¿Demasiado lejos? Cómo la polarización mal percibida alimenta la polarización afectiva en España
Open accessAbstract
España es un país con altos niveles de polarización afectiva. Algunos estudios sostienen que esto es consecuencia de un aumento de la polarización ideológica, mientras que otros destacan el efecto de ciertos temas, así como la influencia de las redes sociales, las élites y los cambios en la oferta partidista. En este artículo proponemos otra explicación basada en el efecto de las percepciones erróneas. En primer lugar, mostramos que los individuos que tienen una percepción más irrealista de la posición ideológica de un partido tienden a desarrollar también mayores sentimientos de antipatía hacia dicho partido. En segundo lugar, demostramos que la polarización percibida incrementa la polarización afectiva individual. Nuestras actitudes están influenciadas por los juicios que hacemos sobre la realidad política, los cuales, a su vez, están condicionados (y sesgados) por nuestras identidades grupales. Finalmente, construimos un indicador de falsa polarización para analizar en qué medida la diferencia entre la polarización percibida y la polarización real del sistema de partidos se asocia con niveles individuales más altos de polarización afectiva. Con esta estrategia también confirmamos que, a medida que aumenta la percepción de falsa polarización, lo hace también la dispersión del afecto entre los distintos grupos partidistas. En resumen, este artículo explora la influencia de las percepciones sobre las actitudes ciudadanas. Estas percepciones tienden con frecuencia a exagerar artificialmente las diferencias con los grupos externos, lo que puede llevarnos erróneamente a pensar que tenemos poco en común.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Using the CEMOP 2021 Spanish political polarization survey, the paper argues that Spaniards overestimate ideological polarization in the party system and that this misperception is associated with greater affective polarization. It finds that misperceived distance from a party predicts antipathy toward it, and that both perceived polarization and false polarization are positively associated with individual affective polarization.
Key findings
- Actual party-system polarization was 0.49, while average perceived polarization was 0.73, a gap of 0.24 points; perceived polarization exceeded actual polarization by approximately 49%.
- Misperceived ideological distance significantly predicted lower feeling-thermometer scores toward all four main parties: PSOE β = −.228, UP β = −.122, PP β = −.221, and Vox β = −.258 (all p < 0.01).
- Perceived polarization was positively associated with affective polarization (β = .155, p < 0.01); an estimated increase in perceived polarization from 0.730 to 0.982 was linked to an increase in affective polarization from 2.44 to 2.62, or 7.38%.
- False polarization was also positively associated with affective polarization (β = .077, p < 0.01); 43.1% of respondents had false polarization levels equal to or higher than 0.4, while only 18.4% had levels lower than 0.2.
Methods
- Data come from the First National Survey of Political Polarization in Spain conducted by CEMOP (2021), with a representative sample of 1,236 Spanish adults aged 18 and older; sampling was stratified multistage with gender and age quotas and strata by autonomous community and habitat size.
- Dependent variables were feeling thermometers toward parties (0–10) for H1 and individual affective polarization using Wagner’s (2021) spread formula for multiparty systems across PSOE, PP, Vox, and UP (range 0–5).
- Main independent variables were misperceived distance between a party’s actual ideological position and an individual’s perceived position, perceived party-system polarization, and false polarization; analysis used multiple OLS linear regression models with sociodemographic and political controls.
Limitations
- The paper states that perception calculations rely on interviewees’ self-reported positions, which may be affected by social desirability biases and could make perceptual deviation reflect modified real preferences rather than misperception.
- The paper states that it does not consider meta-perceptions, which can fuel reactive hostility.
- The paper states that causal direction is uncertain: misperceived polarization may be a consequence rather than a driver of affective polarization, and highly polarized individuals may alter perceptions to justify existing bias.
- Evident from the text: the cross-sectional survey design cannot establish causality, and actual party positions are based on voters’ ideological self-placement rather than manifestos or elite positioning, which the paper itself notes can involve measurement error, temporal instability, and self-report bias.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
14 of 53 cited sources checked · 9 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Spain is marked by high levels of affective polarization.
