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The Logic of Political Survival
Abstract
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
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“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that public spending can be used to 'buy' allegiance and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to the ruling elite.”
From The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war (2015) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
In the citing paper
“In democratic countries, politicians ' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In autocratic countries, by contrast, political leaders ' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In the citing paper
“In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalitions have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
In the citing paper
“Bueno de Mesquita et al . (2003) demonstrate that autocrats ' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition -the segment of the population that supports the leader -relative to the size of the selectorate”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
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Venkatachary, S. K., Prasad, J., & Samikannu, R. (2018) · Energy Reports · doi:10.1016/j.egyr.2018.02.001 · Cited by 44
Political Institutional Change, Obsolescing Legitimacy, and Multinational Corporations
Bucheli, M., & Kim, M.-Y. (2012) · Management International Review · doi:10.1007/s11575-012-0141-4 · Cited by 45
“…our starting point the theory of origins of dictatorship and democracy (acemoglu and Robinson 2006) and the theory of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). these theories provide an explanation on the origins of different institutional systems, how these systems legitimize…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Achilles' Heel of Liberal IR Theory?: Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era
McDonald, P. J., & Sweeney, K. J. (2007) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100020864 · Cited by 43
Tyrants and Terrorism: Why Some Autocrats are Terrorized While Others are Not
Conrad, C. R., Conrad, J. M., & Young, J. K. (2014) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12120 · Cited by 45
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Yao, Y. (2018) · China Economic Journal · doi:10.1080/17538963.2018.1516274 · Cited by 43
“Selectorate theory was proposed by De Mesquita Bruce et al. (2003).”
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“In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all…”
BackgroundInfluentialDiGiuseppe, M. R. (2015) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343315587970 · Cited by 42
“As is common in political economy models of foreign policy, I assume that the desire to remain in power motivates leaders and constituents hold leaders accountable to their provision of both security and the distribution of public and private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundDuckett, J., & Wang, G. (2017) · Europe Asia Studies · doi:10.1080/09668136.2016.1274379 · Cited by 43
“It expects them to channel private goods to members of their support base in the ‘selectorate’, but to neglect the ‘unenfranchised’ majority (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).1 Other recent studies have found authoritarian regimes sometimes do extend provision beyond their immediate support base—but…”
BackgroundPeterson, T. M. (2018) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894218797024 · Cited by 43
“Regardless of the specific issue, I assume that, from the target’s perspective, initial policies reflect the preferences of leaders who wish to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004).”
BackgroundEconomic Growth and Political Survival
Burke, P. J. (2012) · The B E Journal of Macroeconomics · doi:10.1515/1935-1690.2398 · Cited by 60
“Studies such as those of Londregan et al. (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), Carmignani (2002), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Marinov (2005), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), and Malone (2011) report a positive relationship between economic growth and political survival more generally.”
Apaydin, F., & Çoban, M. K. (2022) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2022.2083658 · Cited by 42
“…are lower than the costs of redistribution, the rulers are more likely to concentrate power by eliminating their rivals, keep the size of the ruling coalition small to ensure members get a higher share of the spoils and increase repression to ensure their survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundBrinkman, H.-J., & Hendrix, C. S. (2010) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/27510 · Cited by 44
“In contrast, political leaders with minimal institutionalized ties to the population, such as personalist dictatorships, tend not to survive as long and do a much poorer job of providing public goods, among them, basic food security (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundCumulation from Proper Specification: Theory, Logic, Research Design, and “Nice” Laws
Starr, H. E. (2005) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1080/07388940500339225 · Cited by 42
“Rather, several related syntheses have been evolving, each based in what Russett and Starr (2000) call the “strategic perspective” (for instance, the survival/selectorate model of Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
BackgroundCoups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies
Gilli, M., & Li, Y. (2015) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.011 · Cited by 41
Teorell, J., & Lindberg, S. I. (2019) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592718002098 · Cited by 43
“65 Dahl 1971 66 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.”
