IoT cyber risk: A holistic analysis of cyber risk assessment frameworks, risk vectors, and risk ranking process
Open accessAbstract
Security vulnerabilities of the modern Internet of Things (IoT) systems are unique, mainly due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the technology and data. The risks born out of these IoT systems cannot easily fit into an existing risk framework. There are many cybersecurity risk assessment approaches and frameworks that are under deployment in many governmental and commercial organizations. Extending these existing frameworks to IoT systems alone will not address the new risks that have arisen in the IoT ecosystem. This study has included a review of existing popular cyber risk assessment methodologies and their suitability to IoT systems. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation, Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis, and International Standards Organization are the four main frameworks critically analyzed in this research study. IoT risks are presented and reviewed in terms of the IoT risk category and impacted industries. IoT systems in financial technology and healthcare are dealt with in detail, given their high-risk exposure. Risk vectors for IoT and the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) are discussed in this study. A unique risk ranking method to rank and quantify IoT risk is introduced in this study. This ranking method initiates a risk assessment approach exclusively for IoT systems by quantifying IoT risk vectors, leading to effective risk mitigation strategies and techniques. A unique computational approach to calculate the cyber risk for IoT systems with IoT-specific impact factors has been designed and explained in the context of IoMT systems.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This paper reviews major cyber risk assessment frameworks (NIST, OCTAVE, TARA, ISO) for IoT suitability and argues existing frameworks need customization because IoT risks are complex, heterogeneous, and often not quantified. It proposes a novel IoT risk-scoring method using IoT-specific impact and likelihood factors, demonstrated on IoMT devices such as pacemakers and blood sugar monitors.
Key findings
- NIST, OCTAVE, TARA, and ISO are critically analyzed; all four cover CIA principles, but NIST, OCTAVE, and TARA do not quantify risk, while ISO promotes standardization and compliance.
- In healthcare, NIST is the most used security framework at 57.9%, followed by HITRUST at 26.4%; a cited survey reports 82% of healthcare industries have undergone IoT-focused cyber attacks, with 230 of 700 respondents from healthcare.
- The paper introduces risk ranking as `rr = impact × likelihood`, with risk rank ranges: 81–100 very high, 51–80 high, 21–50 medium, 5–20 low, and 0–4 very low.
- The proposed IoT risk computation is `r(d) = w(d) × s(d)`, where impact `w(d) = [nwt + prt + het + des + cia]/5` and likelihood `S(d) = [pat + lyr + scr + drf]/4`; example scores are 72 (high) for a pacemaker side-channel attack and 36 (medium) for blood sugar monitor tampering.
Methods
- Design: a review and critical analysis of existing cyber risk assessment frameworks and their suitability for IoT, plus a proposed computational risk-scoring model with IoT-specific impact and likelihood parameters.
- Data/sample: literature-based analysis of frameworks, IoT/IoMT risk vectors, and illustrative IoMT device examples; no primary empirical dataset is collected.
- Main analysis: qualitative comparison of NIST, OCTAVE, TARA, and ISO, followed by formula-based risk scoring applied to IoMT examples using weighted parameters such as network type, protocol susceptibility, heterogeneity, device security, CIA impact, past attacks, IoT layer, sector, and device risk factor.
Limitations
- Stated: there are no standard IoT risk frameworks currently available; existing frameworks can be modified for IoT but most do not quantify risk, and more work is needed to enhance awareness of medical device cybersecurity risks.
- Evident from the text: the proposed model is demonstrated only on selected IoMT examples, with weights and parameter values assigned in tables rather than empirically validated across a broader IoT dataset.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 47 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingcitation
The network layer of IoT/IoMT undergoes a number of attacks.
“It is observed that the network layer of IoT/IoMT undergoes a number of attacks [77].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [77] S. Shiva et al, Security and privacy in the Internet of Medical Things: taxonomy and risk assessment, 2017, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/LCN.Workshops.2017.72 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation
There are four types of IoT risk vector classes: cloud-related, real time-oriented, autonomous, and recovery-related.
“There are four types of IoT risk vector classes that have been identified: cloud-related, real time-oriented, autonomous, and recovery-related.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [36] Petar Radanliev, David C. De Roure et al, Standardisation of cyber risk impact assessment for the Internet of Things, Oxford e-Research Center, University of Oxford, 2018
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- Findingnone given
Though encryption is done, there are chances for some BLE devices to be affected by Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks.
