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The Logic of Political Survival
Abstract
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
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“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that public spending can be used to 'buy' allegiance and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to the ruling elite.”
From The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war (2015) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
In the citing paper
“In democratic countries, politicians ' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In autocratic countries, by contrast, political leaders ' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalitions have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
In the citing paper
“Bueno de Mesquita et al . (2003) demonstrate that autocrats ' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition -the segment of the population that supports the leader -relative to the size of the selectorate”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
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Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12175 · Cited by 74
The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad
Sobek, D., Abouharb, M. R., & Ingram, C. G. (2006) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00442.x · Cited by 75
“Recent work finds that the constraints facing democratic leaders depend on the size of the winning coalition (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1999; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundThe Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid
Kono, D. Y., & Montinola, G. R. (2012) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912912456097 · Cited by 75
Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation
Kimball, A. L. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310368346 · Cited by 73
“Increasing demands for N may also cause a leader to substitute between arms and alliances (Diehl, 1994; Morrow, 1993; Most & Siverson, 1987; Most & Starr, 1989). 16 Contracts delineate the expectations of the partners (Goldberg, 1980) similar to Lake’s (1999) concepts of relational contracting and joint production eco…”
BackgroundLegitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy
Lake, D. A. (2013) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00139 · Cited by 78
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Menaldo, V. (2016) · Cited by 75
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Li, X., & Chen, D. (2020) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894220906374 · Cited by 75
“…to the lack of electoral accountability; instead, they may pay more attention to the views of members in the selectorate—“the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 42).”
BackgroundAuthoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico
Albertus, M., Díaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., & Weingast, B. R. V. (2015) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.08.013 · Cited by 81
“the military in a way that causes budget deficits and reduces future revenue (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003); and impose financial market regulations that prevent these markets from financing enterprise creation (Rajan and Zingales 2003). We address this puzzle in the context of a specific, historically prominent inst…”
Democracy and economic growth: A survey of arguments and results
Knutsen, C. H. (2012) · International Area Studies Review · doi:10.1177/2233865912455268 · Cited by 86
“My evaluation is partly based on the strong arguments proposed by, among others, North (1990), Olson (1993) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) on the incentives for dictators to grab property to their own or their supporters’ advantage, and the statistical evidence pointing to a positive effect of…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPopular support for an undemocratic regime: the changing views of Russians
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-4117 · Cited by 75
Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs
Bas, M. A., & Stone, R. W. (2013) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-013-9173-1 · Cited by 74
The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance
Dai, X. (2006) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002706291048 · Cited by 72
Risky but Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble
Goemans, H. E., & Fey, M. (2009) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608090038 · Cited by 72
“(1993), Downs and Rocke (1994), Hess and Orphanides (1995), Smith (1996), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) and Tarar (2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialDo Selection Rules Affect Leader Responsiveness? Evidence from Rural Uganda
Grossman, G. (2014) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00013012 · Cited by 58
Unravelling democratic erosion: who drives the slow death of democracy, and how?
Kneuer, M. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.1925650 · Cited by 76
Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution
Morrow, J. D. (2014) · Cited by 70
Self-citationThe Primacy of the Local: Identifying Terrorist Hot Spots Using Geographic Information Systems
Nemeth, S., Mauslein, J. A., & Stapley, C. S. (2014) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381613001333 · Cited by 77
“This logic is adapted from Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate theory.”
MethodDynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014
Baturo, A., & Elkink, J. A. (2016) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.2015.1032532 · Cited by 73
“Access to rents through control of economic resources induces a strong norm of loyalty to the incumbent leader because such rents can be used as private rewards for coalition members (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 65– 68, 182).”
BackgroundInfluentialBailer, S., & Weiler, F. (2014) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-014-9198-0 · Cited by 77
“Therefore, we expect the selectorate, defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) as the fraction of society that is allowed to choose its leaders, to increasingly favor policies thattackle climate change the more inclusive the composition of the selectorate is.”
BackgroundCao, X., & Ward, H. (2015) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12163 · Cited by 64
“According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), the values of W, S, and the “loyalty ratio” W/S tend to vary between systems: In democracies, both W and S are large; among autocracies, single-party systems have small W, but may have relatively large S; monarchies and military regimes often have small…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe return of the prodigy son: Do return migrants make better leaders?