“Spain is marked by high levels of affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
The effect of perceived polarization on affective polarization may play out through the framework of social norms.
“we argue that the effect of perceived polarization on affective polarization may play out through the framework of social norms (Connors, 2023;Lane et al., 2024).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Connors, 2023 source
- cites Lane et al., 2024 source
The Introduction (page unavailable) proposes social norms as one explanation for party affective polarization, and the Discussion (page unavailable) explores norms as a mechanism in political polarization. The passages do not address whether perceived polarization affects affective polarization through social norms, so they support the proposed framework but not that specific pathway. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
- Findingown data
Perceived polarization increases individual affective polarization.
“Secondly, we show that perceived polarization increases individual affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Individuals with a more unrealistic perception of a party's ideological position develop stronger feelings of antipathy toward that party.
“Firstly, we show that individuals with a more unrealistic perception of a party's ideological position will also develop stronger feelings of antipathy toward that party.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
As the sense of false polarization grows, the dispersion of affect across party groups increases.
“We also confirm with this strategy that, as the sense of false polarization grows, so does the dispersion of affect across party groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
A one-unit change in false polarization is associated with a .077 increase in individual affective polarization.
“Assuming a one-unit change in the level of false polarization, a .077increase in individual affective polarization would be expected.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Perceived polarization remains an important explanatory factor for affective polarization even when controlling for ideological extremism, social media use, and online news consumption.
“Most notably, perceived polarization remains an important explanatory factor even when controlling for variables associated with affective polarization, such as ideological extremism, social media use, or online news consumption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Most individuals in the sample have perceived polarization levels higher than actual levels.
“most of the individuals in the sample (see Figure 1) have levels of perceived polarization that are higher than the actual levels.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
People's assumptions about party positions tend to be inaccurate.
“People's assumptions about party positions tend to be inaccurate”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The sample is representative of the Spanish population, so findings generalize to Spaniards.
- Findingown data
As false polarization grows, affective polarization increases; β = .077, p < 0.01.
“as false polarization grows, so does affective polarization; again, at a 99% significance level (β = .077,p < 0.01).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Misperceived ideological distance from a party, alongside ideological self-placement, is the strongest predictor of feeling thermometer scores.
“misperceived ideological distance from a party-alongside ideological selfplacement-is the strongest predictor of feeling thermometer scores.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Perceived polarization has greater explanatory weight than territorial identity, religion, or Twitter use in explaining affective polarization.
“is a factor with greater explanatory weight than territorial identity, religion, or Twitter use; all of which are variables normally used to explain the political dynamics of European democracies and Spain in particular.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Citizens are not as far away from each other as they might think.
“we have shown that citizens are not as far away from each other as they might think”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The sample is representative of the Spanish population, so findings generalize to Spaniards.
- Premisecitation
The 2023 Edelman Trust Barometer ranked Spain in the group of severely polarized countries based on citizens' self-reported perception of political division.
“The 2023 Edelman Trust Barometer ranked Spain-based on citizens' selfreported perception of the level of political division-in the group of severely polarized countries (along with Argentina, Sweden, and the United States).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Edelman Trust Barometer
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationcitation
We become individually polarized in response to an exaggerated perception of actual polarization levels in the political system.
“we become individually polarized in response to an exaggerated perception of actual polarization levels in the political system (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky & Malhotra, 2013
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
- Premisecitation
Gidron et al. (2020) identified Spain as the most affectively polarized country among twenty democracies.
“Similarly, in their comparative study of twenty democracies, Gidron et al. (2020) identified Spain as the most affectively polarized country.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gidron et al. (2020) source
- Interpretationreasoning
Inaccurate assumptions about party positions explain feelings of rejection toward those perceived in a more distorted way.
“which explains the feelings of rejection toward those we perceive in a more distorted way.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
- Interpretationown data
The same exacerbating effect holds for false polarization.