“Though encryption is done, there are chances for some BLE devices to be affected by Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
The proposed IoT risk computational model computes risk impact and risk likelihood, leading to a risk score.
“The highpoint of this work is the introduction of a novel IoT risk computational model, that computes risk impact and risk likelihood, leading to risk score.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
Network traffic is intercepted by the attacker through impersonation.
“Network traffic is intercepted by the attacker through impersonation [66].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [66] T. Melamed, An active man-in-the-middle attack on bluetooth smart devices (WIT Press, 2018). https://doi.org/10.2495/SAFE-V8-N2-200-211 source
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- Findingcitation
Each protocol is subjected to attacks.
“Each protocol is subjected to attacks [74].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [74] Akram Abdul-ghani Hezam et al, ,A comprehensive IoT attacks survey based on a building-blocked reference mode, International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications · April 2018, DOI: 10.14569/IJACSA.2018.090349 source
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- Findingown data
In the IoMT real incident risk classification, a pacemaker side channel attack has a risk score of 72, classified as High.
“| Pacemaker | Side channel 10 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 10 8 | 9 | 9 | 72 | High | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
Encryption is not carried out by many devices in the BLE link layer.
“Encryption is not carried out by many devices in the BLE link layer [65].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [65] “GATTack.io.” https://gattack.io/.
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- Findingown data
In the IoMT real incident risk classification, a blood sugar monitor tampering attack has a risk score of 36, classified as Medium.
“| Blood sugar monitor Tampering | 5 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 36 | Medium |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
In the pacemaker side-channel attack scenario, the risk impact is calculated as 8.
“Hence, the risk impact is calculated as 8, as per the formula discussed above.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
There are insider threats that cause unique challenges in the IoT risk assessment process.
“There are insider threats that cause unique challenges in the case of the IoT risk assessment process [16].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [16] Nurse J.R.C., Erola, A., Agrafiotis, I., Goldsmith, M., Creese, S., 2015. Smart insiders: exploring the threat from insiders using the Internet-of-Things, Proc. 2015 Workshop Secure Internet of Things (SIoT), pp. 5–14 source
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- Premisenone given
Physical security is one of the main vulnerabilities that has been repeatedly exploited in IoT devices.
“Physical security is one of the main vulnerabilities that has been repeatedly exploited in IoT devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Jamming and MiTM attacks are dangerous in the hardware layer, affecting PHY and MAC communication protocols even though encryption mechanisms are in place.
“Jamming and MiTM (Man in The Middle) attacks are the dangerous ones in the hardware layer [11] affecting the physical layer (PHY) and media access control (MAC) layer communication protocols even though encryption mechanisms are in place.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [11] Panagiotis I., Radoglou Grammatikis et al, Securing the Internet of Things: challenges, threats and solutions, Elsevier, Internet of Things Journal, 2019, doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2018.11.003 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
The risks born out of IoT systems cannot easily fit into an existing risk framework.
“The risks born out of these IoT systems cannot easily fit into an existing risk framework.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Extending existing risk assessment frameworks to IoT systems alone will not address the new risks that have arisen in the IoT ecosystem.
“Extending these existing frameworks to IoT systems alone will not address the new risks that have arisen in the IoT ecosystem.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Due to the uniqueness and high-level complexity of IoT technology, a new category of risks is identified by risk experts.
“Due to the uniqueness and high-level complexity of IoT technology, a new category of risks is identified by risk experts [4].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [4] Elkhodr, M., Shahrestani, S., & Cheung, H. (2016). A middleware for the internet of things. arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.04823. source
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- Premisecitation
Unauthorized access to deployed IoT systems is gained through weak, guessable, or hardcoded passwords.
“Unauthorized access to deployed systems is gained through weak, guessable, or hardcoded passwords [7].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [7] Xingbin Jiang et al, An experimental analysis of security vulnerabilities in industrial IoT devices, ACM Transactions on Internet technology, 2020. source
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- Interpretationreasoning
The traditional cyber risk assessment process has to be customized for IoT systems.
“Hence, the traditional cyber risk assessment process has to be customized for IoT systems keeping the above points in view.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
OCTAVE is appropriate for the risk assessment of smart homes as it has an asset container to cover cyber and physical security.
