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The Logic of Political Survival
Abstract
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
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“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that public spending can be used to 'buy' allegiance and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to the ruling elite.”
From The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war (2015) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
In the citing paper
“In democratic countries, politicians ' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In autocratic countries, by contrast, political leaders ' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalitions have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
In the citing paper
“Bueno de Mesquita et al . (2003) demonstrate that autocrats ' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition -the segment of the population that supports the leader -relative to the size of the selectorate”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
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Items 101–200 of 1,004
Democracy prevention: The international collaboration of authoritarian regimes
von Soest, C. (2015) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12100 · Cited by 301
Blaydes, L., & Chaney, É. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000561 · Cited by 273
“Duration of individual rule in the modern period has long been the subject of empirical study in political science (Bienen and van de Walle 1991; Blondel 1980; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).”
BackgroundLeadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know About It
Ahlquist, J. S., & Levi, M. (2011) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-042409-152654 · Cited by 279
“At one level, much of political science is about how people select, remove, and hold accountable those empowered to make important decisions (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Przeworski et al. 1999).”
BackgroundDenny, E. K., & Walter, B. F. (2014) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343313512853 · Cited by 296
“According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) rebel leaders face a time inconsistency problem when seeking supporters.”
BackgroundPublic good provision under dictatorship and democracy
Deacon, R. T. T. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9391-x · Cited by 272
“Lake and Baum (2001) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) present empirical evidence supporting this prediction for public education (literacy rates, enrollment rates, persistence to grade level) and public health (immunization rates, access to clean water, infant mortality rates).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialRegularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian RegimePreprint
Lorentzen, P. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.995330 · Cited by 270
Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers1
Escribà‐Folch, A., & Wright, J. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00590.x · Cited by 281
Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006
Teorell, J. (2010) · Cited by 273
International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still "Ex Post" Inefficient?
Chiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E. (2004) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00090.x · Cited by 323
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2001) rely on a similar specification.”
BackgroundInfluentialBono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics
Busby, J. W. (2007) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00451.x · Cited by 273
Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy
Peksen, D., & Drury, A. C. (2010) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2010.502436 · Cited by 272
“…repressive regime is the cooperation from powerful political groups (e.g., military and police forces, influential business groups) (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Wintrobe 1998), the growing dependence of influential groups on the leadership’s supply of scarce resources enhances the…”
BackgroundFrantz, E., & Kendall-Taylor, A. (2014) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343313519808 · Cited by 266
“In the tests that follow, we evaluate the effect of cooptation on future (as opposed to contemporaneous) levels of repression because research has indicated that changes in institutions of governance often take a few years to impact policy outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundLegitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
ALLEE, T. L., & Huth, P. K. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062125 · Cited by 264
Lake, D. A. (2013) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/1354066113494330 · Cited by 275
“…1995).13 Drawing on the same theories, democracies were also found to provide higher levels of public goods for their citizens (Lake and Baum, 2001), enjoy higher rates of economic growth (Baum and Lake, 2003), and act in a variety of other distinctive ways (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundKoch, M. T., & Fulton, S. A. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000824 · Cited by 261
“A central premise of this work is that elected officials have an incentive to be faithful to the policy preferences of their constituencies through the reelection incentive (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundResultHegre, H. (2014) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343313512852 · Cited by 297
Does China's National People's Congress Matter? The Returns to Office in a 'Rubber Stamp' Parliament
Truex, R. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000112 · Cited by 244
“…authoritarian politics assume that parliaments allow for the distribution of rents to actors critical to regime stability (Boix and Svolik 2013; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2008; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Svolik 2009, 2012).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialHow Is Power Shared in Africa?
François, P., Rainer, I., & Trebbi, F. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11237 · Cited by 260
How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders
Horowitz, M. C., & Stam, A. C. (2014) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818314000046 · Cited by 272
“See Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; and Chiozza and Goemans 2003 and 2004.”
BackgroundThe Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment
Croco, S. E. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000219 · Cited by 251
“For them, first leaders are more likely than replacements to remain in a conflict because they are more prone to a variety of informational biases pivotal member of his or her winning coalition to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003a; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).”
BackgroundMethodTransparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability
Hollyer, J. R., Rosendorff, B. P., & Vreeland, J. R. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000428 · Cited by 244
“19 In all specifications involving incidents of mass mobilization and unrest, we draw our outcome variables from the Cross National Time Series Archive (Banks, 1979), as made available by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). These data consist of counts of the number of anti-government demonstrations, strikes, riots, guer…”
MethodDoes democracy produce quality of government?
