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Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
Open accessAbstract
Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N=990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2-4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N=112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N=189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N=140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.
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“Conspiracy belief is correlated with lower levels of analytic thinking (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014)”
From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014
In the citing paper
“Recent research has linked individual differences in analytic thinking with skepticism about various epistemically suspect information, such as fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019;2020), religious and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2016;Shenhav et al., 2012), conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014), and pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook et al., 2015;Pennycook & Rand, 2020).”
From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Swami et al., 2014
In the citing paper
“This result extends prior research that associated analytic thinking with higher scrutiny towards other post-truth phenomena, such as fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019, 2020) and conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014).”
From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Swami et al., 2014
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“…control (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013), perceptions of lower social status (Freeman & Bentall, 2017), less analytic thinking (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014), lower levels of education and income (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Freeman &…”
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“As several studies have shown, just like conspiracy belief (Swami et al., 2014), belief in the paranormal is negatively associated with analytical thinking style (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012).”
BackgroundPennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/uhbk9 · Cited by 390
Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain
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Social Media, Echo Chambers, and Political Polarization
Barberá, P. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.004 · Cited by 373
van Prooijen, J., Douglas, K. M., & De Inocencio, C. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2331 · Cited by 355
Everyday Consequences of Analytic Thinking
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721415604610 · Cited by 384
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van Mulukom, V., Pummerer, L., Alper, S., Bai, H., Čavojová, V., Farias, J. E. M., Kay, C. S., Lazarević, L. B., Lobato, E. J. C., Marinthe, G., et al. (2022) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114912 · Cited by 437
“Several cognitive biases and styles, usually those that conflict with more analytical, elaborative thinking, are argued to foster conspiracy beliefs (Brotherton and French, 2014; Douglas et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2014).”
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“According to Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham (2014), conspiracy theories (CTs) can be de fi ned as a set of “ false beliefs in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a plot by multiple actors working together with a clear goal in mind, often lawfully and in secret ”…”
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“…are driven by the extent to which people view epistemic rationality as important for them personally. unfounded beliefs did not control for CA (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2011; Swami et al., 2014; for an exception, see Pennycook et al., 2012).”
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“…(as opposed to relying more on their intuitions) are more likely to endorse evolution (Gervais, 2015), and vaccination (Sarathchandra et al., 2018) and are less likely to believe in superstitions (Pennycook et al., 2012), conspiracies (Swami et al., 2014), and fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019b).”
BackgroundAn Existential Threat Model of Conspiracy Theories
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“While there is evidence for an indirect role as CRT performance successfully predicted scepticism about CAMs and an analytic cognitive style has been associated with spiritual [59], religious [60], paranormal [56], and conspiratorial [61] thinking, the lack of direct association nonetheless suggests that negative atti…”
BackgroundSwami, V., Furnham, A. F., Smyth, N., Weis, L., Lay, A., & Clow, A. (2016) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.04.084 · Cited by 219
“Although this is comparable to other studies (e.g., thinking styles account for 8% of the variance in belief in conspiracy theories; Swami et al., 2014), it does point to neglected variables that could contribute to a fuller picture of the antecedents of conspiracist ideation.”
BackgroundResultMeasuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Validation of a French and English Single-Item Scale
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“Most of the existing studies regarding the nature of conspiracy theories are descriptive; moreover, experimental research exploring the possibility of CT belief change is very rare (Banas and Miller, 2013; Swami et al., 2014).”
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“, 2016), an effect that may be explained by the general negative correlation between belief in CTs and analytic processing style (Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundResultIndividual difference factors and beliefs in medical and political conspiracy theories
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Why conspiracy theories matter: A social psychological analysis
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“interventions that focus on the development of analytical thinking skills, may ultimately prove effective (Douglas et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2013).”
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“Additionally, we experimentally investigate whether political attitudes can be manipulated by priming intuition or reflection—something that no published study we are aware of has yet attempted (but see Swami et al., 2014, on manipulating conspiracist ideation).”
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“Although some conspiracy theories may be considered harmless, research has shown that belief in conspiracy theories is associated with negative social, health, and civic outcomes [2], including more acceptance of violent behaviour [3] and a decrease in prosocial behaviour [4].”
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“This finding is in line with prior results indicating a close association of both constructs (37, 38).”
InfluentialThe efficacy of interventions in reducing belief in conspiracy theories: A systematic review
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“Some priming interventions seek to alter one’s cognition by administering tasks that increase focus and analytical thinking [25].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialFacts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and Content Moderation
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“Beliefs in conspiracy theories are positively related to intuitive rather than analytic thinking [37].”
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“…terrorist attack [6,7], have been a focus of study in the political science literature, which regards such beliefs as ones “in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a plot by multiple actors working together with a clear goal in mind, often unlawfully and in secret” [8].”
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“…one ’ s initial or preferred conclusion and beliefs (Baron et al., 2015, 2016; Stanovich et al., 2016), has been shown to be negatively associated with anti-science attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and paranormal beliefs (Stanovich et al., 2016; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b; Swami et al., 2014).”
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Adam‐Troian, J., Wagner‐Egger, P., Motyl, M. S., Arciszewski, T., Imhoff, R., Zimmer, F., Klein, O., Babińska, M., Bangerter, A., Bilewicz, M., et al. (2020) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12716 · Cited by 119
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“In explanation, it has been suggested that conspiracy theories and anomalous beliefs share features in common (e.g., both overly rely on intuitive-experiential processing of information and lack rigorous, self-generated testing; Swami et al., 2014) and that endorsement of one set of anomalous beliefs (e.”
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The entertainment value of conspiracy theories
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The relationship between schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs via cognitive processes.