“OCTAVE is appropriate for the risk assessment of smart homes as it has an asset container to cover cyber and physical security [42].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [42] B. Ali et al., Cyber and physical security vulnerability assessment for IoT-based smart homes. Journal of Sensors 18, 817 (2018). https://doi.org/10.3390/s18030817 source
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- Premisecitation
NIST does not contain an IoT impact assessment model.
“NIST does not contain an IoT impact assessment model”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [29] NIST, C. Cybersecurity framework NIST. https://www.nist.gov
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- cites [30] M. Barrett, J. Marron, V. Yan Pillitteri, J. Boyens, G. Witte, L. Feldman, Draft NISTIR 8170, The cybersecurity framework: implementation guidance for federal agencies (2017)
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- Interpretationreasoning
Periodic assessments have limitations in IoT systems.
“and hence, periodic assessments have their limitations in IoT systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
IoT systems can undergo drastic changes in a short period due to the interoperability of IoT devices.
“IoT systems can undergo drastic changes in a short period due to the interoperability of IoT devices”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Attacks such as Hajime, IoT Reaper, BrickerBot, or Mirai exploit the vulnerabilities of IoT devices.
“Few attacks such as Hajime, IoT Reaper, BrickerBot, or Mirai [26] exploit the vulnerabilities of IoT devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [26] C. Kolias, G. Kambourakis, A. Stavrou, J. Voas, ddos in the iot: Mirai and other botnets. IEEE Computer 50, 80–84 (2017) source
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- Premisereasoning
IoT devices themselves can be the basis for attacks in the case of the IoT environment.
“but IoT devices themselves can be the basis for attacks in the case of the IoT environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Due to its connectivity model, IoT deployment is different from traditional IT.
“Due to its connectivity model, IoT deployment is different from traditional IT.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
NIST does not have a model to refer to.
“but it does not have a model to refer to.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [29] NIST, C. Cybersecurity framework NIST. https://www.nist.gov
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- cites [30] M. Barrett, J. Marron, V. Yan Pillitteri, J. Boyens, G. Witte, L. Feldman, Draft NISTIR 8170, The cybersecurity framework: implementation guidance for federal agencies (2017)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
There are a few popular RAP frameworks like NIST, ISO/IEC, and OCTAVE that are currently in use.
“There are a few popular RAP frameworks like NIST, ISO/IEC, and OCTAVE [28] that are currently in use.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [28] ENISA. 2016. Risk management resources and approaches, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/threat-risk-management/risk-management [Accessed online 14 April 2017]
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- Premisecitation
NIST assesses risks qualitatively.
“and it assesses risks qualitatively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [29] NIST, C. Cybersecurity framework NIST. https://www.nist.gov
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [30] M. Barrett, J. Marron, V. Yan Pillitteri, J. Boyens, G. Witte, L. Feldman, Draft NISTIR 8170, The cybersecurity framework: implementation guidance for federal agencies (2017)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
230 out of 700 survey respondents belong to the healthcare sector.
“230 out of 700 of the survey respondents belong to the healthcare sector”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites https:// www.fiercehealthcare.com/tech/82-healthcare-organizations-have-experienced-iot-focused-cyber-attack-survey-finds
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- Premisenone given
OCTAVE does not quantify the risk.
“and does not quantify the risk.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
A survey found that 82% of healthcare industries have undergone IoT-focused cyber attacks.
“A survey finds that 82% of healthcare industries have undergone IoT-focused cyber attacks”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites https:// www.fiercehealthcare.com/tech/82-healthcare-organizations-have-experienced-iot-focused-cyber-attack-survey-finds
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- Premisecitation
Insecure network services running on the IoT systems, that are also exposed to the Internet, compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or allow unauthorized remote control.
“Insecure network services running on the IoT systems, that are also exposed to the Internet, compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or allow unauthorized remote control as covered by OWASP [6].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6] OWASP, Top IoT vulnerabilities, 2016. URL https://www.owasp.org/index. php/Top_IoT_Vulnerabilities
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- Interpretationown data
All four CSRF's cover the CIA principles.
“From Table 1, it can be inferred that all four CSRF's cover the CIA principles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 77
- May combine two claims. 35
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenIoMT has privacy and security issues in all layers like IoT.
“IoMT has privacy and security issues in all layers like IoT.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThe risk rank for an IoT risk vector categorizes risks into low, medium, or high categories.
