The hard problem of AI rights
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“Although human-like conversations may activate mind schemas and lead users to attribute consciousness or agency to AI (Guingrich & Graziano, 2024), AI agents lack consciousness and lived experiences, and therefore are unable to form mutual emotional relationships with users (Andreotta, 2021;Floridi & Sanders, 2004;Formosa et al., 2025;Geiselmann et al., 2023).”
From Parasocial relationships with artificial intelligence (AI): A systematic review of benefits and risks (2026) · cites this paper as Andreotta, 2021
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Cited by
Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness
Shepherd, J. (2024) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-023-01835-6 · Cited by 36
Hung, J. W., Lee, C. K. Y., Kasturiratna, K. T. A. S., & Hartanto, A. (2026) · Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans · doi:10.1016/j.chbah.2026.100323 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Andreotta, A. J.
- ORCID
- Andreotta, Adam J.
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2020-05-30
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 19-32
- ISSN
- 0951-5666
- 1435-5655
- Cited by
- 46
- References
- 13
- Language
- en
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
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