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The Logic of Political Survival
Abstract
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
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“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that public spending can be used to 'buy' allegiance and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to the ruling elite.”
From The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war (2015) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
In the citing paper
“In democratic countries, politicians ' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In autocratic countries, by contrast, political leaders ' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalitions have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
In the citing paper
“Bueno de Mesquita et al . (2003) demonstrate that autocrats ' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition -the segment of the population that supports the leader -relative to the size of the selectorate”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
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DiGiuseppe, M. R., & Poast, P. (2016) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123416000247 · Cited by 51
“5 Bennett 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Gaubatz 1996; Gibler 2008; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 2003; Mattes 2012a; Reed 1997; Reiter and Stam 2002; Schultz 2001; Schultz and Weingast 2003. McGillivray and Smith (2008) attempt to bring the co-operative nature of democratic leaders and their ability to issue credi…”
BackgroundCorruption and re-election: how much can politicians steal before getting punished?
Vuković, V. (2019) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2019.09.002 · Cited by 51
Mutually Assured Distrust: Ideology and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars
Keels, E., & Wiegand, K. E. (2020) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002720928414 · Cited by 54
“While governing ideological positions may not be widely popular, they may speak to other members within the selectorate who favor policies that ensure economic, ethnic, or religious advantage (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundPopulism and Environmental Performance
Böhmelt, T. (2021) · Global Environmental Politics · doi:10.1162/glep_a_00606 · Cited by 63
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue here that democracies outperform nondemocratic regimes in the provision of public goods, as this is a more cost-ef fi cient way to satisfy the electorate in this context.”
Energy subsidies, public investment and endogenous growth
Mundaca, G. (2017) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.049 · Cited by 55
“(2007)); and ii) misaligned electoral institutions that deliver policies to favor only special interest groups instead of the general public (Strand (2013); Armijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal (1994), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004); Keefer (2011)); or allows clientelism (Kirtschelt and Wilkinson (2007)). Commander (201…”
BackgroundSplitting Atoms: Why Do Countries Build Nuclear Power Plants?
Fuhrmann, M. (2012) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2012.640209 · Cited by 50
“Democracies are thought to be more constrained by public opinion because leaders can suffer at the ballot box if they pursue policies that are domestically unpopular (eg, Bueno de Mesquita et. al 2003 ).”
BackgroundDomestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness
Jeong, J. M., & Peksen, D. (2017) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002717728105 · Cited by 52
Revolutionary Legacy, Power Structure, and Grassroots Capitalism under the Red Flag in China
Zhang, Q., & Liu, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108657501 · Cited by 50
TERRORISM AND CABINET DURATION*
Gassebner, M., Jong‐A‐Pin, R., & Mierau, J. O. (2011) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x · Cited by 51
Do they know something we don’t? Diffusion of repression in authoritarian regimes
Olar, R.-G. (2019) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343318822718 · Cited by 50
“The size of GDP/capita is accounted for because poorer countries will tend to use repression as an alternative to the provision of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).12 The model includes a binary variable to account for the incidence of Civil conflict in a countryyear (Gleditsch et al.,…”
BackgroundEmerging varieties of incorporated capitalism. Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence
Buhr, D., & Frankenberger, R. (2014) · Business and Politics · doi:10.1515/bap-2013-0020 · Cited by 50
Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan
LaPorte, J. (2014) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.2014.951184 · Cited by 55
“…suggests that rulers use ruling parties, legislatures, and elections to distribute political and monetary rewards, such as policy concessions, state salaries, and privileged access to government contracts (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008).”
BackgroundState Security, Information, and Repression: A Comparison of Communist Bulgaria and Ba'thist Iraq
Dimitrov, M. K., & Sassoon, J. (2014) · Journal of Cold War Studies · doi:10.1162/jcws_a_00448 · Cited by 50
Domestic Signaling of Commitment Credibility
Horowitz, M. C., Poast, P., & Stam, A. C. (2014) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715612576 · Cited by 51
The Schools of Thought Problem in International Relations
Grieco, J. M. (2018) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viy005 · Cited by 49
The Past, Present, and Future of Behavioral IR
Davis, J. W., & McDermott, R. (2020) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818320000272 · Cited by 51
Sullivan, P. L. (2008) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1080/07388940802007223 · Cited by 50
“…approval rates (Eichenberg et al., 2006; Feaver & Gelpi, 2004; Gelpi et al., 2005/06), public perceptions of a war’s progress and likelihood of success (Boettcher & Cobb, 2006; Voeten & Brewer, 2006) and the tenure of elected leaders (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gartner et al., 2003).”
