Rationality: psychological and philosophical perspectives
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Abstract
For some, rationality is one of the defining characteristics of being human. Yet the last decade or so has seen a growing debate about the characterization of human thinking in terms of the notion of rationality. The main impetus behind the debate has been the conflict between theorists who propose that thinking is inherently logical, and hence rational, and researchers who have produced a large set of findings apparently demonstrating widespread and systematic deviations from the norms of reasoning prescribed by logicians and mathematicians. This text draws together a number of figures in the field to present a state of the art review taking a cross-disciplinary perspective. They are Jonathan Evans , Polytechnic of South West; Gerd Gigerenzer, University of Bielefeld, Germany; Philip Johnson-Laird and Ruth Byrne, Princeton, USA and University College, Dublin; Mike Oaksford, University College of North Wales; Keith Stenning, University of Edinburgh; Norman Wetherick, University of Aberdeen; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA; V. Girotto, University of Trieste, Italy; J. Lowe, Durham University; R.J. Stevenson, University of Aberdeen.
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Citations
Cited by
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Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1994-07-01
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 31-6323-31-6323
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1614847979
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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