The DOI matches its Crossref record; 154 of the 154 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans
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Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
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Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. B
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Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825 · cited 2×
“Some types of help are committed because a person has a genuine or unfeigned concern for the wellbeing of the recipient (e.g. empathy, Batson et al., 1997; oneness with others, Cialdini et al., 1997; “warm glow,” Andreoni, 1990).”
BackgroundAltruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616 · cited 2×
“…limited: one can use partner control mechanisms like conditional cooperation and punishment to enforce a partner's cooperation (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Fehr & Gächter, 2002), but one cannot use partner choice to assort with better cooperators or enforce cooperation by threatening to leave (e.g.…”
BackgroundThe Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture
Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992) · Cited by 5,466
Universal dimensions of social cognition: warmth and competence
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Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Impression management: A literature review and two-component model.
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Cited by
Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1400106x · Cited by 639
Gossip and Ostracism Promote Cooperation in Groups
Feinberg, M., Willer, R., & Schultz, M. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613510184 · Cited by 471
Handbook of Heroism and Heroic Leadership
(2016) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315690100 · Cited by 418
Prestige-biased social learning: current evidence and outstanding questions
Jiménez, Á. V., & Mesoudi, A. (2019) · Palgrave Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-019-0228-7 · Cited by 204
Wu, J., Balliet, D., Peperkoorn, L. S., Romano, A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02956 · Cited by 156
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93
The true trigger of shame: social devaluation is sufficient, wrongdoing is unnecessary
Robertson, T. E., Sznycer, D., Delton, A. W., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2018) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.05.010 · Cited by 77
Partner choice versus punishment in human Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Barclay, P., & Raihani, N. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.004 · Cited by 67
“…depend on the likelihood of achieving a better partner by switching: people should not prefer switching if the available partners are no better than their current partner (McNamara et al., 2008), whereas they should prefer switching if they can actively choose a preferred partner (Barclay, 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationNetworks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
Takács, K., Gross, J., Testori, M., Letina, S., Kenny, A. R., Power, E. A., & Wittek, R. P. M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297 · Cited by 61
Pleasant, A., & Barclay, P. (2018) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797617752642 · Cited by 60
“Barclay (2013) proposed a different hypothesis about antisocial punishment and do-gooder derogation, which is based on biological-markets theory.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationRotella, A., Jung, J., Chinn, C., & Barclay, P. (2026) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672251345512 · Cited by 5
“In fact, reputation-based partner choice is important in maintaining human cooperation (Barclay, 2013, 2016; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010), where people with better reputations are more often chosen as partners (Barclay & Barker, 2020; Barclay & Willer, 2007; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010), and receive…”
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Barclay, P.
- Venue
- Evolution and Human Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-05
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 164-175
- ISSN
- 1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2036664156
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 154
- FWCI
- 76.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.