“the same is true if we refer specifically to the concept of false polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
- Interpretationown data
Perceived polarization in the system exacerbates polarization in the individual.
“perceived polarization in the system exacerbates polarization in the individual”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
- Premisecitation
Erroneous beliefs about other partisan tribes are not caused by information problems but respond to a context of competition.
“The erroneous beliefs that occur in our mind when thinking about other partisan tribes are not caused by information problems but respond to a context of competition (Lees & Cikara, 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lees & Cikara, 2021 source
- Premisecitation
When people evaluate rival parties, they think of those groups' most extreme ideological positions.
“As Druckman et al. (2022) demonstrate, when people evaluate rival parties, they think of those groups' most extreme ideological positions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Druckman et al. (2022) source
- Interpretationreasoning
Increased perception of polarization can strengthen partisan ties.
“the increased perception of polarization can strengthen partisan ties.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
- Premisereasoning
Social judgments are determined by group-based categories.
“Social judgments are therefore determined by group-based categories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The more erroneously we perceive others' positions, the more heightened our sense of competition and zero-sum logic becomes.
“This creates a vicious circle: the more erroneously we perceive others' positions (i.e., by attributing to them inaccurate and extreme beliefs), the more heightened our sense of competition and zero-sum logic becomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Intergroup accentuation, by which perceived similarities within groups and differences between them become exaggerated, is a robust consequence of categorization, especially when group labels are salient and congruent with ideological content.
“This process of intergroup accentuation, by which perceived similarities within groups and differences between them become exaggerated, has been experimentally demonstrated to be a robust consequence of categorization, especially when group labels are sali-ent and congruent with ideological content (McGarty & Turner, 1992).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McGarty & Turner, 1992 source
- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
- May combine two claims. 38
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 53
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIdentities influence the perception of facts, and based on this perception, intergroup relations develop.
“In particular, they influence the perception of facts, and, based on this perception, intergroup relations develop (Xiao et al., 2016;Cole et al., 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Xiao et al., 2016 source
- cites Cole et al., 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIntensified bias and hostility toward outgroups is evidence that political conflict has deepened; opponents' positions lead to considerable animosity and we tend to consider them illegitimate and morally reprehensible.
“Intensified bias and hostility toward outgroups is evidence that political conflict has deepened; although we no longer disagree exclusively in our preferences on how best to solve social problems, our opponents' positions lead to considerable animosity and we tend to consider them illegitimate and morally reprehensible (Tappin & McKay, 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Tappin & McKay, 2019 source
The paper describes US partisans as viewing opponents’ moral character negatively, and its Discussion reports substantial moral polarization. But it does not establish that political conflict has deepened over time or that opponents’ positions cause considerable animosity; the Discussion instead calls the association between moral polarization and hostile behavior small and somewhat tenuous. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAttitudes are influenced by judgments about political reality, which are influenced and biased by group identities.
“Attitudes are influenced by judgments about political reality, which in turn are influenced (and biased) by group identities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Allport, 1954
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Xiao et al., 2016 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThis generates a Manichean conception of politics as a permanent zero-sum game.
“This generates a Manichean conception of politics as a permanent zero-sum game (Piazza, 2023).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Piazza, 2023 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationTorcal and Comellas (2022) highlight two key moments of heightened affective polarization in Spain between 1993 and 2019 based on evaluations of political leaders: during the 2008 and 2015 general elections.
“Torcal and Comellas (2022) highlight two key moments of heightened affective polarization in Spain between 1993 and 2019 based on evaluations of political leaders: during the 2008 and 2015 general elections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Torcal and Comellas (2022) source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPerception is conditioned by identity categorization and mediates the influence of identity on attitudes and behaviors by activating stereotypes.
