The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk
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Citations
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Cited by
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x · Cited by 1,491
The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust
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Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review
Balliet, D. (2010) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002709352443 · Cited by 598
Biais, B., Bisière, C., Bouvard, M., & Casamatta, C. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy095 · Cited by 565
Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, V.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-02
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 286-298
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2006567420
- Cited by
- 551
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 12.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.