Mercier, M. (2016) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.04.005 · Cited by 73
Foreign Direct Investment and Authoritarian Stability
Bak, D., & Moon, C. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414016655536 · Cited by 76
Peace agreements without commitment
Beviá, C., & Corchón, L. C. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.012 · Cited by 68
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States
McGillivray, F., & Smith, A. M. (2004) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818304583054 · Cited by 73
Self-citationDivergent Incentives for Dictators
Conrad, C. R. (2012) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712459707 · Cited by 71
“…violation with a corresponding international treaty—the CAT—prohibiting its domestic use.9 A dictator’s primary goal is to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).10 Threats to dictatorial rule are frequent and can come from within the ruling elite or from opposition movements within…”
Backgroundde Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. M. (2015) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715603100 · Cited by 74
“Previous selectorate models have examined normal political transitions as well as revolutionary threats (B. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; B. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010, 2009; Smith 2008).”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationDoes Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative LadderPreprint
Landry, P. F., Lü, X., & Duan, H. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2452482 · Cited by 73
Natural disasters and clientelism: The case of floods and landslides in Colombia
Gallego, J. (2018) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.001 · Cited by 80
“Selectorate theory of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)) suggests that the sizes of the winning coalition (the set of essential supporters without whose support a leader would lose power) and the selectorate (the set of people from which the winning coalition is formed) determine…”
BackgroundColaresi, M. P., & Carey, S. C. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002707310427 · Cited by 73
Lake, D. A., & Fariss, C. J. (2014) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12066 · Cited by 72
“Political institutions, in turn, condition the nature of this coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundExogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War
Savun, B., & Tirone, D. C. (2012) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818312000136 · Cited by 67
In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court
Appel, B. J. (2016) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002716639101 · Cited by 73
“A large body of evidence establishes that leaders prioritize their tenure in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001).”
BackgroundCollective Remittances and the State: The 3×1 Program in Mexican Municipalities
Aparicio, F. J., & Meseguer, C. (2011) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.016 · Cited by 73
Major, S., & McGann, A. J. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705276568 · Cited by 72
Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: The Case of the Hirak Movement
Yom, S. L. (2014) · The Middle East Journal · doi:10.3751/68.2.13 · Cited by 71
Diffusion or Confusion? Clustered Shocks and the Conditional Diffusion of Democracy
Houle, C., Kayser, M. A. L. A. D., & Xiang, J. (2016) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s002081831600028x · Cited by 71
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.”
IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
Casper, B. A. (2015) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715600759 · Cited by 71
“Notice here that I refrain from using the size of a country’s winning coalition for the interaction term because the Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) measure is extremely noisy.”
BackgroundInfluentialGetting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations
Nincic, M. (2010) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00006 · Cited by 71
Examining leaders’ orientations to structural constraints: Turkey’s 1991 and 2003 Iraq war decisions
Çuhadar, E., Kaarbo, J., Kesgin, B., & Özkeçeci‐Taner, B. (2015) · Journal of International Relations and Development · doi:10.1057/jird.2014.31 · Cited by 68
“…context of structural constraints and the characteristics of leaders has been recognised (e.g. Giddens 1984; Dessler 1989; Carlsnaes 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2011), research is still largely silent on the question of how structural constraints are shaped and…”
BackgroundThe Violent Consequences of the Nation
Schrock-Jacobson, G. U. (2012) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712438354 · Cited by 70
“They tend to initiate wars that they think their armies can win quickly with minimal casualties to avoid public backlash and ensure their political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Reiter and Stam 2002).”
BackgroundDiversionary conflict: Demonizing enemies or demonstrating competence?
Haynes, K. (2015) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894215593723 · Cited by 70
“According to the gambling logic, conversely, leaders are essentially agents that must demonstrate competence to their poorly informed principals, the general public or winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundDemocracy, Authoritarianism, and Policy Punctuations
Jones, B. D., Epp, D. A., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2019) · International Review of Public Policy · doi:10.4000/irpp.318 · Cited by 72
Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link
Kimball, A. L. (2006) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343306064816 · Cited by 68
Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition
Genschel, P., Lierse, H., & Seelkopf, L. (2016) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995 · Cited by 70
“Others claim that intermediate regimes are more conducive to predatory government than pure autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 68; Zakaria, 2003, p. 15).”
BackgroundMass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies
Girod, D. M., Stewart, M. A., & Walters, M. R. (2016) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894216651826 · Cited by 71
Geddes, B. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.003.0014 · Cited by 71
The ruler’s game of musical chairs: Shuffling during the reign of Ethiopia’s last emperor
Woldense, J. (2017) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2017.07.002 · Cited by 69
A question of trust: military defection during regime crises in Benin and Togo
Morency-Laflamme, J. (2017) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2017.1375474 · Cited by 73
Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power1
Ramsay, K. W. (2011) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00687.x · Cited by 74
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Goldring, E., & Matthews, A. S. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123421000569 · Cited by 73
“However, despite some initial assumptions to the contrary (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), recent work has shown that individual elites are not interchangeable (Bokobza et al. forthcoming).”