BackgroundPolitical Institutions and Foreign Debt in the Developing World
Oatley, T. H. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00582.x · Cited by 50
“3 The logic is similar to the selectorate model (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialEnding Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining
Krustev, V. L., & Morgan, T. (2011) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894211413057 · Cited by 52
“According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) a winning coalition and selectorate focus also offers a more general regime classification than the democracy–autocracy continuum.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMedia Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse
Guriev, S. M., Egorov, G., & Сонин, К. И. (2007) · Voprosy Ekonomiki · doi:10.32609/0042-8736-2007-4-4-24 · Cited by 50
“…we use recent advances in political economics with its emphasis on dynamic models of strategic interaction (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, 2006, Acemoglu, 2003, 2006, Laguno¤, 2006, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Konrad and Skaperdas, 2005, Restrepo, 2002, and Gallego and Pitchik, 2004).”
BackgroundMethodThe Political Economy of Economic SanctionsPreprint
Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (2007) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 50
Carney, R. W. (2014) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2014.958091 · Cited by 48
“…develop institutional mechanisms to co-opt the opposition either through the distribution of economic transfers and rents (Wintrobe, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) or through institutions that produce credible inter-temporal power-sharing deals with potential elite opponents (Lazarev,…”
BackgroundElfversson, E. (2015) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343315597968 · Cited by 47
“Strategic interests and intervention in communal conflict The most basic interest of the central government is to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Gates et al., 2006). Its strategies in relation to local conflicts should be seen in this light. In the context of Africa after the Cold War, states tend to b…”
BackgroundStrategies of legitimation in Central Asia: regime durability in Turkmenistan
Polese, A., Beacháin, D. Ó., & Horák, S. (2017) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2017.1331391 · Cited by 50
“In the end, the goal of political survival, as it has been demonstrated (De Mesquita, 2005), can pass through authoritarian rule but can also manipulate and misuse normatively democratic instruments.”
BackgroundQuinn, J., Joshi, M., & Melander, E. (2019) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqz073 · Cited by 49
Terrorism abroad and migration policies at home
Bove, V., Böhmelt, T., & Nussio, E. (2020) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1729227 · Cited by 49
“can remove democratic leaders relatively easily if they are dissatisfied with their performance (Mesquita et al. 2004).”
BackgroundZimmermann, E. (2011) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.09.003 · Cited by 48
Simulating the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process in the Undergraduate Classroom
Loggins, J. A. (2009) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096509090544 · Cited by 49
“…abstractly about the various components of leaders’ selectorates and how they might be accountable to different portions of those groups (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), students often forget this when examining real political situations and dramatically oversimplify very complex political…”
BackgroundA Preference for War: How Fairness and Rhetoric Influence Leadership Incentives in Crises
Gottfried, M. S., & Trager, R. (2016) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqv025 · Cited by 50
Tyson, S. A., & Smith, A. (2018) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/693986 · Cited by 47
Self-citationA Vote for Freedom? The Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions on Regime Type
Levin, D. H. (2018) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002718770507 · Cited by 50
Politicising Government Engagement with Corporate Social Responsibility: “CSR” as an Empty Signifier
Zueva‐Owens, A., & Fairbrass, J. M. (2019) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-019-04330-5 · Cited by 49
Censorship as Reward: Evidence from Pop Culture Censorship in Chile
Esberg, J. (2020) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305542000026x · Cited by 45
The Puzzle of Abu Ghraib: Are Democratic Institutions a Palliative or Panacea?Preprint
Davenport, C., Moore, W. H., & Armstrong, D. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1022367 · Cited by 49
“Following the direction charted by Davenport and Armstrong (2004), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), Gates et al.”
InfluentialThe Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient MonarchsPreprint
Menaldo, V. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1548222 · Cited by 49
Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks: An Agent‐Based Organizational Ecology
Jung, D. F., & Lake, D. A. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00536.x · Cited by 47
Political Competition and Ethnic Riots in Democratic Transition: A Lesson from Indonesia
Toha, R. J. (2015) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123415000423 · Cited by 49
“For example, they may have regular and somewhat competitive elections (Levitsky and Way 2009), provide public services (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and allow some degree of public liberties (Linz and Stepan 1996).”
