Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity

“By definition, political partisans see their party as part of who they are; the stronger the partisan, the stronger the motive to see the best in their allies and the worst in their opponents (Mason, 2018).”

“Some believe that ideology among the general public is not so much about orienting belief systems as it is about defining and thinking about oneself and an individual’s attachment to a group identity (Mason, 2018).”

“Partisan-ideological sorting has increased the importance of political party as a social identity (Mason, 2015), in part by better aligning political identity with other key social identities (Mason, 2018).”

“…instead seen as either the ‘enemy’ or ‘one of us’ according to their political convictions and partisan sympathies: “Rather than simply disagree-ing over policy outcomes, we are increasingly blind to our commonalities, seeing each other only as two teams fighting for a trophy” (Mason 2018, p. 4).”

“The polarization literature conceives of party affiliation as a social identity (Mason 2018), as does influential scholarship on party identification (PID) (Greene 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004; Hawkins and Nosek 2012; Theodoridis 2017).”

“Cross-pressured voters have long been demonstrated to behave distinctly from voters whose partisan preferences align with their other preferences, while aligned preferences reinforce partisan predispositions (Berelson et al., 1954; Boyd 1969; Campbell 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Mason 2018).”

“…theory (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), in-group members tend to place a premium on complying with fellow in-group members’ expectations (Mason, 2018) and, perhaps more significantly, are systematically more predisposed to signal their rejection and dissimilarity from the out-group…”

“This is also true for divisive issues where people tend to develop a sense of social connection to others who adopt a similar position and a sense of distance from those defending the opposite opinion (e.g. Balcells and Kuo, 2023; Hobolt et al., 2021; Mason, 2018b).”

“Though the competing “party‐over‐policy” perspective (polarization from social identity attachments to parties; Mason, 2018b) has gained traction, an issue‐focus is particularly appropriate for adolescents still developing partisan identities and whose attitudes often center on specific issues.”

“Through the processes of social and political sorting (Huddy 2001; Huddy et al. 2015; Mason 2018; Mason and Wronski 2018; Marsh 2022a), then, our social identities (including partisan identity) are likely to shape the dynamics of trust.”

“Traditionally, party affiliation has been used as an identity marker to study political issues (Mason, 2018).”

“Another major societal pressure point is the current level of political polarization that has been growing for decades but peaked following the 2016 presidential election (Hetherington & Weiler, 2018; Mason, 2018).”

“Partisan viewers will clue in candidates’ parties and root for their in-group (Mason 2018).”

“As a result, a massive literature on increasing partisanship has emerged (see, e.g., Koger and Lebo 2017; Lee 2009; Mason 2018; Mayhew 2005).”

“Also motivating this increased attention are recent changes in the political landscapes of many Western democracies which are driven by polarization (Mason, 2018) and the activation of citizens’ baser instincts.”

“As political psychologist Lilliana Mason (2018) recently wrote, “Partisanship can now be thought of as a mega-identity, with all the psychological and behavioral magnifications that implies” (p. 14).”

“The intense emotional conflict between partisans then is not a dispute about issue positions, but rather an “us versus them” dynamic familiar in social psychology (Mason 2018).”

“More recently, the role of identities in driving political attitudes and behaviors has received growing attention (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy 2001, 2015; Klar 2013; Mason 2018; Transue 2007).”

“Both strong identi fi cation with a group and aligned social identities tend to enhance emotional reactions to political events (Mason 2018, Ch. 6) – this is the setting of contemporary identity politics.”

“…partisan identity strength strongly predict electoral involvement (Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe 2015; Klar and Krupnikov 2016; Mason 2018), while policy attitude in-congruence with the Democratic and Republican party platforms negatively predicts it (Carmines, Ensley, and…”

“As partisan and ideological identities have become increasingly aligned, such identity-based ideologies are closely pertinent to increased affective polarization (Mason, 2018); that is, partisans tend to dislike and distrust those from the other party (for a review, see Iyengar et al., 2019).”

“Hannon builds on the work of Mason ( 2018) and Shanto Iyengar and his colleagues ( 2019) to suggest that citizens’ voting decisions are largely influenced by social issues such as social group membership, cultural identity, and social networks, rather than political parties’ policy positions.”

“6 A growing consensus in the literature suggests that our social identity as Republican or Democrat drives our policy position rather than the other way around (Mason, 2018).”

“…behavior may also in fl uence the way voters react to these types of rules, as voters may not have the underlying ideological views spatial models presume, or they may be motivated by negative affect toward the other party (Achen and Bartels 2017; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Mason 2018; Webster 2020).”

“Going forward, political differences toward trust in advertising may become even more pronounced as self-identified liberals and conservatives are becoming increasingly polarized along party lines, rooting themselves deeper into their respective ideology’s core beliefs and values (Mason 2018).”

“…access) or the “ post-material ” cleavage (Inglehart, 1977) over environmental and cultural issues (benefits for same-sex partners and require recycling) that has folded with the left-right divide in a single dimension of conflict in contemporary American national politics (e.g., Mason, 2018).”

“No longer merely a party identi fi cation, partisanship is a proxy for a suite of attitudes about politics and political life (Mason 2018).”

“The United States is projected to become a majority minority country by 2060.”

““Ingroup bias is deeply rooted in the physical body as well as the thoughtful mind, and no person is immune” (Mason 2018, 13).”

“Ultimately, in-group cues are likely to be more persuasive than out-group cues, often because they are viewed as being more credible (Druckman 2001; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Mason 2018).”

