugaya N. Yamamoto R. Ogawa N. Nomura S. (2010). The cortisol awakening response and autonomic nervous system activity during nocturnal and early morning periods. Neuro Endocrinol. Lett. 31, 685– 689 21178943

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Metadata

Authors
Lempert, K. M., Porcelli, A. J., Delgado, M. R., & Tricomi, E.
Affiliations
  • New York University (US)
  • Marquette University (US)
  • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
Corresponding author
Tricomi, Elizabeth
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2012
Volume
3
Pages
251-251
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2161045592
Cited by
112
References
79
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 5
FWCI
4.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • e-Publications@Marquette (Marquette University) (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
National Institute on Drug Abuse (R03DA029170, R01DA027764)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience › Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior
Keywords
delay discounting, acute stress, anticipatory stress, time orientation, decision-making, reward responsiveness, speaking tasks, Perceived Stress Scale, individual differences, impulsivity

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