BackgroundInfluentialImmigration Policy and Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis
Choi, S. (2019) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2019.1659577 · Cited by 42
Political Leadership in Africa
Carbone, G., & Pellegata, A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108529266 · Cited by 46
International Sports Events and Repression in Autocracies: Evidence from the 1978 FIFA World Cup
Scharpf, A., Gläßel, C., & Edwards, P. (2022) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000958 · Cited by 45
“We start with the assumption that illiberal regimes seek to maximize their chances of survival (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundRESOURCE CURSE, POLITICAL ENTRY, AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS
Tsui, K. K. (2010) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00373.x · Cited by 40
“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies
Melville, A. Y., & Mironyuk, M. G. (2015) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.2015.1052215 · Cited by 44
“…is regular rotation of power, a strategy of cooptation prevails over the strategy of repressions, the “selectorate” and the “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) are rather broad, property rights are guaranteed, contracts are enforced, but – most importantly – there are relatively…”
BackgroundThe Rise (and Decline?) of Arab Aid: Generosity and Allocation in the Oil Era
Shushan, D., & Marcoux, C. (2011) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.025 · Cited by 42
Timing Is Everything: Economic Sanctions, Regime Type, and Domestic Instability
Major, S. (2012) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2012.640253 · Cited by 43
“On the other hand, democrats rise and fall on the strength of their economic performance—and their associated capacity to provide public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Wintrobe 1990).”
BackgroundNatural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development
Al‐Ubaydli, O. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.009 · Cited by 41
Corruption as an Institution: Rethinking the Nature and Origins of the Grabbing Hand
Teorell, J. (2007) · Gothenburg University Publications Electronic Archive (Gothenburg University) · Cited by 42
Taking Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Reform Seriously
Carothers, C. (2020) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592720001371 · Cited by 53
“…with chaotic governance, economic mismanagement, and rampant corruption (Nathan 2003; Chang and Golden 2010); and 3) the theory that the provision of public goods in authoritarian regimes is dependent on the autocrat needing to satisfy a broad “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundHendrix, C. S., & Salehyan, I. (2016) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715620473 · Cited by 43
THEORIES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Hymans, J. E. C. (2006) · The Nonproliferation Review · doi:10.1080/10736700601071397 · Cited by 42
Ash, K. (2014) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.899585 · Cited by 44
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Jiang, J., & Yang, D. L. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2564413 · Cited by 42
Democracy and TransparencyPreprint
Rosendorff, B. P., Hollyer, J. R., & Vreeland, J. R. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1750824 · Cited by 45
War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy
Baum, M., & Potter, P. (2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim290060006 · Cited by 42
Contingent Democratization: When Do Economic Crises Matter?
Tang, M., Huhe, N., & Zhou, Q. (2015) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123415000095 · Cited by 41
“25 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004.”
InfluentialEfrat, A. (2016) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqw012 · Cited by 41
“Democratic governments that wish to survive politically must deliver policies that benefit a significant number of voters (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundDoes Oil Hinder Social Spending? Evidence from Dictatorships, 1972–2008
Hong, J. Y. (2017) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-017-9237-y · Cited by 43
“…politics have generally agreed that, compared to democratic regimes, autocracies provide more private goods at the expense of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Rudra and Haggard 2005; Lustig 2007; Przeworski et al. 2000; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Rudra and…”
BackgroundInfluentialDemocracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919 to 2001
Gibler, D. M., & Owsiak, A. P. (2017) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002717708599 · Cited by 41
“…the democratic peace research program is that democracies possess characteristics that encourage conflict management—institutional constraints, electoral accountability, norms, or an advantage when signaling resolve (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Schultz 1999).”
BackgroundInfluentialDisaggregating China’s local political budget cycles: “Righting” the U
Vortherms, S. A. (2018) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.09.025 · Cited by 41
“Instead, previous research argues non-democratic governments provide social goods for political survival and economic competition (Ansell, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Kosack, 2009; Oates, 1985; Tiebout, 1956; Wilson, 2008; Xiao & Tsang, 1999).”
Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries
Sullivan, P. L., Blanken, L. J., & Rice, I. C. (2018) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388 · Cited by 41
“Moreover, distribution of resources as private goods to key supporters gives a leader greater control over state policies and decreases the risk that supporters of the incumbent leader will defect to the opposition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundDomestic Interests, Democracy, and Foreign Policy Change
Leeds, B. A., & Mattes, M. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009037938 · Cited by 39
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DeLeo, R. A., Zohlnhöfer, R., & Zahariadis, N. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009397926 · Cited by 45
Party System Nationalization and the Provision of Public Health Services
Hicken, A. D., Kollman, K., & Simmons, J. W. (2015) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2015.41 · Cited by 40
“…where decision makers have very narrow constituencies, they prefer goods and services that can be targeted to smaller groups (e.g., Olson 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Franzese, Jusko and Nooruddin 2007; Stasavage 2005; Hicken and Simmons 2008).”
BackgroundHenne, P. S. (2012) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343312456225 · Cited by 44
Foreign military intervention and women’s rights
Peksen, D. (2011) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343311406305 · Cited by 40
Cirone, A. E., & Urpelainen, J. (2013) · Technovation · doi:10.1016/j.technovation.2013.06.001 · Cited by 41
Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants?
Bodea, C., Elbadawi, I. A., & Houle, C. (2016) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1188093 · Cited by 41
“The literature on leader tenure is probably the least arbitrary in the choice of events to be explained, but it misses civil wars that do not see leadership change or failed coups d’état (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Goemans 2008).”
BackgroundSanction Consequences and Citizen Support: A Survey Experiment
Heinrich, T., Kobayashi, Y., & Peterson, T. M. (2016) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqw019 · Cited by 40
“Leaders desire the appearance of efficacy to maintain their office, most likely achieved in a democratic state via the provision of public goods (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004).”
BackgroundStudying Leaders and Military Conflict
Horowitz, M. C., & Fuhrmann, M. (2018) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002718785679 · Cited by 40
Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession1
Hollyer, J. R., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2012) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00750.x · Cited by 41
“This is not a general theory of leadership survival (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)); a number of factors that may be relevant have been omitted.”
Has Democracy Slowed Growth in Asia?
Rock, M. T. (2009) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.09.002 · Cited by 41
Intra-party democracy, political performance and the survival of party leaders
Ennser‐Jedenastik, L., & Müller, W. C. (2013) · Party Politics · doi:10.1177/1354068813509517 · Cited by 41
“…party leader survival A huge body of literature argues that leadership selection mechanisms and devices to hold leaders accountable matter by making incumbents more or less vulnerable to replacement (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002, 2003; Konrad and Skaperdas, 2007; Samuels and Shugart, 2010).”
BackgroundThe Violence Trap: A Political-Economic Approach to the Problems of DevelopmentPreprint
Cox, G. W., North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. V. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2370622 · Cited by 37
Jazayeri, K. B. (2015) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894215570426 · Cited by 43
“See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Gandhi (2008), Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) and Geddes (1999). 5. Stewart (2008: 13). I use Stewart’s (2008: 3) conceptualization of group level inequalities as entailing ‘‘inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between defined groups’’. Politic…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialConstitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making
Tridimas, G. (2017) · Constitutional Political Economy · doi:10.1007/s10602-017-9241-2 · Cited by 43
“11 Such formulations are examined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).”
BackgroundStrange, A. M. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009090902 · Cited by 40
The international dimension of authoritarian regime legitimation: insights from the Cuban case
Hoffmann, B. (2014) · Journal of International Relations and Development · doi:10.1057/jird.2014.9 · Cited by 42
“The material benefits that authoritarian regimes offer to the ‘winning coalition’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), which keeps them in power, have been studied, among others, as ‘patronage’ by Magaloni for the case of Mexico; as ‘provision pacts’ by Slater (2010) in his study on Southeast Asia; and by Holmes (1993) wh…”
InfluentialVenezuela and military expenditure data
Colgan, J. D. (2011) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343311406156 · Cited by 40
“Others link to broader research debates, such as the democratic peace and its impact on military expenditures (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), the extent to which international trade is inhibited by military concerns (Morrow, 1997), or institutional learning in an organization (Lebovic, 1995).”
