The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk
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Citations
Cites
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The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
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Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk
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Mutual influence between language and perception in multi-agent communication games
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“Communication games have been used to study the emergence and evolution of language theoretically [29], experimentally [30, 31], and computationally [32].”
Rankings and Risk‐Taking in the Finance Industry
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Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, V.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-02
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 286-298
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2006567420
- Cited by
- 551
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 12.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.