“Risk rank for IoT risk vector categorizes the risks into low, medium, or high categories.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenIf the risk rank is very high, then the risk has a severe impact.
“If the risk rank is very high, then the risk has a severe impact.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenBLE has risks including Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks, replay attacks, and network communication decryption.
“BLE has risks including Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks, replay attacks, and network communication decryption.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingreasoningHigh and very high risks have high impacts.
“High and very high risks need better treatment as their impacts are high.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThere are heavy challenges in implementing IoMT devices including the high infrastructure cost, security concerns, load with the existing network, and lack of standardization.
“There are heavy challenges in implementing IoMT devices including the high infrastructure cost, security concerns, load with the existing network, and lack of standardization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenRisks with rank ≤ 10 come under a very low level.
“There are risks with rank ≤ 10 and these risks come under a very low level since they are not worthy to be considered.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Findingown dataAs discussed in Table 4, the risk score range of 21-50 falls in medium risk level and the risk score range of 51-80 falls in high-risk level.
“As discussed in Table 4, the risk score range of 21-50 falls in medium risk level and the risk score range of 51-80 falls in high-risk level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningWhen the pacemaker undergoes side-channel attack, the risk score is 72, which represents a higher risk level compared to the tampering attack of the blood sugar monitor which comes under the medium risk level.
“For example, when the pacemaker undergoes side-channel attack, we calculate the impact of the attack and its likelihood with the formulae explained above and derive the risk score to be 72, which represents a higher risk level when compared to the tampering attack of the blood sugar monitor which comes under the medium risk level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenThere are five levels shown for IoT risks based on the rank calculation.
“There are five levels shown for IoT risks based on the rank calculation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenDenial of service (DoS) attacks are also possible.
“Denial of service (DoS) attacks are also possible.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningTampering of blood sugar monitor leads to the risk impact factor of 6 and the risk likelihood factor of 6, and hence, the risk score is 36 which represents a medium risk level.
“In the same way, tampering of blood sugar monitor leads to the risk impact factor of 6 and the risk likelihood factor of 6, and hence, the risk score is 36 which represents a medium risk level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenWhen the IoT device does not support the use of strong credentials, weightage 95 is given to this IoT vector along with 0.9 as a risk score which calculates the risk rank as 85.
“For example, when the IoT device does not support the use of strong credentials, weightage 95 is given to this IoT vector along with 0.9 as a risk score which calculates the risk rank as 85.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenIn the pacemaker scenario, when the pacemaker is not secured (des = 10) along with a few heterogeneous systems (het = 5), it undergoes side-channel attacks due to unsecured network (nwt = 10) and the protocols susceptible to attacks (prt = 10).
“In the above scenario, when the pacemaker is not secured (des = 10) along with a few heterogeneous systems (het = 5), it undergoes side-channel attacks due to unsecured network (nwt = 10) and the protocols susceptible to attacks (prt = 10).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationPatients in general appear to be unaware of the dangers of cyber attacks, and they consider the security of their implanted medical devices (IMDs) as a secondary aspect.
“Patients in general appear to be unaware of the dangers of cyber attacks, and they consider the security of their implanted medical devices (IMDs) as a secondary aspect [69] perhaps due to lack of adequate awareness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [69] R. Altawy et al., Security tradeoffs in cyber physical systems: a case study survey on implantable medical devices, EEE, 2016. DOI: Digital Object Identifier. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2521727 source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationDempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions is used to model uncertainties in the risk assessment process.
“Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions is used to model uncertainties in the risk assessment process [21].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [21] R. Srivastava, An information systems security risk assessment model under Dempster-Shafer Theory of belief functions. Journal of Management Information Systems 22(4), 109–142 (2006) source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenCIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) is compromised if IoT devices have insecure network services.
“Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) will be compromised if the IoT devices have insecure network services.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe healthcare sector is the largest target of cybersecurity attacks in the USA, compared to industrial and financial institutions.
“The healthcare sector is the largest target of cybersecurity attacks in the USA, compared to industrial and financial institutions [15].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15] Marwedel, P. & Engel, M. Cyber-physical systems: opportunities, challenges and (some) solutions. in 1–30 (Springer International Publishing, 2016). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-26869-9_1
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSecurity vulnerabilities of modern IoT systems are unique, mainly due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the technology and data.
