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The Logic of Political Survival
Abstract
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
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“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that public spending can be used to 'buy' allegiance and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to the ruling elite.”
From The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war (2015) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
In the citing paper
“In democratic countries, politicians ' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In autocratic countries, by contrast, political leaders ' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalitions have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
In the citing paper
“Bueno de Mesquita et al . (2003) demonstrate that autocrats ' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition -the segment of the population that supports the leader -relative to the size of the selectorate”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
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“The data on a country’s accountability stem from Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2004) ‘W/S’ measure, that is, the ratio of the size of a country’s winning coalition (W ) to its selectorate (S). Further, the data on election dates are taken from Goemans’s extension of the Archigos data (see Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza, 2…”
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“If the reverse inequality holds in (7), then, for st < s N both (η1t, η2t) = (0, 1) and (η1t, η2t) = (1, 0) are mutually optimal replies.”
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“See (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) decentralization policies.”
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“Some scholars argue that the ruler’s incapacity to distribute benefits induces splits within the ruling elite, leading to regime collapse (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
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“Some scholars suggest that one of the ways of addressing the potential multicollinearity problem between democracy and a conceptually related variable is to residualize democracy (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
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“In that matter they refer to precursors of their own model by: Roemer (1985), Grossman (1991, 1994), Wintrobe (1998) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) .”
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Self-citationJohns, L. (2006) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705284825 · Cited by 32
“Vot-ers then make retention decisions based on the distribution of such goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
Islamic Politics, Muslim States, and Counterterrorism Tensions
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“The coalition whose support is needed to ensure political survival varies, however, between democracies and autocracies in ways that shape political incentives (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2003-08-28
- Volume
- 1
- OpenAlex
- W1535643370
- Cited by
- 4,217
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 147 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 169 · 2022: 257 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 262 · 2019: 312 · 2018: 234 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 253 · 2015: 268 · 2014: 237 · 2013: 243 · 2012: 218
- FWCI
- 70.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Keywords
- political survival, leadership selection, political institutions, resource allocation, public policy incentives, war and politics, economic development, political economy
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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