Charron, N., & Lapuente, V. (2010) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01906.x · Cited by 253
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
Casper, B., & Tyson, S. A. (2014) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381613001485 · Cited by 227
Lai, B. H., & Slater, D. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x · Cited by 249
“…process for removing a government from power, forcing decision makers to analyze how their actions are likely to affect their tenure, leading to a significantly decreased likelihood of conflict between democracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gaubatz 1991).”
BackgroundResultHereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies
Brownlee, J. M. (2007) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2008.0002 · Cited by 258
Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War
Berger, D., Easterly, W. R., Nunn, N., & Satyanath, S. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.2.863 · Cited by 250
de Mesquita, B. B., & Downs, G. W. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060206 · Cited by 250
Self-citationElections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes
Miller, M. K. (2014) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014555443 · Cited by 248
Measuring High Level Democratic Principles Using the V-Dem Data
Coppedge, M., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S., & Teorell, J. (2015) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512115622046 · Cited by 302
“…in the causal relationship between democracy and, say, civil liberties (e.g., Møller and Skaaning, 2013), equality (e.g., Boix, 2003), or public goods (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), one should carefully distinguish these features from each other in conceptualization and measurement.”
Emergency deployment of direct air capture as a response to the climate crisis
Hanna, R., Abdulla, A., Xu, Y., & Victor, D. G. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-20437-0 · Cited by 248
Formal institutions and subjective well-being: Revisiting the cross-country evidence
Bjørnskov, C., Dreher, A., & Fischer, J. A. V. (2010) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.03.001 · Cited by 244
Anderson, B., Böhmelt, T., & Ward, H. (2017) · Environmental Research Letters · doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa8f80 · Cited by 245
The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending
Nooruddin, I., & Simmons, J. W. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060334 · Cited by 239
Paler, L. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000415 · Cited by 240
THE LOGIC OF AUTHORITARIAN BARGAINS
Desai, R. M., Olofsgård, A., & Yousef, T. M. (2008) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00337.x · Cited by 240
Smith, A. M. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608080754 · Cited by 229
“Since prior to revelation, all affinity orderings are 4Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002, 2003) examine optimal coalition choice.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationThe Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions
Allen, S. H. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708325044 · Cited by 236
Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change
de Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. M. (2008) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414008323330 · Cited by 240
“position in the ordering, as assumed in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) .”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationFormal Models of Nondemocratic Politics
Gehlbach, S. G., Сонин, К. И., & Svolik, M. W. (2016) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-042114-014927 · Cited by 226
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) explore the implications of such variation in WS across political systems—and especially across various types of nondemocracies—for their stability, quality of governance, provision of public versus private goods, and participation in international conflict.7 As they demonstrate, leader…”
InfluentialIdentity, procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule
von Soest, C., & Grauvogel, J. (2017) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2017.1304319 · Cited by 257
Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies
Hicken, A. D. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511575563 · Cited by 234
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY
Robinson, J. A. (2006) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.092704.171256 · Cited by 237
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) present a theory of democratization that combines elements of both of these approaches.”
Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict
Tir, J. (2010) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381609990879 · Cited by 228
“Becoming embroiled in protracted, escalating, stalemated, costly, or losing conflicts is likely to hurt the leader’s popularity (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundClientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections
Vicente, P. C., & Wantchekon, L. (2009) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grp018 · Cited by 226
“A major dilemma in democratic policy-making is that bad policies can be good politics and good policies can be bad politics (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003).”
BackgroundThe Politics of Effective Foreign Aid
Wright, J., & Winters, M. S. (2010) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.032708.143524 · Cited by 231
“…constructed many theories to suggest when and why politicians spend on programs that are more likely to reach larger segments of society (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and promote growth (e.g., Stasavage 2005 and Hicken & Simmons 2008) and not simply result in inefficient patronage spending (…”
BackgroundJackson, M. O., & Morelli, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1353 · Cited by 221
Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies
Somer, M., McCoy, J. L., & Luke, R. E. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1865316 · Cited by 220
“Fairer Sex” or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender, and Institutional Context
Esarey, J., & Chirillo, G. (2013) · Politics & Gender · doi:10.1017/s1743923x13000378 · Cited by 217
“This makes efficient governance and provision of public goods a more effective means of winning the necessary number of supporters to gain office than patronage and corruption (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Routledge Handbook of Security Studies
(2009) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203866764 · Cited by 219
Ali, S., Yusop, Z., Kaliappan, S. R., & Chin, L. (2020) · Environmental Science and Pollution Research · doi:10.1007/s11356-020-07768-7 · Cited by 225
Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic ChangePreprint
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.894211 · Cited by 218
Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea
Byman, D., & Lind, J. M. (2010) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00002 · Cited by 223
Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State Repression
Ritter, E. H. (2013) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712468724 · Cited by 214
“, Fein (1995), Gartner and Regan (1996), Poe, Tate and Keith (1999), Regan and Henderson (2002), Davenport and Armstrong (2004), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), Davenport (2007b), Cingranelli and Filippov (2010).”
BackgroundInfluentialDemocracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly
Carter, D. B., & Stone, R. W. (2014) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818314000186 · Cited by 215
Hollyer, J. R., Rosendorff, B. P., & Vreeland, J. R. (2014) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpu001 · Cited by 232
“2Notable exceptions include Islam (2006), who focuses on the speed with which data are reported; Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Rosendorff and Vreeland (2006), Lebovic (2006), and Williams (2009), who examine aspects of data dissemination; and Stone (2008), who treats data dissemination as a…”
Arregle, J., Miller, T. L., Hitt, M. A., & Beamish, P. W. (2013) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2051 · Cited by 214
Delivering Stability—Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000–1800
Kokkonen, A., & Sundell, A. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541400015x · Cited by 214
“The internal threats can be divided into two categories: those from within the ruling elite, and those from the masses (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict
Wolford, S. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00280.x · Cited by 211
Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments
Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x · Cited by 210
Globalization, Democracy, and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World
Rudra, N., & Haggard, S. M. (2005) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414005279258 · Cited by 209
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) assume that all leaders secure support through the provision of a mix of private and public goods.”
BackgroundState Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights
Englehart, N. A. (2009) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343308100713 · Cited by 221
Gehlbach, S. G., & Keefer, P. E. (2012) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611001952 · Cited by 215
Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War1
Grieco, J. M., Gelpi, C. F., Reifler, J., & Feaver, P. D. (2011) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00660.x · Cited by 205
Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform in China
Lü, X. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000124 · Cited by 200
“1 See for example the theoretical frameworks in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Boix (2003), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), and Wintrobe (1998).”
BackgroundSvolik, M. W. (2012) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712449327 · Cited by 201
“Meanwhile, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Besley and Kudamatsu (2007), and Guriev and Sonin (2009) build models of accountability between a dictator and his selectorate and draw implications for economic performance and leadership turnover in authoritarian regimes.”
BackgroundPoliticians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India
Gulzar, S., & Pasquale, B. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000502 · Cited by 203
A theory of informational autocracy
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104158 · Cited by 205
Human Rights and Structural Adjustment
Abouharb, M. R., & Cingranelli, D. L. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511551055 · Cited by 216
Monteiro, N. P. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107449350 · Cited by 214
Climate shocks and political violence
Salehyan, I., & Hendrix, C. S. (2014) · Global Environmental Change · doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.007 · Cited by 212
Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival
Wallace, J. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381613000340 · Cited by 195
“‘‘Selectorates’’ for Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and those ‘‘able to impose costs on the regime’’ for Fearon (2000) or Oi and Zhao (2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialDomestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict
Colgan, J. D. (2013) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s004388711300021x · Cited by 195
“88 mansfield and snyder 2005; Bueno de mesquita et al. 2004; Weeks 2008.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World
Bermeo, S. B. (2017) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818317000315 · Cited by 197
The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation
Dewan, T., & Myatt, D. P. (2008) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055408080234 · Cited by 194
“In the context of party leaders, we have learned how leaders manipulate the agenda (Riker 1996), serve as agents of their parties (Fiorina and Shepsle 1989), and choose policies that enhance their survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundClimate variability, economic growth, and civil conflict
Koubi, V., Bernauer, T., Kalbhenn, A., & Spilker, G. (2012) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343311427173 · Cited by 192
“In addition, since democratic political leaders are responsive to a larger winning coalition and lack sufficient resources to reward their comparatively large group of supporters with private goods, they have to resort to the provision of public goods – including economic prosperity – to ensure political support and,…”
Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration
Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Pevehouse, J. C. W. (2008) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01082.x · Cited by 189
“Theory and empirical research have shown that democracies tend to choose more efficient economic policies than other regimes (e.g. Wittman, 1989, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Milner with Kubota, 2005).”
BackgroundInfluentialUnrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful
Monteiro, N. P. (2011) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00064 · Cited by 194
Pickering, J., & Peceny, M. (2006) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00413.x · Cited by 183
Does foreign aid harm political institutions?
Jones, S., & Tarp, F. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.004 · Cited by 188
“Such a view is explicitly found in the selectorate theory of politics due to de Mesquita et al. (2003), also echoed elsewhere (e.g., Morrison, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008; de Mesquita and Smith, 2013).”
BackgroundThe Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design
Koremenos, B. (2016) · Cited by 189
Robustness Tests for Quantitative Research
Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108233590 · Cited by 198
Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico
Díaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., & Ruiz-Euler, A. (2013) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.008 · Cited by 195
International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?
