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Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
Open accessAbstract
Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N=990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2-4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N=112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N=189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N=140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.
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“Conspiracy belief is correlated with lower levels of analytic thinking (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014)”
From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014
In the citing paper
“Recent research has linked individual differences in analytic thinking with skepticism about various epistemically suspect information, such as fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019;2020), religious and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2016;Shenhav et al., 2012), conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014), and pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook et al., 2015;Pennycook & Rand, 2020).”
From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Swami et al., 2014
In the citing paper
“This result extends prior research that associated analytic thinking with higher scrutiny towards other post-truth phenomena, such as fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019, 2020) and conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014).”
From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Swami et al., 2014
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“For psychoeducation to be effective, it should also instigate analytical thinking, which appears to decrease conspiracy theory adherence [22].”
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“It could also be the case that conspiracy theories attract an intuitive thinking style simply due to their nature of typically requiring lower cognitive effort and triggering affective feelings (Swami et al., 2014; Swami & Furnham, 2014; van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018).”
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“Social-psychological research has demonstrated that conspiracy beliefs can be seen as the by-product of intuitive reasoning (Swami et al., 2014), conflictual intergroup relations (Biddlestone et al., 2020), maladaptive coping strategies (Marchlewska et al., 2021), uncertainty, distrust (van Mulukom…”
BackgroundFake news: When the dark side of persuasion takes over
Nyilasy, G. (2019) · International Journal of Advertising · doi:10.1080/02650487.2019.1586210 · Cited by 65
“Belief in conspiracy theories is associated with anger and helplessness (Butler, Koopman, and Zimbardo 1995), social isolation and closed as opposed to open societies (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009); existential threat (Newheiser, Farias, and Tausch 2011), lack of analytic thinking (Swami et al. 2014) and need for cognit…”
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Bronstein, M. V., Pennycook, G., Joormann, J., Corlett, P. R., & Cannon, T. D. (2019) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2019.101748 · Cited by 68
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“Research has shown that tendency to believe in conspiracy theories is related to lower levels of analytic thinking and open-mindedness and higher levels of intuitive thinking (Swami et al., 2014; Pennycook et al., 2015, 2020).”
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“We also added a measure of analytical thinking which was expected to be negatively relatedwith conspiracy theory beliefs (Šrol et al., 2020Preprint; Swami & Barron, 2020; Swami et al., 2014).”
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“Scholarship suggests that people who believe in conspiracy theories report lower levels of agency than others (Swami et al. 2014), a trend which is exacerbated when the problem under consideration is particularly dangerous (Newheiser, Farias, and Tausch 2011).”
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“It has long been recognised that people’s tendency to engage in intuitive or analytic thinking plays an important role in the endorsement of different ESBs (e.g., Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al. 2015; Risen 2016; Swami et al. 2014).”
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“However, earlier studies suggested a link between people’s better analytic thinking and fewer conspiracy beliefs(Swami et al., 2014).”
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“To provide conclusive evidence that cognitive ability and rationality motives interactively cause changes in UB, future experiments should not only manipulate rationality motives but also cognitive ability as well (e.g., by using a cognitive disfluency task, see Swami et al., 2014; Studies 2–4).”
BackgroundThe Politics of Attributing Blame for Cyberattacks and the Costs of Uncertainty
Schulzke, M. (2018) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s153759271800110x · Cited by 22
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“…might indeed lead an individual to be less susceptible to conjunction fallacy, which is a violation of a probabilistic rule, thus confirming Swami et al. (2014)’s hypothesis, but that does not necessarily apply also to confirmation bias, which is a violation of a normative belief-updating…”
InfluentialDoes deliberation decrease belief in conspiracies?Preprint
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“Because Open-Minded Cognition is part of a broader ‘analytical reasoning’ style it has been found to be associated with lower levels of conspiracist ideation (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014).”