“Perception as a psychological process is conditioned by identity categorization and, in turn, mediates the influence of identity on attitudes and behaviors by activating stereotypes (Xiao et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Xiao et al., 2016 source
The Perceptual Model of Intergroup Relations section says social identification influences perception and proposes that perceptual processes can mediate intergroup relations. It does not say that perception mediates effects on attitudes and behavior by activating stereotypes; its stereotype example chiefly describes stereotype-related concepts influencing perception. The paper also notes that evidence for the path from perception to intergroup relations is more limited. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationGrowing sorting of social identities and ideological positions within party groups reduces cross-cutting identities, increases intragroup homogeneity, and exacerbates the sensation of intergroup estrangement.
“a) the grow-ing sorting of social identities and ideological positions within party groups, which reduces cross-cutting identities, increases intragroup homogeneity, and exacerbates the sensation of intergroup estrangement (Mason, 2018;Harteveld, 2021)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Mason, 2018 source
- cites Harteveld, 2021 source
Sections 1 and 2.2 describe how alignment of political and non-political identities reduces cross-cutting identities and makes political groups appear more distinct and homogeneous, fostering negative feelings toward outgroups. The claim presents this as a causal effect, whereas section 2.2 says the paper's observational data cannot establish causal direction with certainty. Page numbers are not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- The authors state this as an assumption: Partisanship acts as a powerful social identity.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThinking that outgroups are highly extremist assigns them an undesirable characteristic and points to the moral superiority of the ingroup.
“Thinking that outgroups are highly extremist assigns them an undesirable characteristic and points to the moral superiority of the ingroup (Rojo-Martínez et al., 2023).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Rojo-Martínez et al., 2023 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAmerican citizens estimate that U.S. parties are 20% further apart than they actually are.
“As other research has shown, such as Levendusky and Malhotra (2016:384), American citizens estimate that U.S. parties are 20% further apart than they actually are.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky and Malhotra (2016:384) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationEven beliefs about measurable political and economic indicators can reflect partisan bias.
“According to Bullock et al. (2015), even beliefs about measurable political and economic indicators can reflect partisan bias.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Bullock et al. (2015) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
PremisecitationMore ideological distance from a candidate or party increases affective polarization.
“This hypothesis combines findings indicating that more ideological distance from a candidate or party increases affective polarization (Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016;Harteveld, 2021;Ryan, 2023) with research on partisan bias since the ideological distance is perceived and not actual in this case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016 source
- cites Harteveld, 2021 source
Section 4.4.2 (page unavailable) reports that greater ideological polarization among parties predicts greater affective polarization within countries. But the paper does not establish that an individual’s ideological distance from a candidate or party increases their affective polarization; Section 2.1 describes the individual-level evidence as mixed. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Ryan, 2023 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationInforming individuals of their inaccurate beliefs can be beneficial for intergroup relations.
“informing individuals of their inaccurate beliefs can be beneficial for intergroup relations (Ruggeri et al., 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ruggeri et al., 2021 source
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataWhen mean perceived polarization increases from 0.730 to 0.982, affective polarization increases from 2.44 to 2.62, an estimated increase of 7.38%.
“when the mean of perceived polarization increase from 0.730 μ to 0.982 + , affective polarization will increase from 2.44 to 2.62 (recall that the statistical range of the indicator is 5).This example represents an estimated increase of 7.38% in the dependent variable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataSpaniards exaggerate their ideological differences and perceive an unreal polarization in the political system.
“This article has shown the extent to which Spaniards exaggerate their ideological differences and perceive an unreal polarization in the political system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The sample is representative of the Spanish population, so findings generalize to Spaniards.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the sample, 43.1% of individuals presented false polarization levels equal to or higher than 0.4 (maximum 0.51), and only 18.4% have false polarization levels lower than 0.2.
“In our sample, 43.1% of the individuals presented false polarization levels equal to or higher than 0.4 (the maximum being 0.51).In turn, only 18.4% have false polarization levels lower than 0.2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAffective polarization in Spain may have been driven by mistaken assumptions that lead us to overestimate the extent of actual disagreement with our rivals.
“However, affective polarization in this context may have been driven by mistaken assumptions that lead us to overestimate the extent of actual disagreement with our rivals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPartisanship becomes a source of social segregation, extends beyond policy preferences to influence emotions, acts expressively and non-instrumentally by influencing personal identity, and is a shortcut for building judgments and making decisions.