BackgroundHicken, A. D., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. J. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00162.x · Cited by 41
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) have recently developed a rigorous formal framework for evaluating the consequences of variations in the size of the group to which a chief executive is ultimately accountable.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPeksen, D. (2010) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512110372610 · Cited by 42
“Due to the disproportionate economic cost of sanctions on groups outside ‘the winning coalition’ of the political leadership (for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Cortright and Lopez, 1995; Gibbons, 1999; Weiss, 1999; Wintrobe, 1990, 1998), independent media organizations (newspapers and…”
BackgroundLeaders' Motivations and Actions: Explaining Government-Dissident Conflict-Cooperation Processes
Shellman, S. M. (2006) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1080/07388940500503820 · Cited by 40
“While the IPI project proves useful in the study of domestic conflict (Moore & Davis, 1998; Carey, 2006), the ordinal scales impose on the data a constant, interval, linear relationship between the events and their assigned values. Rather than impose such a strong assumption, Shellman (2004a) surveys a set of scholars…”
BackgroundMethodOffice or Officeholder? Regime Deinstitutionalization and Sources of Individual Political Influence
Baturo, A., & Elkink, J. A. (2014) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381614000280 · Cited by 40
“Indeed, many leadership studies are concerned with the effects of institutions on leader survival in office rather than with the effects of leaders as such (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundFit and Feasible: Why Democratizing States Form, not Join, International Organizations1
Poast, P., & Urpelainen, J. (2013) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12031 · Cited by 39
Worsnop, C. Z. (2016) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-016-9260-1 · Cited by 40
“As others have shown, leaders prioritize maintaining office and need domestic political support to do so (Geddes 1996; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundSelf-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States
Roessler, P. G., & Ohls, D. (2018) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818318000073 · Cited by 41
“Bates 2008; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Reno 1998; Roessler 2011.”
BackgroundLei, Z., & Nugent, J. B. (2018) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2018.08.002 · Cited by 38
The Politics of Party Leader Survival and Succession: Australia in Comparative Perspective
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“The few more analytical contributions mostly examine different institutional mechanisms of leadership selection, survival and ejection (Weller 1983 , 1994 ; Heclo 1992 ; Courtney 1995 ; LeDuc 2001 ; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003 ; Quinn 2004 , 2005 ) or the policy effects of leadership succession (Bunce 1981 ; Roeder 1…”
BackgroundHoriuchi, Y., Laing, M., & Hart, P. ‘. (2013) · Party Politics · doi:10.1177/1354068812472577 · Cited by 40
“Seminal studies in this vein include Bienen and van de Walle (1991), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2003) and Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995).”
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Co-optation in the process of dominant party system building: the case of Russia
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Self-interest, partisanship, and the conditional influence of taxation on support for war in the USA
Kriner, D. L., Lechase, B., & Zielinski, R. C. (2015) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894215611133 · Cited by 37
“This result challenges an earlier view that the public would ‘‘rally around the fiscal flag’’ and bear the cost of taxation to help insure victory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).5 Instead, war taxes appear to decrease significantly the public’s willingness to back a war.”
BackgroundInfluentialHorowitz, M. C., Stewart, B., Tingley, D. H., Bishop, M., Samotin, L. R., Roberts, M. E., Chang, W., Mellers, B. A., & Tetlock, P. E. (2019) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/704437 · Cited by 40
Çuhadar, Ç. E., Kaarbo, J., Kesgin, B., et al. (2020) · Turkish Studies · doi:10.1080/14683849.2020.1724511 · Cited by 39
Taking it personal? Investigating regime personalization as an autocratic survival strategy
Grundholm, A. T. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1737677 · Cited by 42
Gengler, J. J., Shockley, B., & Ewers, M. (2020) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041521x15903211136400 · Cited by 39
Trubowitz, P. L., & Burgoon, B. M. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197535400.001.0001 · Cited by 38
Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?
