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Cited by 7Corruption and Economic DevelopmentElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationFiscal Policies and Political Economy

Corruption and partisan polarization: evidence from the European Union

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Apergis, Nicholas, Pinar, Mehmet·2023·Empirical Economics
DOI 10.1007/s00181-022-02247-z
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Abstract

Recent work documents that even though partisan polarization may have detrimental economic and social outcomes, polarized societies lead to better governance and less corruption. However, the effect of corruption on partisan polarization has been mostly ignored by the literature. By using various measures of partisan polarization and corruption, this paper demonstrates that corrupt behaviours are associated with more partisan polarization in the European Union, indicating that a stronger presence of corruption leads to higher partisan polarization. The findings are robust to the use of different polarization measures, methodologies, and a battery of control variables. This paper’s main finding, increased corruption leading to increased partisan polarization, provides another important mechanism beyond the standard socio-economic factors that led to the current rise in support of parties opposing to European Union and rise of populist parties in European Union. Polarized societies tend to generate inefficient economic outcomes and the alleviation of corruption could improve economic outcomes by decreasing partisan polarization.

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  • As new political parties may emerge seeking to challenge the corrupt elite, the political arena becomes more fragmented and polarized.

    “As new political parties may emerge, seeking to challenge the corrupt elite, the political arena becomes more fragmented and polarized (Apergis & Pinar, 2023).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Apergis & Pinar, 2023

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Apergis, N., & Pinar, M.
Affiliations
  • University of Piraeus (GR)
  • Edge Hill University (GB)
Corresponding author
Pinar, Mehmet
ORCID
Venue
Empirical Economics
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2022-05-05
Volume
64
Issue
1
Pages
277-301
ISSN
  • 0377-7332 (ISSN-L)
  • 1435-8921
DOI
10.1007/s00181-022-02247-z
OpenAlex
W4229015578
Cited by
7
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2
FWCI
2.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Empirical Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Deposito de Investigacion Universidad de Sevilla (University of Seville) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Deposito de Investigacion Universidad de Sevilla (University of Seville) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Keywords
corruption, partisan polarization, European Union, populist parties, governance, political economy, economic outcomes, polarization measures

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