Detecting Psychological Phenomena: Taking Bottom-Up Research Seriously
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
For more than 50 years, psychology has been dominated by a top-down research strategy in which a simplistic account of the hypothetico-deductive method is paired with null hypothesis testing in order to test hypotheses and theories. As a consequence of this focus on testing, psychologists have failed to pay sufficient attention to a complementary, bottom-up research strategy in which data-to-theory research is properly pursued. This bottom-up strategy has 2 primary aspects: the detection of phenomena, mostly in the form of empirical generalizations, and the subsequent understanding of those phenomena through the abductive generation of explanatory theories. This article provides a methodologically informative account of phenomena detection with reference to psychology. It begins by presenting the important distinctions between data, phenomena, and theory. It then identifies a number of different methodological strategies that are used to identify empirical phenomena. Thereafter, it discusses aspects of the nature of science that are prompted by a consideration of the distinction between data, phenomena, and explanatory theory. Taken together, these considerations press for significant changes in the way we think about and practice psychological research. The adoption of these changes would help psychology correct a number of its major current research deficiencies.
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Citations
Cites
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Hacking, I. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814563 · Cited by 4,814
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“For example, Gergen (1973) maintained that the behavioral sciences deal with facts that are often nonrepeatable and that, at best, they produce generalizations that hold for a limited time only because they are invalidated by cultural and historical factors.”
BackgroundThagard, P. (1992) · doi:10.1515/9780691186672 · Cited by 1,066
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Cited by
The Theory Crisis in Psychology: How to Move Forward
Eronen, M. I., & Bringmann, L. F. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620970586 · Cited by 454
Back to Basics: The Importance of Conceptual Clarification in Psychological Science
Bringmann, L. F., Elmer, T., & Eronen, M. I. (2022) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/09637214221096485 · Cited by 221
“Thus, when using theoretical or statistical models, one should revisit the phenomena that are the foundations of the models (see also Bogen & Woodward, 1988; Haig, 2013), as well as how they are conceptualized and measured.”
MethodAdvancing the Network Theory of Mental Disorders: A Computational Model of Panic Disorder
Robinaugh, D., Haslbeck, J. M. B., Waldorp, L., Kossakowski, J. J., Fried, E. I., Millner, A., McNally, R. J., Ryan, O., de Ron, J., van der Maas, H., et al. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/km37w · Cited by 120
Causal discovery and the problem of psychological interventions
Eronen, M. I. (2020) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100785 · Cited by 102
Perach, R., Joyner, L., Husbands, D., & Buchanan, T. (2023) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/20563051231192032 · Cited by 19
“However, unless they also incorporate bottom-up approaches grounded in data derived from social media users’ own explanations for their behavior, the sets of motives identified risk providing an incomplete picture (Haig, 2013).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Haig, B. D.
- Venue
- The American Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- University of Illinois Press
- Published
- 2013-07-01
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-153
- ISSN
- 0002-9556 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-8298
- OpenAlex
- W2312285788
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 8.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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