BackgroundComplicit States and the Governing Strategy of Privilege Violence: When Weakness Is Not the Problem
Kleinfeld, R., & Barham, E. (2018) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-015628 · Cited by 49
A Boom with Review: How Retrospective Oversight Increases the Foreign Policy Ability of Democracies
Colaresi, M. P. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00567.x · Cited by 49
Moon, C. (2015) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12182 · Cited by 54
“It has been broadly studied and found that autocrats show diversity in terms of their political structures and economic performances (for example, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Wright 2008a), and the quality of property rights institutions shows a similar pattern.”
BackgroundLeaders, States, and Reputations
Wu, C. X., & Wolford, S. (2018) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002718786001 · Cited by 48
Dynamic dictators: improving the research agenda on autocratization and authoritarian resilience
Sinkkonen, E. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.1903881 · Cited by 49
The killing game: A theory of non-democratic succession
Egorov, G., & Сонин, К. И. (2015) · Research in Economics · doi:10.1016/j.rie.2015.05.005 · Cited by 48
“…how to survive if forced out of power.2 Unlike democratic leaders, dictators can use imprisonment, torture, and executions of political opponents as means of staying in power; this has been recognized long ago (e.g., Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Svolik, 2012).”
InfluentialDEMOCRATIC PEACE AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Conconi, P., Sahuguet, N., & Zanardi, M. (2014) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12074 · Cited by 48
“Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Jackson and Morelli, 2007). Theymay also help reveal information about the government’s political incentives in a crisis by improving its ability to send credible signals (e.g. Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 1998; Levy and Razin, 2004). Normative explanations contend that democracies are less c…”
Tightening the Belt: Sovereign Debt and Alliance Formation*
Allen, M. A., & DiGiuseppe, M. R. (2012) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12010 · Cited by 48
Property rights in dictatorships: kings protect property better than generals or party bosses
Knutsen, C. H., & Fjelde, H. (2013) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2013.773205 · Cited by 46
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) show that dictators with small winning coalitions and large selectorates have incentives to under-provide growth-enhancing public goods, preferring to distribute private goods to stay in office.”
Background“Mao’s last revolution”: a dictator’s loyalty–competence tradeoff
Bai, Y., & Zhou, T. (2019) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-019-00649-9 · Cited by 47
Fordham, B. O. (2007) · Social Science History · doi:10.1215/01455532-2007-010 · Cited by 47
Democracy, dictatorship, and disease: Political regimes and HIV/AIDS
Justesen, M. K. (2012) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.02.001 · Cited by 46
State Capacity, Democracy, and the Violation of Personal Integrity Rights
Young, J. K. (2009) · Journal of Human Rights · doi:10.1080/14754830903324712 · Cited by 48
“The results are consistent, and I report the results using the Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) data.”
MethodResultRepression, Political Threats, and Survival Under AutocracyPreprint
Escribà-Folch, A. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1705508 · Cited by 47
Neudorfer, N. S., & Theuerkauf, U. G. (2014) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414013516919 · Cited by 54
“Rather than seeking interethnic accommodation, we propose that corrupt governments in resource-rich countries are more likely to use their wealth to buy the loyalty of their supporters (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) and reinforce grievances along ethnic lines.”
BackgroundHuman rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state
Ritter, E., & Conrad, C. (2015) · Revista Internacional de Organizaciones · doi:10.1007/s11558-015-9238-4 · Cited by 2
Systemist International Relations
James, P. (2019) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqz086 · Cited by 46
Rivals within: political factions, loyalty, and elite competition under authoritarianism
Chen, T., & Hong, J. Y. (2020) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.61 · Cited by 47
Regional Governance in Divided Societies: Evidence from the Republic of Congo and Kenya
Carter, B. L., & Hassan, M. (2020) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/708915 · Cited by 45
KEEPING YOUR HEAD DOWN: PUBLIC PROFILES AND PROMOTION UNDER AUTOCRACY
Gueorguiev, D. D., & Schuler, P. (2016) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/jea.2015.1 · Cited by 46
Bucheli, M., & Kim, M. (2015) · Global Strategy Journal · doi:10.1002/gsj.1090 · Cited by 46
Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation
Svolik, M. W. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00223.x · Cited by 47
“Morrow’s (1994) application of Crawford and Sobel (1982).”
Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?
Little, A. T. (2016) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951629816630436 · Cited by 44
“Democratizing has many effects on policies that impact the incumbent’s decision to open up the political system such as tax rates, redistribution, and public goods provision (among many others, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)).”
BackgroundThe British Academy Brian Barry Prize Essay: An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics
Clark, W. R., Golder, M., & Golder, S. (2017) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123416000442 · Cited by 50
“101 Alesina and Perotti 1994; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Przeworski et al. 2000.”
Profits from Peace: The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption
Haaß, F., & Ottmann, M. (2017) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.07.006 · Cited by 51
“Knowing this, the leader can afford to offer fewer private ben-efits to these elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. , 2003, p. 66).”
InfluentialThe impact of democracy and media freedom on under-5 mortality, 1961–2011
Wigley, S., & Akkoyunlu-Wigley, A. (2017) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.08.023 · Cited by 46
Peksen, D. (2017) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1368258 · Cited by 45
“This, in turn, helps them maintain cooperation from their support base (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundThe Reach of Political Economy
Weingast, B. R. V., & Wittman, D. A. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0001 · Cited by 48
MIDLOC: Introducing the Militarized Interstate Dispute Location dataset
Braithwaite, A. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343309350008 · Cited by 45
“Moreover, in these societies, this risk-averse population has the ability to select and remove their leadership; hence, their risk-aversion tends to have an influence in the decision-making process (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Origins of Patronage Politics: State Building, Centrifugalism, and Decolonization
Kenny, P. D. (2013) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s000712341300015x · Cited by 47
“In the 25 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005.”
BackgroundRepression as a Double‐edged Sword: Resilient Monarchs, Repression and Revolution in the Arab World
Bischof, D., & Fink, S. (2015) · Swiss Political Science Review · doi:10.1111/spsr.12169 · Cited by 45
“Thus, autocratic leaders use repression to deter would-be challengers (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005: 338-340).”
BackgroundInfluentialLearning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration
Weisiger, A. (2016) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818316000059 · Cited by 48
“See, in particular, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; and Goemans 2000.”
BackgroundUnpacking Territorial Disputes
Wright, T. M., & Diehl, P. F. (2014) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002714553105 · Cited by 45
“The selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003) began as a way to explain how states with different regime types behaved in war.”
BackgroundMcDermott, R. (2018) · The Leadership Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.11.005 · Cited by 46
Why Remittances Are a Political Blessing and Not a Curse
Bearce, D. H., & Park, S. (2018) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-018-9277-y · Cited by 45
When Autocrats Threaten Citizens with Violence: Evidence from China
Carter, E. B., & Carter, B. L. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123420000575 · Cited by 40
“…feature an in-group whose support the autocrat must retain and an out-group that is excluded from political decision British Journal of Political Science 5 making and is thus subject to more repression (Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Padro i Miquel 2007).”
BackgroundEconomic development and democracy: An electoral connection
Knutsen, C. H., Gerring, J., Skaaning, S., Teorell, J., Maguire, M., Coppedge, M., & Lindberg, S. I. (2018) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12282 · Cited by 56
“Although development may also enhance the power resources of leaders, leaders in poor countries are already in control of considerable resources, especially in autocratic states (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), where they are generally freer to engage in predation.”
Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships
Kim, N. K., & Sudduth, J. K. (2021) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414021997161 · Cited by 45
“Dictators use parties and legislatures to distribute rents and privileges, which enables them to co-opt citizens and potential regime opponents (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundThe Political Economics of Non-democracy
Egorov, G., & Сонин, К. И. (2020) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20221494 · Cited by 53
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR
Gowa, J. (2011) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00382.x · Cited by 45
Learning, Policy Making, and Market Reforms
Meseguer, C. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511626685 · Cited by 106
The Language of Autocrats: Leaders' Language in Natural Disaster Crises
Windsor, L., Dowell, N., & Graesser, A. C. (2014) · Risk Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy · doi:10.1002/rhc3.12068 · Cited by 43
Ethnic Parties and Public Spending
Thachil, T., & Teitelbaum, E. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414015576743 · Cited by 43
Working with the Grain and Swimming against the Tide
Booth, D. (2012) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2012.657959 · Cited by 80
“…that democracies that are ‘young’ in various senses are likely to promote the targeted distribution of private goods and not the provision of public goods is increasingly mainstream in political science and institutional theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Keefer 2007; North et al. 2009).”