The conspiracy of Covid-19 and 5G: Spatial analysis fallacies in the age of data democratization
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“In the following sections, we consider some principles of explanation in human geography, both as a means of interrogating the basis of conspiracy theory correlation, and to advance critical tools for their further deconstruction (Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundAvoidant attachment style and conspiracy ideation
Leone, L., Giacomantonio, M., Williams, R., & Michetti, D. (2018) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2018.06.043 · Cited by 26
Does Poor Understanding of Physical World Predict Religious and Paranormal Beliefs?
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“…thinking is important as individual differences in analytic thinking have been shown to relate to a host of irrational beliefs, including conspiracy and super-natural thinking (Pennycook, Fugelsang & Koehler, 2015b; Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014).”
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Conspiracy theories and reasonable pluralism
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“As such, the most typical remedies proposed in the public sphere revolve around media literacy and critical thinking in education (e.g. Douglas et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2014; Van Prooijen, 2017).”
BackgroundPsychometric properties of the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale
Janssen, E. M., Verkoeijen, P. P. J. L., Heijltjes, A. E. G., Mainhard, T., van Peppen, L. M., & van Gog, T. (2020) · Thinking Skills and Creativity · doi:10.1016/j.tsc.2020.100659 · Cited by 42
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Australasian Public Awareness and Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Motivational Correlates
Marques, M. D., Ling, M., Williams, M. N., Kerr, J. R., & McLennan, J. (2021) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12746 · Cited by 51
Injustice Without Evidence: The Unique Role of Conspiracy Theories in Social Justice Research
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“Belief in conspiracy theories is positively related with intuitive thinking yet negatively with analytic thinking (Swami et al., 2014), and is closely coupled with a range of non-evidentiary beliefs such as witchcraft, PSI, spiritualism, superstition, and precognition (Darwin et al.”
BackgroundSuspicious conspiracy theories
Dentith, M. R. X. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03602-4 · Cited by 40
“Indeed, some generalists (like Swami et al. (2014) and Daniel Pipes, 1997) argue that conspiracy theories are just false by definition.”
BackgroundThe generic conspiracist beliefs scale – 5: A short-form measure of conspiracist ideation
Kay, C. S., & Slovic, P. (2022) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2022.104315 · Cited by 43
Bots and Computational Propaganda: Automation for Communication and Control
Woolley, S. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.006 · Cited by 41
Buturoiu, R., Udrea, G., Oprea, D.-A., & Corbu, N. (2021) · Societies · doi:10.3390/soc11040138 · Cited by 39
“Nevertheless, we believe that analytic thinking is an important means to counter the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories [6,37,42], as education proved to play an important role.”
BackgroundFacts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and Content Moderation
Keller, D., & Leerssen, P. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.011 · Cited by 39
Ferreira, S., Campos, C., Marinho, B., Rocha, S., Fonseca‐Pedrero, E., & Rocha, N. (2021) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114611 · Cited by 44
“Previous evidence suggests that psychotic experiences are positively related to conspiracy theories receptivity and ontological fantastic stories, as these experiences potentiate the development of bizarre or abnormal thoughts and non-conventional logic, which in turn might be associated with impaired perceptive decis…”
Normativity in studying conspiracy theory belief: Seven guidelines
Peels, R., Kindermann, N., & Ranalli, C. (2023) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2191644 · Cited by 37
Jabkowski, P., Domaradzki, J., & Baranowski, M. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-44752-w · Cited by 37
Empowerment as a Tool to Reduce Belief in Conspiracy Theories
van Prooijen, J. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0030 · Cited by 37
Counterfactual thinking as a prebunking strategy to contrast misinformation on COVID-19
Bertolotti, M., & Catellani, P. (2022) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104404 · Cited by 40
Health misinformation: what it is, why people believe it, how to counter it
Nan, X., Thier, K., & Wang, Y. (2023) · Annals of the International Communication Association · doi:10.1080/23808985.2023.2225489 · Cited by 42
“Scienti fi c, reliable health misinformation is often complex and nuanced, whereas rumors and conspiracy theories are almost always intuitive and tantalizing (Pytlik et al., 2020; Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundInoculating Against Anti-Vaccination Conspiracies
Banas, J. A., Bessarabova, E., Penkauskas, M. C., & Talbert, N. (2023) · Health Communication · doi:10.1080/10410236.2023.2235733 · Cited by 19
“Research on the effect of logical reasoning on conspiratorial beliefs has demonstrated that when analytic reasoning is increased, con-spiracy theories appear less plausible (Swami et al., 2014).”
