The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Classical probability in the Enlightenment
Abstract
What did it mean to be reasonable in the Age of Reason? Classical probabilists from Jakob Bernouli through Pierre Simon Laplace intended their theory as an answer to this question--as nothing more at bottom than good sense reduced to a calculus, in Laplace's words. In terms that can be easily grasped by nonmathematicians, Lorraine Daston demonstrates how this view profoundly shaped the internal development of probability theory and defined its applications.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.102.4.684 · Cited by 2,127
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506
Helping Doctors and Patients Make Sense of Health Statistics
Gigerenzer, G., Gaissmaier, W., Kurz-Milcke, E., Schwartz, L. M., & Woloshin, S. (2007) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6053.2008.00033.x · Cited by 1,336
Cosmides, L. (1996) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00664-8 · Cited by 1,293
How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”
Gigerenzer, G. (1991) · European Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/14792779143000033 · Cited by 1,159
Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change
Gigerenzer, G., & Hug, K. (1992) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(92)90060-u · Cited by 770
Bayesian Analysis for the Social Sciences
Jackman, S. (2009) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9780470686621 · Cited by 756
The priority heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs.
Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.2.409 · Cited by 745
From tools to theories: A heuristic of discovery in cognitive psychology.
Gigerenzer, G. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.98.2.254 · Cited by 634
Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto
Collective, C. A. S. E. (2006) · Security Dialogue · doi:10.1177/0967010606073085 · Cited by 424
Bayesian Estimation and Inference: A User’s Guide
Zyphur, M. J., & Oswald, F. L. (2015) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313501200 · Cited by 385
Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War
Beyerchen, A. (1992) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539130 · Cited by 351
Risk, uncertainty, and heuristics
Mousavi, S., & Gigerenzer, G. (2014) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.02.013 · Cited by 335
Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000284 · Cited by 335
A world of indicators: The making of governmental knowledge through quantification
Rottenburg, R., & Merry, S. E. (2015) · The World of Indicators · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316091265.001 · Cited by 289
A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk
Althaus, C. E. (2005) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00625.x · Cited by 286
Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality
Gigerenzer, G. (2010) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01094.x · Cited by 277
Life beyond big data–governing with little analytics
Amoore, L., & Piotukh, V. (2015) · Economy and Society · doi:10.1080/03085147.2015.1043793 · Cited by 187
Goldstein, W. M., & Weber, E. U. (1995) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60308-4 · Cited by 119
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1989-02-01
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 06
- Pages
- 26-3257-26-3257
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2160153783
- Cited by
- 567
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.