ResultMeasuring change in source of leader support
Mattes, M., Leeds, B. A., & Matsumura, N. (2016) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343315625760 · Cited by 69
“In Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) terminology, this set of actors is the leader’s ‘winning coalition’.”
BackgroundThe Dictator's Digital Toolkit: Explaining Variation in Internet Filtering in Authoritarian Regimes
Hellmeier, S. (2016) · Politics & Policy · doi:10.1111/polp.12189 · Cited by 69
Linzer, D. A., & Staton, J. K. (2012) · Cited by 65
A dynamic theory of the transition to democracy
Zak, P. J., & Feng, Y. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00018-0 · Cited by 69
Agoba, A., Abor, J., Osei, K., & Sa-Aadu, J. (2020) · Journal of African Business · doi:10.1080/15228916.2019.1584263 · Cited by 73
The Dynamics of Reciprocity, Accountability, and Credibility
Brandt, P. T., Colaresi, M. P., & Freeman, J. R. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708314221 · Cited by 66
“Putnam (1988), Fearon (1994, 1998), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) view world politics as a two-level game where elites sit at the insticese of foreign and domestic politics.”
BackgroundPolitical Corruption and Institutional Stability
Fjelde, H., & Hegre, H. (2014) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-014-9155-1 · Cited by 69
“In a similar approach as ours, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p. 203-04) treat pervasive corruption as indicative of a distributive regime wherein leaders buy their continuation in office through the provision of private rather than public goods.(6) These two processes of political corruption – one for enrichment, th…”
BackgroundInfluentialMultilateralism and Democracy: A Dissent Regarding Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik
Gartzke, E. A., & Naoi, M. (2011) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818311000142 · Cited by 66
Who Defects? Unpacking a Defection Cascade from Russia's Dominant Party 2008–12
Hale, H., & Colton, T. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000642 · Cited by 43
How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2018) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 67
The corruption and income inequality puzzle: Does political power distribution matter?
Keneck-Massil, J., Nomo-Beyala, C., & Owoundi, F. (2021) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105610 · Cited by 61
Political Institutions, Credible Commitment, and Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies
Breen, M., & McMenamin, I. (2013) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12079 · Cited by 66
“We seek to identify the central tendency of the set of 43 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 87; Olson 2000, 3-6; Olson 1982.”
BackgroundIncome inequality and the tax structure: Evidence from developed and developing countries
Adam, A., Kammas, P., & Λαπατίνας, Α. (2014) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2014.05.006 · Cited by 70
“…are various constraints that increase the leader’s accountability even in the absence of elections (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Padro-i-Miguel, 2007; Besley and Kundamatsu, 2008).8 Thus, even in non-democracies the leader will cater for the wishes of the…”
BackgroundInfluentialDemocracy and Trade Discrimination
Kono, D. Y. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608080985 · Cited by 61
“Milner and Kubota argue that democratization changes the composition of the ‘‘selectorate’’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), i.e., the set of people empowered to choose leaders. According to them, ‘‘In many autocracies, this selectorate consists of . . . those who own the most capital’’ (116). Democratization, however…”
BackgroundTransboundary air pollution from coal-fired power generation
Du, X., Jin, X., Zucker, N., et al. (2020) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.110862 · Cited by 67
Whitfield, L., & Therkildsen, O. (2011) · Econstor (Econstor) · Cited by 66
Fordham, B. O., & Asal, V. H. (2007) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00438.x · Cited by 70
Blood in the Village: A Local-Level Investigation of State Massacres
Sullivan, C. M. (2012) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894212449087 · Cited by 65
“The challenges of domestic government produce numerous strategic incentives for states, including, but not limited to, military conquest, population control, wealth extraction, and the provision of public goods such as political order (Tilly, 1993; Olsen, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundBroich, T. (2017) · China Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2017.09.006 · Cited by 66
von Stein, J. (2020) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s000712342000054x · Cited by 72
“A second variant comes from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), who assume that policy choices under all government types aim to promote the interests of elite groups.”
BackgroundKnutsen, C. H. (2015) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/kykl.12087 · Cited by 67
Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Autocratic Survival
Bader, J., & Faust, J. (2014) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/misr.12158 · Cited by 74
The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives?
Pereira, C., Melo, M. A., & Figueiredo, C. M. (2008) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912908320664 · Cited by 66
“Persson and Tabellini (2000), as well as Ferraz and Finan’s (2007a) model, predict that when races are close, the higher share of pivotal voters induces politicians to reduce rent extraction to guarantee reelection for a second term (also see Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialElectoral Democracy and Human DevelopmentPreprint
Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Skaaning, S., Teorell, J., Coppedge, M., Lindberg, S. I., & Maguire, M. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2652180 · Cited by 66
Fashions and Fads in Finance: The Political Foundations of Sovereign Wealth Fund Creation
Chwieroth, J. M. (2014) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12140 · Cited by 64
The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence
Besley, T. J., & Reynal‐Querol, M. (2017) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-017-9140-4 · Cited by 62
“The term selectorate, coined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) could represent a variety of institutional settings.”