“A challenge, as Mason (2018) puts it is that “The vast majority of American citizens are not, and cannot be expected to be, political experts” (p. 5), and also that “Humans are hard-wired to cling to social groups” (p. 9).”

“Conceptualizing party identification squarely within social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), as recent work as done (Green et al., 2004; Mason, 2015, 2018; Egan, 2019), provides a path forward.”

“But we see a need for a general concept that can capture the sense of historical decline in economic well-being as well as the varieties of status threat, since out-group aversion can be associated with many identities (Mason 2018).”

“Conversely, as demonstrated by Mason (2018), social identity simplicity, measured as the degree to which partisans “sort” various social identities (racial, religious, ideological) into one simple mega-identity, results in cooler evaluations of partisan outgroups/affective polarization.”

“Second, levels of political polarization have rapidly increased in the last decade (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Mason, 2018; Tyler & Iyengar, 2023), along with rises in populism more generally (Jenne et al., 2021).”

“While a great deal of SIT research tied to politics has focused on political identities (e.g., partisanship; Mason, 2018), recent scholarship has highlighted the need to look at group identities more broadly (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Sides et al., 2019).”

“Mason (2016 , 2018) highlights the concept of “social sorting,” where political identities become intertwined with other social identities, such as race, religion, and sexuality.”

“This is consistent with the argument that affective polarization in contemporary America is driven by partisan sorting (Mason, 2018).”

“Also, because partisanship has become a salient social identity whereby people associate with their in-groups and show animus toward out-groups (Mason 2018, 14 – 16), partisanship influences attitudes about who deserves assistance, not only what type of assistance (Hussey and Pearson-Merkowitz…”

“Investigates the psychological and emotional factors driving political divisions (Iyengar et al., 2019; Mason, 2018).”

“Given that political partisanship is often a personally important and meaningful social identity (Huddy & Bank-ert, 2017), conservatives and liberals not only perceive each other as outgroups but display high levels of animosity toward each other (Finkel et al., 2020; Mason, 2018).”

“Previous studies have indicated that political polarization tends to frame political opponents as fundamentally different and non-negotiable, a view that may pave the way for their dehumanization (Cassese, 2021) and legitimize violence or hostility against others with differing views (Mason, 2018).”

“Scholars have long been interested in the in fl uence of social identities on American politics (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Converse et al., 1961; Dawson 1994; Kinder, Sanders, and Sanders, 1996; Mason 2018).”

“Over the last three decades, politics in the United States has become increasingly characterized by affective polarization and negative partisanship (Banda & Cluverius, 2018; Mason, 2018; Webster, 2020).”

“Unlike deeply ingrained values, which function as enduring belief systems resistant to external change (Schwartz, 1992), political identity is shaped by exposure to evolving political discourse and external triggers (Mason, 2018; Tajfel and Turner, 1979).”

“As Republicans have gained electoral favor from older, White, and Christian voters more broadly (Hopkins 2017; Mason 2018; Munger 2022), the rural vote has become key to its successes in statewide races—with no alternative groups of urban-residing voters to pursue as a backup (Shea and Jacobs 2023).”

“…to be very effective in influencing public sentiment (Widmann 2021) leading to detrimental outcomes such as affective polarization, negative partisanship, and political sectarianism (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Druckman et al. 2021; Finkel et al. 2020; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2018).”

“As a result, political identities often take on a “mega-identity” status, absorbing and amplifying other social affiliations and becoming central to how individuals navigate social and political life (Mason, 2018).”

“Moreover, growing polarization affects relationships in all dimensions, from family members and romantic partners to friendships (Mason, 2018), especially in countries where WhatsApp is a predominant messaging app, such as Brazil or India (Santos et al., 2018; Sharma, 2019).”

“…will have lower levels of affective polarization, even when controlling for factors that tend to predict greater affective polarization such as endorsement of party-line policy views (Lelkes, 2018), strength of party identification (Mason, 2018b), and political knowledge (Suk et al., 2022).”

“In the context of the recent strain on democracies all over the world, much attention has been devoted to identity-based polarization (see e.g.: Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2018; Reiljan, 2020; Wagner, 2021).”

“Under these circumstances political losses are more likely to be viewed as existentially catastrophic (Drutman, 2020; Mason, 2018), potentially motivating a “no holds barred” approach to political conflict in which anti-democratic action is tolerated or supported for instrumental partisan reasons…”

“Coupled with the social divergence among public sup-porters of each party (e.g., Mason 2018), the divergence in backgrounds across members of Congress suggests that overcoming current partisan divides may be increasingly di ffi cult.”

“Online communities reinforced their identification with “the people” through visible in-group loyalty and out-group rejection, a feature of affective polarization (Mason, 2018).”

“Moreover, research on political sorting suggests Americans whose religious or secular identities align with political identities in more conventional ways tend to be more politically engaged (Baker and Marti 2020; Cassese 2020; Djupe et al. 2023; Mason 2018).”

“These questions are especially pressing in the increasing partisan polarization that characterizes American politics generally (Hasen 2019; Mason 2018; Abramowitz and Webster 2016) and the judiciary specifically, which has driven the Supreme Court ’ s approval ratings to historic lows (Brenan 2023).”

“The role of racial ideology is crucial because such ideas increasingly structure partisan identities (Mason 2018).”

“Identity serves as a socially grounded frame that shapes perception and influences evaluative judgments, highlighting which interpretations are considered critical, believable, or threatening in a given context (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Mason, 2018).”