The Logic of Political Survival

“Authoritarian regimes, moreover, are likely respond to the interests of a narrower fraction of their citizens than democratic regimes (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) and, hence, will be more beholden to special interest pressures than a regime whose constituents include laborers and farmers, along…”

“This pattern is consistent with the logic of the selectorate theory as regimes will be more likely to rely on public goods provision as the size of their selectorate and winning coalition increases (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”

“For example, scholars expect that sudden increases in participation, such as those brought about by democratization, will have large effects on government policies, including those governing the redistribution of income (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”

“As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 37) conclude, “leaders who rely on a broad-based coalition to remain in office cannot keep their supporters from defecting to a rival by offering substantial private benefits.””

“All three of these goals can be understood within the framework of the political survival model (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004).”

“In line with prominent general theories of elite motivations in dictatorships (e.g., Svolik 2012; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), we assume that the dictator wants to stay in power, while regime elites primarily want to sustain the privileged position that allows them to peddle influence and…”

“Additionally, Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues (2003 , 2005 ) argued that governments with a larger “selectorate” will be less corrupt.”

“This is similar to the argument underlying the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”

“Examining twentieth-century political patterns in nine of the United States’ largest cities, I find that dominant regimes establish electoral control, then target core supporters and powerful interests at the expense of the larger community.”

“…upsetting the public, but the basic model of decision-making is that the autocrat chooses a policy and that policy is then implemented if the autocrat remains in power (e.g., Boix & Svolik, 2013; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Magaloni, 2008; Truex, 2016).”

“Many writers (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Rousseau, 2005; Reiter and Stam, 2002; myself) regard this conceptualization as the most compelling explanation of the DP.25 By this interpretation what matters is the ‘invention’ of institutions of representative government constrained by free…”

“Various empirical studies have supported the connection (e.g., Mousseau 1998; Russett and Starr 2000; Russett and Oneal 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”

“1986); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (2002). 15 Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, & Bruce Sacerdote, Why Doesn’t the US have a European-Style Welfare State? (Discussion Paper No.”

“Political System: Democracy Many authors (Olson, 1993; McGuire and Olson, 1996; Niskanen, 1997; Lake and Baum, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Deacon, 2005) have argued that non-democratic regimes are likely to underprovide public goods, including environmental quality.”

“Through the distribution of spoils (Magaloni, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005), the CCP has successfully linked the fate and interests of the police chiefs to the longevity of the regime.”

“Poverty and autocracy tend to be the handmaidens of emigration (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 552), but there is enough variation in the population of autocracies to void the issue of endogeneity.”

“First, while it shares an endogenous risk of leader removal with Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Debs and Goemans (2010), and Goemans and Fey (2009), it follows other work by introducing the possibility of future interactions with a successor (Schultz 2005, Smith and Hayes 1997, Wolford 2007).”

“For example, interveners can create puppets by changing the target state’s leader to fulfill their goals and include proxies in the cabinet or government staff in the target state (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”

“Our results complement other prevalent issues of autocratic tenure, including the guardianship dilemma (McMahon and Slantchev 2015; Svolik 2013), power sharing agreements (Svolik 2009; 2012), and satisfying (e.g., bribing) a domestic constituency (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”

“The more centralized the target’s decision-making process is and the more restricted political participation is, the more likely the leader is to survive sanctions by redistributing resources to her domestic ‘base’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”

“For example, consider the strategy of 18 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.”

“For instance, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) show that authoritative governments tend to overlook the corrupt behaviour of bureaucrats.”

“We are aware of the fact that democracy has many dimensions, and for many theoretical and empirical questions it is important to specify exactly how democracy should influence behavior (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Przeworski 1991).”

“(2004), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).”

“Democratic governments may have stronger incentives to provide short term growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Rajan, 2010).”

“…work exploring the relationship among conºict outcome, regime type, and the postwar fate of leaders conªrms our theory, noting that his main result “now offers empirical support for some of these theories [of international conºict] (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003; Reiter and Stam 2002).””

“This legitimacy can be drawn from either among a population at large or — echoing selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004) — within a narrowly circumscribed group of elites, such as military commanders or crony capitalists.”

“…preemptively guard against this hovering threat, autocrats weaken their military (De Bruin, 2020; Quinlivan, 1999), oust rival ethnic groups (Roessler, 2016), stymie coordination (Arriola, 2009; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003), and purge or shuffle their officials (Sudduth, 2017; Woldense, 2018).”

“In such self-aggrandizing circumstances it is difficult to square their international interactions with a state-centric approach’s attentiveness to the “national interest” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004; Morrow et al. 2006).”

“…states, they can also be dominated by special interests and distribute protection unequally; they can be inefficient and corrupt, which can hamper long-term policy undertakings, such as building up a country’s readiness to cope with exogenous shocks (Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Diamond 2007).”

“For a broader treatment of strategies of political survival see, e.g., B. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Myerson (2008), and Svolik (2008).”

“…integrate learning into their permanent structures to create space for adjustment to dynamic environmental change. xxiii This follows thinking in de Mesquita et al. (2003) and in Grindle and Thomas (1993) and echoes Ilchman and Uphoff’s definition of politics (1997, xxii-xxiii) as encompassing…”

“Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.”

“2This results is consistent with the empirical evidence that democratic nations produce more public goods than autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Deacon 2009; Blaydes and Kayser 2011).”

“See for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Davenport (2007), Gandhi (2008), Vreeland (2008) and Weeks (2008).”

“See also Tullock (1987); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003); and Haber (2006).”

“We derive our second hypothesis from the Selectorate Model (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”

“17 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Maoz and Russett 1993. See Chan (2012) for a review of the democratic peace research program.”

“…comparison minimizes the potential effects of institutional variation, but the ongoing debate about regime types and audience costs suggests that the role of institutions in shaping the people’s role as “audience” requires further investigation (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Weeks 2008).”

“The poor comprise a large part of the population—this is precisely what gives them additional political power in democracy—so the provision of public goods is a more efficient way to make transfers than the provision of private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lake & Baum, 2001).”