San-Akca, B. (2009) · Journal of Strategic Studies · doi:10.1080/01402390902987012 · Cited by 39
International Terrorism and the Political Survival of Leaders
Park, J. C., & Bali, V. A. (2015) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715613139 · Cited by 40
“It is also widely assumed that political leaders want to maintain their office and make policy in a way that enhances or at least does not hurt their political survival (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundDo dictatorships redistribute more?
Kammas, P., & Sarantides, V. (2018) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2018.10.006 · Cited by 38
“(McGuire and Olson, 1996; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Deacon, 2009). According to Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996), a crucial factor that drives this”
BackgroundResultInfluentialLiou, Y.-M., & Musgrave, P. (2016) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqw021 · Cited by 41
Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China
Dickson, B. J., Shen, M., & Yan, J. (2016) · Modern China · doi:10.1177/0097700416672419 · Cited by 37
“In return, the regime expects support from the people who receive these benefits (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; King, 2007).”
BackgroundInformal Networks as Safety Nets: The Role of Personal Ties in China’s Anti-corruption Campaign
Zeng, Q., & Yang, Y. (2017) · China An International Journal · doi:10.1353/chn.2017.0027 · Cited by 39
What Money Can’t Buy: Wealth, Inequality, and Economic Satisfaction in the Rentier State
Mitchell, J. S., & Gengler, J. J. (2018) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912918776128 · Cited by 39
Bel, G., Gasulla, Ó., & Mazaira‐Font, F. A. (2021) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13394 · Cited by 41
Life, Literacy, and the Pursuit of Prosperity: Party Competition and Policy Outcomes in 50 States
Gamm, G., & Kousser, T. (2021) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421000617 · Cited by 28
Domestic Institutions and Wartime Casualties1
Horowitz, M. C., Simpson, E., & Stam, A. C. (2011) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00679.x · Cited by 39
Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda
Green, E. D. (2011) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041511796301614 · Cited by 38
“In other words, in the terminology of ( Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 ), the size of both Kagame and Museveni’s ‘winning coalition’ is small in comparison to the size of their ‘selectorates,’ which in both cases is synonymous with the electorate.”
BackgroundThe Political Economy of Financial SystemsPreprint
Haber, S. H., & Perotti, E. C. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 43
How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of LeadersPreprint
Horowitz, M. C., & Stam, A. C. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2012633 · Cited by 39
A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered
Sharma, V. S. (2014) · Cambridge Review of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/09557571.2013.872600 · Cited by 38
Huang, X. L., & Gao, Q. (2017) · Social Science Research · doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.11.001 · Cited by 40
“Political economy theory posits that autocratic leaders design social policies and mandate public goods provision for regime legitimacy and support (Wintrobe, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundGrewal, S. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192873910.001.0001 · Cited by 39
Portela, C., & Mora‐Sanguinetti, J. S. (2023) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106370 · Cited by 40
Do Voters’ Coalition Preferences Affect Government Formation?
Debus, M., & Müller, J. M. (2013) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2013.796186 · Cited by 38
Domestic Institutions and the Taxing of Multinational Corporations1
Jensen, N. M. (2013) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12015 · Cited by 38
Tiernay, M. (2013) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002713499720 · Cited by 39
“…effects that interstate war can have on leader survival (Bueno De Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Goemans 2000a, 2000b; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004; Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon 2006; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialBangalore, M., Hochman, G., & Zilberman, D. (2016) · Renewable Energy · doi:10.1016/j.renene.2016.05.062 · Cited by 38
Measuring social trust and trusting the measure
Justwan, F., Bakker, R., & Berejikian, J. (2017) · The Social Science Journal · doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2017.10.001 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2003-08-28
- Volume
- 1
- OpenAlex
- W1535643370
- Cited by
- 4,217
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 147 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 169 · 2022: 257 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 262 · 2019: 312 · 2018: 234 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 253 · 2015: 268 · 2014: 237 · 2013: 243 · 2012: 218
- FWCI
- 70.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Keywords
- political survival, leadership selection, political institutions, resource allocation, public policy incentives, war and politics, economic development, political economy
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