“In short, partisanship becomes a source of social segregation, extends beyond policy preferences to influence the field of emotions, acts in an expressive and non-instrumental way by influencing our personal identity and, finally, is a great shortcut for building judgments and making decisions (Huddy & Bankert, 2017;Goldenberg et al., 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Huddy & Bankert, 2017 source
- cites Goldenberg et al., 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Partisanship acts as a powerful social identity.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningThe reinforcement of intergroup differentiation results in a cognitive gap, so partisans see themselves differently from how other partisans perceive them.
“The reinforcement of intergroup differentiation results in a cognitive gap, so partisans see themselves differently from how other partisans perceive them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Partisanship acts as a powerful social identity.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPartisan identity has a strong influence on self-concept and generates homophily in social relationships, that is, a preference for those who are politically similar.
“b) partisan identity has a strong influence on self-concept and generates homophily in social relationships, that is, a preference for those who are politically similar (Huber & Malhotra, 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huber & Malhotra, 2017 source
- The authors state this as an assumption: Partisanship acts as a powerful social identity.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPerceptions often artificially exaggerate differences with outgroups, which can lead individuals to mistakenly think they have little in common.
“These perceptions often tend to artificially exaggerate differences with outgroups, which can lead individuals to mistakenly think they have little in common.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenOur mind distorts reality, leading us to develop attitudes that further reinforce group preferences and biases.
“Our mind plays a trick on us by distorting reality, leading us to develop attitudes that further reinforce group preferences and biases.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationOne of the most common perceptual biases caused by identity is the exaggeration of differences between groups, known as intergroup accentuation, explained by the need for positive distinctiveness.
“One of the most common perceptual biases caused by identity is the exaggeration of differences between groups, a phenomenon known as "intergroup accentuation," which has traditionally been explained in social psychology by the need for positive distinctiveness (Rothermund & Deutsch, 2024).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rothermund & Deutsch, 2024 source
- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSpain is a strongly polarized society, having moved from ordinary political disagreements to an affective gap between partisan groups.
“This evidence supports the general impression that Spain is a strongly polarized society”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Crespo et al., 2021a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIdentities have cognitive effects.
“Identities have cognitive effects (Allport, 1954).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Allport, 1954
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningOur perception of the degree of differentiation is usually biased and responds to the need to consolidate group boundaries.
“Although our perception of the degree of differentiation is usually biased and responds to the need to consolidate group boundaries, human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataMisperceived distance fuels negative partisanship, which is the main constituent of affective polarization.
“misperceived distance fuels negative partisanship, which is the main constituent of affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningThe attribution of positions to the outgroup (first-order beliefs) seeks to maximize contrasts and to reduce accepted levels of diversity and variability in the perception of its members.
“The attribution of positions to the outgroup (i.e., first-order beliefs 2 ) seeks to maximize contrasts, but also to reduce accepted levels of diversity and variability in the perception of its members.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe First National Survey of Political Polarization in Spain was administered to a representative sample of the Spanish population aged 18 years and older with a total of 1,236 cases.
“The survey was administered to a representative sample of the Spanish population aged 18 years and older with a total of 1,236 cases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe true percentage of Republicans holding extreme views was 19 points lower than the estimate for the Democrats.
“In 2019, a report published by More in Common reinforced the findings of Levendusky and Malhotra (2016) by detecting that the true percentage of Republicans holding extreme views was 19 points lower than the estimate for the Democrats.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yudkin et al., 2019 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataTwo clear effects of perceptions on polarization are a rejection effect on those we overestimate the furthest away and an affective dispersion effect that arises from inaccurate inference.
“We observed two clear effects of perceptions on polarization: a rejection effect on those we overestimate the furthest away (we dislike them because we think they think in a manner we dislike) and an affective dispersion effect that arises from inaccurate inference.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWhen the political system is perceived to be highly polarized, an extraordinary level of political confrontation may become normalized, and unmoderated attitudes and positions may be assumed as acceptable behavior.
