The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On economic applications of evolutionary game theory
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Why is economic geography not an evolutionary science? Towards an evolutionary economic geography
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Exploring the effect of digital transformation on Firms’ innovation performance
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What is specific about evolutionary economics?
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Zakaria (2025) · doi:10.3390/su17094053 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Friedman, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Published
- 1998-03-19
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 15-43
- ISSN
- 0936-9937 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1386
- OpenAlex
- W2062799716
- Cited by
- 879
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 12.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.