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Cited by 2,616

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues

Bardhan, Pranab·2017·Political Corruption
DOI 10.4324/9781315126647-30
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Abstract

Corruption has its adverse effects not just on static efficiency but also on investment and growth. This chapter discusses the reasons for the persistence of corruption that have to do with frequency-dependent equilibria or intertemporal externalities. There are many cases where corruption is mutually beneficial between the official and his client, so neither the briber nor the bribee has an incentive to report or protest, for example, when a customs officer lets contraband through, or a tax auditor purposely overlooks a case of tax evasion, and so on. The idea of multiple equilibria in the incidence of corruption is salient in some of the recent economic theorists&s; explanations. There is a strand in the corruption literature, contributed both by economists and non-economists, suggesting that, in the context of pervasive and cumbersome regulations in developing countries, corruption may actually improve efficiency and help growth.

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Metadata

Authors
Bardhan, P.
Venue
Political Corruption
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2017-07-12
Pages
321-338
DOI
10.4324/9781315126647-30
OpenAlex
W1550693638
Cited by
2,616
References
1
FWCI
727.74
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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