Rapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Over the past several decades, we have argued that cultural evolution can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation because it often leads to more rapid adaptation than genetic evolution, and, when multiple stable equilibria exist, rapid adaptation leads to variation among groups. Recently, Lehmann, Feldman, and colleagues have published several papers questioning this argument. They analyze models showing that cultural evolution can actually reduce the range of conditions under which cooperation can evolve and interpret these models as indicating that we were wrong to conclude that culture facilitated the evolution of human cooperation. In the main, their models assume that rates of cultural adaption are not strong enough compared to migration to maintain persistent variation among groups when payoffs create multiple stable equilibria. We show that Lehmann et al. reach different conclusions because they have made different assumptions. We argue that the assumptions that underlie our models are more consistent with the empirical data on large-scale cultural variation in humans than those of Lehmann et al., and thus, our models provide a more plausible account of the cultural evolution of human cooperation in large groups. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s00265-010-1100-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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Citations
Cites
Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution
Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2004) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226712130.001.0001 · Cited by 2,793 · cited 3×
“(See Richerson and Boyd 2005 and Henrich and Henrich 2007 for references).”
BackgroundSelf-citationHenrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 3×
“Recent studies of cultural transmission in humans suggest that learning mechanisms generate potent effects (see reviews in Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Henrich and Henrich 2007: chapter 2; McElreath et al. 2008; Mesoudi 2009), and the literatures on the diffusion of innovations, public health,…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748 · cited 5×
“Lehmann et al. (2007) analyze a model of the evolution of cooperation and punishment that is similar to that in Boyd et al. (2003) .”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citationCultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Henrich, J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5 · Cited by 1,096 · cited 1×
“Summaries and further references can be found in Richerson and Boyd (2005), Boyd and Richerson (2009), Henrich (2004, 2008), and Henrich and Henrich (2007).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCooperation between non-kin in animal societies
Clutton-Brock, T. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature08366 · Cited by 951
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Self-citationDid Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?
Bowles, S. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1168112 · Cited by 773
The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion
Henrich, J. (2009) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005 · Cited by 693 · cited 3×
“Adaptive learning biases in human cognition, including conformist learning, can both re-enforce these effects, and in some circumstances, stabilize many equilibria in the absence of reputational mechanisms (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Henrich 2009).”
BackgroundSelf-citationHenrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
Self-citationGroup beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
BOYD, R., & RICHERSON, P. J. (2002) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515 · Cited by 455 · cited 15×
“This is a crucial modification of Boyd and Richerson (2002) where the core assumption is that there is are two norms, both stable when common.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
The cultural evolution of prosocial religions
Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14001356 · Cited by 934
Self-citationCulture-gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of human prosociality
Chudek, M., & Henrich, J. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.03.003 · Cited by 739
Self-citationA mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1400106x · Cited by 639
Self-citationSixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans
West, S. A., El Mouden, C., & Gardner, A. (2011) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.08.001 · Cited by 541
Atran, S., & Henrich, J. (2010) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1162/biot_a_00018 · Cited by 459
Self-citationThe Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation
Henrich, J., & Muthukrishna, M. (2021) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106 · Cited by 457
“Based on data from a small Fijian community of roughly 200 people, one analysis found that cultural relatedness based on common descent (i.e., learning from the same models) was 0.053 or less (Boyd et al. 2011).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationGeneralizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups
Wilson, D. S., Ostrom, E., & Cox, M. E. (2013) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.010 · Cited by 442
Richerson, P., & Henrich, J. (2012) · Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution · doi:10.21237/c7clio3112453 · Cited by 131
Self-citationThe greatness and limitations of Erich Fromm’s humanism
Cortina, M. (2015) · Contemporary Psychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/00107530.2015.999297 · Cited by 32
“…engagement takes the form of a conversation, because communication is its most important function, and prepares the ground for the extensive cooperation and social learning needed to assimilate a huge amount of cultural knowledge that has accumulated though several millennia (Boyd et al., 2011b).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., & Henrich, J.
- Venue
- Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology
- Published
- 2010-12-01
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 431-444
- ISSN
- 0340-5443 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0762
- OpenAlex
- W2072387993
- Cited by
- 144
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 251.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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