BackgroundThe Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001
Sechser, T. S., & Saunders, E. N. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00596.x · Cited by 45
The Effects of Authoritarian Iconography
Bush, S. S., Erlich, A., Prather, L., & Zeira, Y. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414016633228 · Cited by 44
Which democracies prosper? Electoral rules, form of government and economic growth
Knutsen, C. H. (2010) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.006 · Cited by 47
“Human capital is another vital source of economic growth (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992), and provision of universal education is a typical broad-interest policy (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundAutocratic Rule and Social Capital: Evidence from Imperial ChinaPreprint
Xue, M. M., & Koyama, M. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2856803 · Cited by 49
Can I stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral investment treaties on political survival
Mazumder, S. (2015) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-015-9235-7 · Cited by 44
“Finally, I also check that my results hold with using Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004)’s”
BackgroundResultThe New Barbary Wars: Forecasting Maritime Piracy
Daxecker, U., & Prins, B. (2013) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1111/fpa.12014 · Cited by 44
Gauri, V., Woolcock, M. J. V., & Desai, D. (2012) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388.2012.700396 · Cited by 44
Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses
Manion, M. (2015) · Cited by 44
Self-Reinforcing Civilian Control: A Measurement-Based Analysis of Civil-Military Relations
Kenwick, M. (2020) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqz092 · Cited by 47
Natter, K. (2023) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.1080/1369183x.2023.2269784 · Cited by 52
“Although autocratic leaders also need to forge compromises and reconcile diverging interests with state and societal actors (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Kinne 2005; Purcell 1973), they have greater leeway to enact fundamental policy shifts and to choose which clients or constituencies to serve…”
BackgroundThe History of Imposed Democracy and the Future of Iraq and Afghanistan
Enterline, A. J., & Greig, J. M. (2008) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00074.x · Cited by 46
Early, B. R., & Spice, R. (2014) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1111/fpa.12038 · Cited by 44
Evaluating the Monadic Democratic Peace
Quackenbush, S. L., & Rudy, M. (2009) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894209104554 · Cited by 44
“The conventional wisdom within the democratic peace literature is that democracies are peaceful only in their relationships with other democracies (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2003; Chan, 1997; Dixon, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Oneal and Russett, 1997), not in general.”
BackgroundWhy there Should be No Political Foreign Aid Curse
Altincekic, C., & Bearce, D. H. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.05.014 · Cited by 43
Constrained by the bank and the ballot
Conrad, C. R., & DeMeritt, J. H. R. (2013) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343312454556 · Cited by 45
State Capacity and the Environmental Investment Gap in Authoritarian States
Ward, H., Cao, X., & Mukherjee, B. (2013) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414013509569 · Cited by 45
Promoting Trade: The Importance of Market Protecting Institutions
Souva, M., Smith, D. L., & Rowan, S. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608080377 · Cited by 44
“Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) contend that democracies are more likely to provide public goods than nondemocracies and since trade is a public good, democratic states are likely to engage in more trade.”
BackgroundReligious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history
Auriol, E., & Platteau, J. (2016) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.12.007 · Cited by 44
“These elites, whom De Mesquita et al. (2005) call the ”selectorate”, are generally considered as the most serious threat to the dictators’ power.”
BackgroundWhy class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars
Houle, C. (2016) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343316652187 · Cited by 47
“No political regime, even if authoritarian, can be instated and maintained without a coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Geddes, 1999). Inequality between social classes widens the gap between the preferences over economic policies of members of the masses and the elites (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003,…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2003-08-28
- Volume
- 1
- OpenAlex
- W1535643370
- Cited by
- 4,217
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 147 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 169 · 2022: 257 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 262 · 2019: 312 · 2018: 234 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 253 · 2015: 268 · 2014: 237 · 2013: 243 · 2012: 218
- FWCI
- 70.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Keywords
- political survival, leadership selection, political institutions, resource allocation, public policy incentives, war and politics, economic development, political economy
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