“When the political system is perceived to be highly polarized, an extraordinary level of political confrontation may become normalized, and it may even be assumed that the acceptable behavior shared by the members of the different groups is the adoption of unmoderated attitudes and positions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe greater the perceived distance between the system's extreme and relevant parties, the more significant the electoral outcome becomes.
“The greater the perceived distance between the system's extreme and relevant parties, the more significant the electoral outcome becomes-particularly regarding which party governs or shapes public policy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCategorization emphasizes perceived differences between parties, with the opposing group's position always exaggerated more than the ingroup's position.
“According to the results of Westfall et al. (2015:149-151), categorization emphasizes perceived differences between parties (i.e., the opposing group's position is always exaggerated more than the ingroup's position 3 )”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Westfall et al. (2015:149-151) source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe effects of false polarization have yet to be demonstrated in detail, and it remains unclear whether perceptual biases contribute to affective polarization.
“Despite these initial approaches, the effects of false polarization have yet to be demonstrated in detail.More specifically, it remain unclear whether these perceptual biases do indeed contribute to affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningA more distorted view of the political arena may encourage the mobilization (not only behavioral, but also attitudinal) of individuals who feel that political competition will imply significantly greater changes and a notable risk to their interests.
“A more distorted view of the political arena may encourage the mobilization (not only behavioral, but also attitudinal) of individuals who feel that political competition will imply significantly greater changes and a notable risk to their interests.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationMisperceptions about others are not measurement errors but structured distortions shaped by identity and motivated reasoning.
“As Bursztyn and Yang (2022) argue, misperceptions about others are not measurement errors but structured distortions shaped by identity and motivated reasoning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bursztyn and Yang (2022) source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThrough a representativeness heuristic, we infer that the most extreme positions of some members of a group are the group's most common traits.
“Through a representativeness heuristic, we infer that the most extreme positions of some members of a group are, in fact, the group's most common traits (Ahler & Sood, 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ahler & Sood, 2023 source
- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIndividuals may feel that dangerous changes will develop depending on who wins or loses, which can cause anxiety.
“Individuals may come to feel that dangerous changes will develop depending on who wins or loses, which can even cause anxiety.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe false polarization effect is not the main driver of affective polarization, but rather an adjuvant or amplifying element.
“However, this effect is not the main driver of affective polarization, but rather an adjuvant or amplifying element.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIncreased perception of polarization may increase interest in politics and engagement.
“Since we perceive there is a higher level of ideological divergence, this may increase both our interest in politics and engagement”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe size of actual polarization in the U.S. was medium, but perceived polarization exceeded it by a factor of two.
“Previously, Westfall et al. (2015) found that the size of actual polarization in the U.S. was medium, but the perceived polarization exceeded it by a factor of two.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Westfall et al. (2015) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationTorcal (2023) analyzed the importance of the perception of partisan supply to understand affective polarization.
“More recently, Torcal (2023) analyzed the importance of the perception of partisan supply to understand affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Torcal (2023)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThese types of misperceptions respond to two widespread cognitive mechanisms: categorical thinking and simplification.
“These types of misperceptions respond to two widespread cognitive mechanisms: categorical thinking and simplification (Fernbach & Van Boven, 2022).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fernbach & Van Boven, 2022 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenStratified multistage sampling was used, with gender and age quotas and construction of strata by crossing the autonomous community of residence and habitat size.
“Stratified multistage sampling was the procedure used, with the application of gender and age quotas and construction of strata by crossing the autonomous community of residence and habitat size.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationThe decision to analyze party system polarization based on voters' ideological self-placement is a generally accepted approach.
“The decision to analyze party system polarization based on voters' ideological self-placement is a generally accepted approach (Sartori, 1976;Sani & Sartori, 1983), though it is not without limitations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Sartori, 1976
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Sani & Sartori, 1983
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationA sense of effervescence and excitement due to excessive perception of conflict may occur, making us more attentive and involved, which is a polarizing factor.
