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The hard problem of AI rights

Andreotta, Adam J. · 2021 · AI & SOCIETY
Cited by 46

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

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Show all 13 references

Research works printed but not linked: 49

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Andreotta, A. J.
Venue
AI & SOCIETY
Published
2020-05-30
Volume
36
Issue
1
Pages
19-32
ISSN
  • 0951-5666
  • 1435-5655
Cited by
46
References
13
Language
en
Licence

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The hard problem of AI rights. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s00146-020-00997-x
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Andreotta, A. J. (2021). The hard problem of AI rights. AI & SOCIETY. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00997-x

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