DeMeritt, J. H. R. (2012) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2012.726180 · Cited by 186
“To capture this mediating influence, I weight foreign aid per capita by the size of the winning coalition (W), drawing winning coalition data from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).”
BackgroundThe Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party
Trager, R., & Vavreck, L. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x · Cited by 178
“…and crisis decision making include Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009), Tomz (2007), Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 2004), Schultz (2005), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2003), Mueller (1973), DeNardo (1995), Stam (1999), Berinsky (2009), Holsti (2004), James and Oneal (1991), Jentlesen (1992),…”
BackgroundBader, J., Grävingholt, J., & Kästner, A. (2010) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569771003593904 · Cited by 183
“…on foreign policy considerations of autocratic vs. democratic leaders have so far mainly concentrated on issues of war (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, pp. 243–248) and trade (Frieden and Lake 2000, Milner and Kubota 2005), while preferences for regime types have not yet been a…”
BackgroundInfluentialTerrorism in the Context of Civil War
Stanton, J. A. (2013) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381613000984 · Cited by 187
“…autocratic leaders do have political constituencies whose support they must maintain to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Weeks 2008), in comparison to democracies, autocratic governments are less vulnerable to the demands of the domestic public.9…”
BackgroundChiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E. (2003) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002703252975 · Cited by 183
“We should acknowledge, however, that theoretical and empirical work has shown long-term economic performance is endogenous to regime type and that tenure in office is endogenous to economic performance given regime type (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
Ahlborg, H., Boräng, F., Jagers, S. C., et al. (2015) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2015.09.002 · Cited by 182
“…can be expected to work in the interest of the majority (i.e., the rural population) since a larger portion of the citizenry is included in the political process, whereas authoritarian regimes will frequently only see to a narrow elite (Bueno de Mequita et al., 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006).”
BackgroundAutocracies and International Cooperation
Mattes, M., & Rodríguez, M. (2014) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12107 · Cited by 182
Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?
Kono, D. Y., & Montinola, G. R. (2009) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381609090550 · Cited by 180
“…of W here, our empirical analysis controls for the size of S. 706 daniel yuichi kono and gabriella r. montinola of WL adopt a threshold utility that ‘‘[does] not exceed the value of the challenger’s best offer, assuming a normal economy (the shock equals 0)’’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 284).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialTerminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?
Leeds, B. A., & Savun, B. (2007) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00612.x · Cited by 178
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), for instance, argue that leaders choose foreign policies to maximize their probability of staying in power, and that the best policies for staying in power vary with the political institutional structure of states.”
Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs
Slantchev, B. L. (2006) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00409.x · Cited by 178
“Although this is much less sophisticated than the current leading theory of leader survival by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), it can be defended on the grounds that interstate crises (or wars) are events whose outcomes do not really have common or private good attributes.”
BackgroundDemocratization and the Varieties of International Organizations
Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. W. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002707313691 · Cited by 171
Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development
Miller, M. K. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414015582051 · Cited by 185
Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict
Gibler, D. M. (2007) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00462.x · Cited by 181
Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations
Horowitz, M. C., McDermott, R., & Stam, A. C. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705279469 · Cited by 178
Can states buy peace? Social welfare spending and civil conflicts
Taydaş, Z., & Peksen, D. (2012) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343311431286 · Cited by 183
“Under such conditions, the allegiance that the government enjoys will be limited to those who are favored and rewarded by the government thorough provision of private goods, and hence governments will not be able to attract support from a large constituency (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Moreover, the legitimacy of…”
BackgroundInfluentialChaisty, P., Cheeseman, N., & Power, T. J. (2012) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.710604 · Cited by 174
Goemans, H. E. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708323316 · Cited by 175
“To date, the diversionary use of force offers the best-known leader-level explanation for international conflict (Simmel 1898; Levy 1989; Richards et al. 1993; G. Downs and Rocke 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Gelpi 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Mansfield and Snyder 2005).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialResisting infection: How state capacity conditions conflict contagion
Braithwaite, A. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310362164 · Cited by 168
“…of Skocpol’s five components is reflected in the range of recent efforts to characterize this key concept: fair public goods provision (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), the ability to increase the costs associated with challenging the regime (Gates et al., 2006), government revenue and…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2003-08-28
- Volume
- 1
- OpenAlex
- W1535643370
- Cited by
- 4,217
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 147 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 169 · 2022: 257 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 262 · 2019: 312 · 2018: 234 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 253 · 2015: 268 · 2014: 237 · 2013: 243 · 2012: 218
- FWCI
- 70.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Keywords
- political survival, leadership selection, political institutions, resource allocation, public policy incentives, war and politics, economic development, political economy
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