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The Modularity of Mind
Abstract
This study synthesizes current information from the various fields of cognitive science in support of a new and exciting theory of mind. Most psychologists study horizontal processes like memory and information flow; Fodor postulates a vertical and modular psychological organization underlying biologically coherent behaviors. This view of mental architecture is consistent with the historical tradition of faculty psychology while integrating a computational approach to mental processes. One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in artificial intelligence. Bradford Books imprint
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In the citing paper
“This contrasts with classical views that treat perception as a passive internal process in which the brain receives sensory input, processes it, and issues commands for action.”
From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Fodor, 1983
In the citing paper
“Enactive perspectives contrast with classical representationalist views, in which perception is framed as a passive process where sensory input is transmitted through the body's sensory apparatus and transformed into internal representations of the world.”
From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Fodor, 1983
In the citing paper
“which implies that phenomenal transparency-opacity is ‘cognitively impenetrable’”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Fodor, 1983
In the citing paper
“In other words, in contrast with earlier proposals, Gauthier and colleagues have emphasized a domain-general, but process-specific, understanding of FFA activity (for an extended discussion of domain-general vs. domain-specific cognitive processing, see Fodor 1983).”
From Activity in Right Temporo-Parietal Junction is Not Selective for Theory-of-Mind (2008) · cites this paper as Fodor 1983
In the citing paper
“Such models are thus ultimately functionalist in nature; particular behaviours are explained by appeal to a revision of modality-specific prediction errors, as computed by encapsulated, physically localized brain modules, without specifying a particular computational implementation (Fodor 1983).”
From From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind (2018) · cites this paper as Fodor 1983
In the citing paper
“Our findings suggest that the effect of social and ecological complexity may be limited to influencing more specialized, and potentially domain-specific forms of cognition (188-196).”
From The evolution of self-control. (2014) · cites this paper as [191]
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 1,001–1,019 of 1,019
Verschure, P. F. M. J., & Voegtlin, T. (1998) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/s0893-6080(98)00029-x · Cited by 73
Gilbert, S. J., Meuwese, J. D. I., Towgood, K. J., Frith, C. D., & Burgess, P. W. (2009) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awn365 · Cited by 73
Evolutionary systems theory: a unifying meta-theory of psychological science
Badcock, P. B. (2012) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0026381 · Cited by 61
Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
Cross, F. R., Carvell, G. E., Jackson, R. R., & Grace, R. C. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568049 · Cited by 59
Assessment of executive functions in school-aged children: A narrative review
Souissi, S., Chamari, K., & Bellaj, T. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.991699 · Cited by 56
A Modular Mind? A Test Using Individual Data from Seven Primate Species
Amici, F., Barney, B., Johnson, V. E., Call, J., & Aureli, F. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0051918 · Cited by 56
Auditory perception and the evolution of speech
Kuhl, P. K. (1988) · Human Evolution · doi:10.1007/bf02436589 · Cited by 49
Prefrontal cortex: Typical and atypical development
Dennis, M. (2006) · The Frontal Lobes · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511545917.007 · Cited by 41
The Leabra architecture: specialization without modularity
Petrov, A. A., Jilk, D. J., & O'Reilly, R. C. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10001160 · Cited by 26
The language-ready head: Evolutionary considerations
Boeckx, C. (2017) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1087-5 · Cited by 23
The influence of prior belief on scientific thinking
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.011 · Cited by 22
Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020) · Culture, Mind, and Brain · doi:10.1017/9781108695374.010 · Cited by 20
Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debate
Colombo, M. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1427-7 · Cited by 15
Minimal theory of 3D vision: New approach to visual scale and visual shape.
Linton, P. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0455 · Cited by 13
Apples and oranges: The pitfalls of comparative intelligence
Savage, A., & Snowdon, C. T. (1989) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00057897 · Cited by 7
Meaning by Courtesy: LLM-Generated Texts and the Illusion of Content
Ostertag, G. (2023) · The American Journal of Bioethics · doi:10.1080/15265161.2023.2249851 · Cited by 7
Dennett's realisation theory of the relation between folk and scientific psychology
Cussins, A. (1988) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00058659 · Cited by 4
Sensorimotor Mechanisms of Decisions and Actions
James, T. W. (2026) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.a.2484
Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence
Rafiee, B., & Sutton, R. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2605.24238
Metadata
- Authors
- Fodor, J. A.
- Corresponding author
- Fodor, Jerry A.
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 1983-04-06
- OpenAlex
- W2888882506
- Cited by
- 7,734
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 232 · 2025: 241 · 2024: 224 · 2023: 181 · 2022: 186 · 2021: 192 · 2020: 252 · 2019: 402 · 2018: 243 · 2017: 205 · 2016: 180 · 2015: 196 · 2014: 256 · 2013: 181 · 2012: 178
- FWCI
- 87.69
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- UCLA - Biblioteca de Ciencias y Tecnologia Felix Morales Bueno (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
- Keywords
- modularity of mind, Jerry Fodor, theory of mind, cognitive architecture, faculty psychology, computational theory of mind, artificial intelligence, cognitive processes
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