“A sense of effervescence and excitement (due to the excessive perception of conflict) may occur.This can make us more attentive and involved in what is happening and, as other studies have shown, this is a polarizing factor (Suk et al., 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Suk et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationHighlighting differences with rivals implicitly enhances ingroup status and reinforces group ties as shared characteristics with outgroups are reduced.
“By highlighting differences with rivals, there is also an implicit enhancement of ingroup status and a reinforcement of group ties as shared characteristics with outgroups are reduced (McGarty & Penny, 1988).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McGarty & Penny, 1988 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe perception of greater polarization may trigger defensive responses to an unreal sense of threat.
“the perception of greater polarization may trigger defensive responses to an (unreal) sense of threat.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationFalse polarization could be interpreted as a product of ingroup favoritism bias.
“Consequently, false polarization could be interpreted as a product of ingroup favoritism bias (Dimdins, 2003).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Dimdins, 2003
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPerceived polarization predicts political engagement.
“and perceived polarization predicts political engagement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Westfall et al. (2015:149-151) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe perception gap was 27 points.
“Conversely, the perception gap was somewhat higher (27 points) (Yudkin et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yudkin et al., 2019 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe misestimation of the extremism of rival groups via stereotypical generalization is accompanied by a tendency to hyperrepresent outgroup homogeneity.
“The misestimation of the extremism of rival groups via stereotypical generalization is accompanied by a tendency to hyperrepresent outgroup homogeneity (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992 source
- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenAnalyzing party system polarization based on voters' ideological self-placement is susceptible to measurement error, temporal instability, and potential bias in self-reporting.
“These include susceptibility to measurement error, temporal instability, and potential bias in self-reporting-issues that will be”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAccentuating differences is not only prompted by a desire for ingroup distinction but is also the result of memory problems that make us more prone to remembering a group's extreme prototype and leads to overgeneralizations.
“Other theories add that accentuating differences is not only prompted by a desire for ingroup distinction but is the result of memory problems that make us more prone to remembering a group's extreme prototype and leads to overgeneralizations (Rothermund & Deutsch, 2024).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rothermund & Deutsch, 2024 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisereasoningThis leads to the assumption that all individuals in the outgroup share the same type of position.
“This leads to the assumption that all individuals in the outgroup share the same type of position.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
PremisecitationPerceived polarization influences negative evaluations of opposing parties more than actual polarization.
“This is a relevant task since, in view of the revised literature, we conclude that perceived polarization influences negative evaluations of opposing parties more than actual polarization, although we almost always focus on the latter (Enders & Armaly, 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Enders & Armaly, 2019 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe more intense the sense of ideological divergence, the greater the antipathy toward the outgroups.
“In addition, the more intense the sense of ideological divergence, the greater the antipathy toward the outgroups (Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe perception of polarization could discourage agreements and compromises between parties.
“Furthermore, the perception of polarization could discourage agreements and compromises between parties.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe partisan divide in Spain is largely rooted in disagreements over facts, resulting in tribes that inhabit distinct cognitive realities.
“The partisan divide in our country is, to a large extent, rooted in disagreements over facts, resulting in tribes that inhabit distinct cognitive realities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The sample is representative of the Spanish population, so findings generalize to Spaniards.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenThe perception calculations are based on interviewees' self-reported positions.
“the perception calculations are based on the interviewees' self-reported positions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningAccentuating differences and simplification are recurrent tools among political elites, especially during election campaigns.
“Accentuating differences and simplification are recurrent tools among political elites, especially during election campaigns, to make it easier for voters to better distinguish the partisan supply and to make a more direct choice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe media participates in exacerbated rhetoric that presents a more desolate panorama than really exists.
“The media also participates in the exacerbated rhetoric that presents us with a far more desolate panorama than really exists, since it is evident that conflict and tension capture attention better than agreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe perception gap on levels of systemic ideological polarization is between 16 and 17 points higher between PP and Vox voters and between 23 and 28 percentage points between PSOE and UP voters.
