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Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
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In the citing paper
“It seems that proposers in the contest condition felt self-servingly entitled to a higher payoff, but responders did not view the contest as relevant to the fair division of the pie.”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994
In the citing paper
“Offers in the contest condition were lower than in the chance condition, and the rejection rate was substantially higher.”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994
In the citing paper
“Experiments using the ultimatum game have shown that seemingly subtle variations in procedure that should not matter from a strictly economic point of view-for example, the mechanism that determines the roles, whether the game is framed as an offer game or a demand game, and the timing and method of eliciting an offerall have powerful effects on how people play the game (Blount, 1995;Hoffman, McC”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994
In the citing paper
“To assess the convergent validity of the ZPG, participants played the dictator game [31].”
From Short-term compassion training increases prosocial behavior in a newly developed prosocial game (2011) · cites this paper as [31]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V.
- Affiliations
- University of Arizona (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1994-11
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 346-380
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2010008813
- Cited by
- 1,674
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 52 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 77 · 2014: 75 · 2013: 103 · 2012: 113
- FWCI
- 76.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness, self-regarding preferences, first-mover advantage, property rights, anonymity, double-blind experiment, expectations, knowledge quiz
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