Does think mean the same thing as believe? Linguistic insights into religious cognition.
Heiphetz, L., Landers, C., & Leeuwen, N. V. (2018) · Psychology of Religion and Spirituality · doi:10.1037/rel0000238 · Cited by 38
Conspiracy theories on Twitter: emerging motifs and temporal dynamics during the COVID-19 pandemic
Batzdorfer, V., Steinmetz, H., Biella, M., & Alizadeh, M. (2022) · International Journal of Data Science and Analytics · doi:10.1007/s41060-021-00298-6 · Cited by 38
“…discussions [22, 23], anti-science CTs, often discussed with the example of anti-climate change CTs [24–26] or anti-vaccination CTs [27–29], and the role of demographic predictors [20, 30], political predictors, such as political orientation [31, 32], or psychological predictors [33–36].”
BackgroundFactors associated with the myth about 5G network during COVID-19 pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa
Ovenseri-Ogbomo, G. O., Ishaya, T., Osuagwu, U. L., Abu, E. K., Nwaeze, O., Oloruntoba, R., Ekpenyong, B. N., Mashige, K. P., Timothy, C. G., Langsi, R., et al. (2020) · Journal of Global Health Reports · doi:10.29392/001c.17606 · Cited by 31
Democratic Creative Destruction? The Effect of a Changing Media Landscape on Democracy
Nielsen, R. K., & Fletcher, R. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.008 · Cited by 35
Falling for fake news: the role of political bias and cognitive ability
Tandoc, E. C., Lee, J., Chew, M., Tan, F. X., & Goh, Z. H. (2021) · Asian Journal of Communication · doi:10.1080/01292986.2021.1941149 · Cited by 38
Swami, V., & Barron, D. S. (2021) · Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology · doi:10.1177/18344909211037385 · Cited by 40
“…(for a review, see Pennycook et al., 2015a), with greater rational/analytic thinking in particular being associated with significantly lower belief in conspiracy theories (Barron et al., 2018; Swami et al., 2014; van Prooijen, 2017), including COVID-19 conspiracy theories ( Cavojová et al., 2021).”
BackgroundCaycho‐Rodríguez, T., Ventura‐León, J., Valencia, P. D., Vilca, L. W., Carbajal‐León, C., Reyes-Bossio, M. A., White, M., Rojas-Jara, C., Polanco-Carrasco, R., Gallegos, M., et al. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.855713 · Cited by 36
Interconnectedness and (in)coherence as a signature of conspiracy worldviews
Miani, A., Hills, T. T., & Bangerter, A. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abq3668 · Cited by 35
“Conversely, analytic thinking style, negatively associated with belief in CTs ( 47 ), decreases the endorsement of contradictory statements ( 48 ).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Westminster (GB)
- University of Vienna (AT)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Swami, Viren
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-12
- Volume
- 133
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 572-585
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965444852
- Cited by
- 726
- References
- 105
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 77 · 2024: 81 · 2023: 71 · 2022: 122 · 2021: 100 · 2020: 94 · 2019: 43 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 15
- FWCI
- 55.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nbn-resolving.de
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- WestminsterResearch (University of Westminster) (acceptedVersion)
- KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, analytical thinking, conspiracist ideation, intuitive thinking, open-mindedness, verbal fluency
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Culture, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Personality, Thinking, Young Adult
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