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On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Stahl, D. O., & Wilson, P. W.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1995-07
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 218-254
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2011353069
- Cited by
- 1,132
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.