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“This is important as it suggests that the findings reported in previous studies (Barron et al., 2014; Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2014; van der Tempel and Alcock, 2015) are relatively robust and remain stable across different samples.”
InfluentialBeliefs in conspiracy theories following ostracism
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“In contrast, individuals high in analytical thinking (Swami et al., 2014) and perceived control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015) tend to be less likely to endorse conspiracy theories.”
BackgroundOnline communication as a window to conspiracist worldviews
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The Conspiracy Mentality Scale
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Conspiracy Thinking in Europe and America: A Comparative Study
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“Analytical thinking is negatively related to belief in conspiracy theories, as analytical skills enable people to evaluate conspiracy theories more critically, in particular conspiracy theories that defy logic and are not supported by evidence (Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundIndividual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories
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Anti-Vaccination Beliefs and Unrelated Conspiracy Theories
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Misbehaving in the Corona crisis: The role of anxiety and unfounded beliefs
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Bridging the great divide: Conspiracy theory research for the 21st century
Bütter, M., & Knight, P. (2015) · Diogenes · doi:10.1177/0392192116669289 · Cited by 95
“Others have conducted experiments to show that belief in potentially harmful conspiracy theories can be reduced with a task that increases analytic thinking (Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundPennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Bagó, B., & Rand, D. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/zhjkp · Cited by 47
“…(as opposed to relying more on their intuitions) are more likely to endorse evolution (Gervais, 2015), and vaccination (Sarathchandra et al., 2018) and are less likely to believe in superstitions (Pennycook et al., 2012), conspiracies (Swami et al., 2014), and fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019b).”
BackgroundČavojová, V., Šrol, J., & Jurkovič, M. (2019) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3595 · Cited by 103
Lantian, A., Bagneux, V., Delouvée, S., & Gauvrit, N. (2021) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3790 · Cited by 124
Romer, D., & Jamieson, K. H. (2021) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114480 · Cited by 105
“, 2017, 2019) whose intent is malign (Swami et al., 2014).”
Norris, P., Garnett, H. A., & Grömping, M. (2019) · Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2019.1593181 · Cited by 92
“This is particularly prevalent among those with lower cognitive skills (Swami et al. 2014), who may not have an alternative means to make sense of a situation.”
BackgroundNeubauer, A. C. (2021) · Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.intell.2021.101563 · Cited by 106
van Prooijen, J., Rodrigues, T. C., Bunzel, C., Georgescu, O., Komáromy, D., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2022) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12802 · Cited by 105
The detection of political deepfakes
Appel, M., & Prietzel, F. (2022) · Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication · doi:10.1093/jcmc/zmac008 · Cited by 95
“Rand, 2019; 2020) and conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014).”
Factors Related to COVID-19 Preventive Behaviors: A Structural Equation Model
Šuriņa, S., Mārtinsone, K., Perepjolkina, V., Koļesņikova, J., Vainik, U., Ruža, A., Vrubļevska, J., Smirnova, D. A., Fountoulakis, K. Ν., & Rancāns, E. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.676521 · Cited by 113
“…also show negative correlation between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 threat appraisal (H3 supported), and as mentioned in other studies (Swami et al., 2014; Allington et al., 2020; Banai et al., 2020), our research confirms a negative correlation between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and…”
ResultNapolitano, M. G., & Reuter, K. (2021) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00441-6 · Cited by 91
Wilson, J. A. (2018) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-018-9956-0 · Cited by 90
“…is similar to Aarnio and Lindeman (2005) who found that men actually had a higher belief in aliens, and who suggested that women show a more intuitive thinking processes than men and that intuitive thinking has been associated with increased belief in non-empirical subjects (Swami et al. 2014).”
InfluentialFake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines
Bago, B., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/29b4j · Cited by 593
Analytic-thinking predicts hoax beliefs and helping behaviors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
Stanley, M. L., Barr, N., Peters, K., & Seli, P. (2020) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2020.1813806 · Cited by 88
“…on the CRT are less likely to hold paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2012), less likely to believe that conspiracy theories are veridical (Swami et al., 2014), better at differentiating real and fake news reports (Bronstein et al., 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2020), and less likely to find…”
BackgroundGerts, D., Shelley, C. D., Parikh, N., Pitts, T., Ross, C. W., Fairchild, G. C., Chavez, N. Y. V., & Daughton, A. R. (2021) · JMIR Public Health and Surveillance · doi:10.2196/26527 · Cited by 84
“These observations are consistent with prior studies that showed that people who believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to also believe in others or are more broadly prone to conspiratorial thinking [60,61].”
Is It All a Conspiracy? Conspiracy Theories and People’s Attitude to COVID-19 Vaccination
Yang, Z., Luo, X., & Jia, H. (2021) · Vaccines · doi:10.3390/vaccines9101051 · Cited by 84
Hart, J., & Graether, M. (2018) · Journal of Individual Differences · doi:10.1027/1614-0001/a000268 · Cited by 83
Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement
Stanovich, K. E., & Toplak, M. E. (2023) · Journal of Intelligence · doi:10.3390/jintelligence11020027 · Cited by 114
Metadata
- Authors
- Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Westminster (GB)
- University of Vienna (AT)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Swami, Viren
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-12
- Volume
- 133
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 572-585
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965444852
- Cited by
- 726
- References
- 105
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 77 · 2024: 81 · 2023: 71 · 2022: 122 · 2021: 100 · 2020: 94 · 2019: 43 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 15
- FWCI
- 55.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nbn-resolving.de
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- WestminsterResearch (University of Westminster) (acceptedVersion)
- KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, analytical thinking, conspiracist ideation, intuitive thinking, open-mindedness, verbal fluency
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Culture, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Personality, Thinking, Young Adult
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