Interests, ideas, and the study of state behaviour in neoclassical realism
Meibauer, G. (2019) · Review of International Studies · doi:10.1017/s0260210519000214 · Cited by 73
DEMOCRACY AND DE FACTO EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
Bearce, D. H., & Hallerberg, M. (2011) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00381.x · Cited by 65
“Democracies have larger ‘‘selectorates’’ and ‘‘winning coalitions’’ than autocracies, which makes private good provision an inefficient means for the former to remain in political power, although it may work well r 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd for the latter (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundBesley, T. J., & Kudamatsu, M. (2008) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv21hrgnz.15 · Cited by 132
“The second perspective is taken in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002, 2003) who are the rst to model accountability in a framework applicable to non-democratic government.”
BackgroundPolitical Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions
Allen, S. H. (2008) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00069.x · Cited by 63
“With a small winning coalition, the influence of each individual is great, so the rewards must be large enough to guarantee continued loyalty (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundTerrorism and the Fate of Dictators
Aksoy, D., Carter, D. B., & Wright, J. (2015) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887115000118 · Cited by 68
Wagner, W. (2017) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.12572 · Cited by 65
How Governments Shape the Risk of Civil Violence: India's Federal Reorganization, 1950–56
Lacina, B. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12074 · Cited by 62
“10See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005); Chandra (2004); Cox (1999); Dixit and Londregan (1996); Horowitz (1985); Lijphart (1977); Posner (2005); and Wilkinson (2004).”
BackgroundThe Logic of Public Fear in Terrorism and Counter-terrorism
Braithwaite, A. (2013) · Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology · doi:10.1007/s11896-013-9126-x · Cited by 75
Global Governance, Poverty and Inequality
Wilkinson, R. (2010) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203852132 · Cited by 64
The determinants of democracy: a sensitivity analysis
Rød, E. G., Knutsen, C. H., & Hegre, H. (2019) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-019-00742-z · Cited by 67
Democracy, Development, and Career Trajectories of Former Political Leaders
Baturo, A. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414016666835 · Cited by 65
Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index: Country Scores and Rankings
Randolph, S., Fukuda‐Parr, S., & Lawson-Remer, T. (2010) · Journal of Human Rights · doi:10.1080/14754835.2010.501257 · Cited by 64
“Second, there exists an uneasy consensus in the literature that in the face of per capita income growth, institutions evolve producing democracies with better public policy (see, for example, Acemoglu et al. 2008 and Bueno de Mesquita et al.”
Finding the Golden Mean: Country Size and the Performance of National Bureaucracies
Jugl, M. (2018) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muy044 · Cited by 64
Modeling Inefficient Institutions
Acemoğlu, D. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139052269.011 · Cited by 64
Bräuninger, T., & Debus, M. (2008) · Politische Vierteljahresschrift · doi:10.1007/s11615-008-0101-6 · Cited by 64
Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property RightsPreprint
Сонин, К. И., & Guriev, S. M. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 61
The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes
ALLEE, T. L., & Huth, P. K. (2006) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1080/07388940600972644 · Cited by 63
“…we believe our model and empirical findings converge nicely with certain scholars in the democratic peace literature who have argued that institutional accountability is a strong influence on foreign policy decisionmaking (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Reiter & Stam, 2002; Lipson, 2003).”
ResultRefugee flows and state contributions to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions
Uzonyi, G. (2015) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343315574353 · Cited by 63
“In this manner, multilateral action through the UN can help its members stop the spread of refugees and war (Beardsley, 2011).1 However, a state must be strategic in how it distributes goods (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundTake the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements
Girod, D. M., & Tobin, J. (2016) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818315000326 · Cited by 63
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.”
War Outcomes and Leader Tenure
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“10 Bueno de mesquita et al. 2003.”
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“Sanctions could be more effective against democracies, as the political leaders are accountable to a larger segment of the population (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
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“Low growth in an autocracy may also undermine the support that the incumbent receives from some key constituency, such as the military (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2003-08-28
- Volume
- 1
- OpenAlex
- W1535643370
- Cited by
- 4,217
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 147 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 169 · 2022: 257 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 262 · 2019: 312 · 2018: 234 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 253 · 2015: 268 · 2014: 237 · 2013: 243 · 2012: 218
- FWCI
- 70.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Keywords
- political survival, leadership selection, political institutions, resource allocation, public policy incentives, war and politics, economic development, political economy
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