“Crespo et al. (2021b:83) show that the perception gap on levels of systemic ideological polarization is between 16 and 17 points higher between the Partido Popular (PP) party (center-right, conservative) and Vox party (radical-right) voters and between 23 and 28 percentage points between the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) party (centerleft, social democratic) and Unidas Podemos (UP) part”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Crespo et al. (2021b)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe study does not consider meta-perceptions.
“the study does not consider meta-perceptions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEmphasizing what unites us or showing that it is not so much what differentiates us contributes to reducing affective hostilities.
“Emphasizing what unites us or showing that it is not so much what differentiates us contributes to reducing affective hostilities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The sample is representative of the Spanish population, so findings generalize to Spaniards.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFalse polarization allows us to keep alive partisan links, mobilize the electorate, and avoid vote conversion processes.
“False polarization allows us to keep alive partisan links, mobilize the electorate, and avoid vote conversion processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Study design and conductnone givenMembers of a group may be influenced by social desirability biases that lead them to place themselves in less extreme positions.
“Members of a group, in expressing what they think, may be influenced by social desirability biases that lead them to place themselves in less extreme positions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningIdentity may mediate and amplify misperceptions.
“We recognize that identity may mediate and amplify misperceptions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningMisperceptions about what rivals think can be explained by three cognitive mechanisms: accentuation of intergroup differences, naïve realism, and use of stereotypes.
“Misperceptions about what our rivals think can be explained by three important cognitive mechanisms: the tendency to accentuate intergroup differences to reinforce ingroup status and the sense of belonging; naïve realism”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
Partisanship acts as a powerful social identity.
“If we assume that partisanship acts as a powerful social identity, we should pay attention to how categorization and intergroup comparison processes affect the way we perceive the world.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.
“Although our perception of the degree of differentiation is usually biased and responds to the need to consolidate group boundaries, human beings are convinced the world is as they think it is.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Perceived polarization causally drives affective polarization rather than the reverse.
“perceived polarization in the system exacerbates polarization in the individual”
The paper relies on this without support.
The sample is representative of the Spanish population, so findings generalize to Spaniards.
“This article has shown the extent to which Spaniards exaggerate their ideological differences and perceive an unreal polarization in the political system.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
False-polarization effect confuses standardized and unstandardized coefficients
MinorA one-unit change in the predictor corresponds to the unstandardized coefficient, 0.588, not the standardized coefficient, 0.077. The stated expected change therefore contradicts Table 8.
“Assuming a one-unit change in the level of false polarization, a .077increase in individual affective polarization would be expected.”
“| False polarization | .770*** | .102*** | .588*** | .077*** |”
Actual polarization uses a different Vox position from Table 1
MinorTable 1 reports Vox's actual ideological position as 7.21, but its calculation of actual party-system polarization uses 7.12. Using the reported Vox and UP positions gives (7.21 − 2.70)/9 ≈ 0.50, rather than the reported 0.49.
“| Party system polarization (actual) | ABS(7.12-2.70)/9 = 0.49 |”
“| Actual ideological position Vox | 134 | 1 | 10 | 7.21 1.93 |”
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Flagged first, then by citations
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Research works printed but not linked: 6
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- Authors
- Rojo-Martínez, J. M.
- Venue
- Papers. Revista de Sociologia
- Publisher
- Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
- Published
- 2025-07-07
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- e3363
- ISSN
- 0210-2862 (ISSN-L)
- 2013-9004
- OpenAlex
- W4412090455
- Semantic Scholar
- 4f3f150d95e94feba68bac49e8d77406e9dc77ce
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 61
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- es
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Papers Revista de Sociologia (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- RACO (Revistes Catalanes amb Accés Obert) (Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- Fundación Séneca (21876/PI/22)
- Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (FPU20/01033)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- affective polarization, perceived polarization, ideological polarization, party identification, group identity, Spanish party system, political attitudes
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-13.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-13.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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