The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Philosophy of Philosophy
Abstract
Preface. Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. The Linguistic Turn and the Conceptual Turn. 2. Taking Philosophical Questions at Face Value. 3. Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity. 4. Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity. 5. Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality. 6. Thought Experiments. 7. Evidence in Philosophy. 8. Knowledge Maximization. Afterword. Must Do Better. Appendix 1. Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic. Appendix 2. Counterfactual Donkeys. Bibliography. Index
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Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, T.
- Venue
- Wiley eBooks
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-11-20
- OpenAlex
- W657137669
- Cited by
- 2,277
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 92.58
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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