“Security vulnerabilities of the modern Internet of Things (IoT) systems are unique, mainly due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the technology and data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationCommon IoT vulnerabilities arise due to complex architecture, inappropriate security configuration, physical security, and insecure firmware or software.
“Common IoT vulnerabilities arise due to the following factors: (a) complex architecture, (b) inappropriate security configuration, (c) physical security, and (d) insecure firmware or software [5].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [5] Minhaj Ahmad Khan, Khaled Salah, IoT Security: review, blockchain solutions, and open challenges, future generation computer systems, Nov 2017, doi: 10.1016/j.future.2017.11.022 source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenAttacks on IoT devices are possible if firmware is not validated or anti-rollback mechanisms are not in place.
“Attacks are possible if either the firmware on the device is not validated or if the anti-rollback mechanisms are not in place.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenIf vulnerabilities in IoT devices or the IoT environment are exploited by threats in the system, it leads to IoT risks.
“If the vulnerabilities in IoT devices (or the IoT environment) are exploited by threats in the system, it leads to IoT risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIoT attacks are classified based on IoT architecture and application scenarios.
“IoT attacks are classified based on IoT architecture and application scenarios [10].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [10] K. Chen, S. Zhang, Z. Li, Y. Zhang, Q. Deng, S. Ray, Y. Jin, Internet-of-Things security and vulnerabilities: taxonomy, challenges, and practice. Journal of Hardware and Systems Security 2, 97–110 (2018) source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenAll three IoT layers-application, network, and hardware-have security issues.
“All three IoT layers, namely application, network, and hardware layers, have security issues.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe constantly expanding IoT threat landscape warrants a study of IoT risks and its mitigation.
“The constantly expanding IoT threat landscape warrants a study of IoT risks and its mitigation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationA multidimensional methodology that incorporates both FMEA and fuzzy set theory is utilized for the risk management process.
“A multidimensional methodology that incorporates both FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) and fuzzy set theory is utilized for the risk management process [24].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [24] Maisa Mendonca Silva et al, A multidimensional approach to information security risk management using FMEA and fuzzy theory, International Journal of Information Management, 2014.
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationNIST framework is well documented and provides guidance on risk assessment and management implementation.
“The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [29] framework is well documented and provides guidance on risk assessment and management implementation [30]”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [29] NIST, C. Cybersecurity framework NIST. https://www.nist.gov
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- cites [30] M. Barrett, J. Marron, V. Yan Pillitteri, J. Boyens, G. Witte, L. Feldman, Draft NISTIR 8170, The cybersecurity framework: implementation guidance for federal agencies (2017)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThreat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) facilitates system recovery but fails in addressing the cyber risk impact level.
“Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) is one such example that facilitates system recovery but fails in addressing the cyber risk impact level [34].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [34] Wynn, J., Whitmore, G., Upton, L., Spriggs, D., McKinnon, R., McInnes, R., Clausen, J. Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) Methodology Description Version 1.0. (2011).
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenIn IoT systems, failure can also happen when the assessment is done for the processes through which devices are bound, i.e., the connections that allow these devices to couple and operate.
“In IoT systems, failure can also happen when the assessment is done for the processes through which devices are bound i.e., the connections that allow these devices to couple and operate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationOCTAVE helps to find out various security vulnerabilities of IoT-based smart homes, presents the risks on home inhabitants, and proposes approaches to mitigate the identified risks.
“OCTAVE helps to find out various security vulnerabilities of IoT-based smart homes, presents the risks on home inhabitants, and proposes approaches to mitigate the identified risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [42] B. Ali et al., Cyber and physical security vulnerability assessment for IoT-based smart homes. Journal of Sensors 18, 817 (2018). https://doi.org/10.3390/s18030817 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenSensor nodes, smart devices, and wearable devices used in the IoT domain are resource-constrained devices.
“Sensor nodes, smart devices, and wearable devices that are used in the IoT domain are resourceconstrained devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationNew methodologies to assess risk considering the dynamics and uniqueness of IoT have been described elsewhere.
“New methodologies to assess risk considering the dynamics and uniqueness of IoT have been described elsewhere [35].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [35] Jason R. C. Nurse et al, Security risk assessment in Internet of Things systems, University of Oxford, 2018
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenNIST has three goals concerning IoT risk management-to protect device security, data security, and privacy of individuals.
“NIST has three goals concerning IoT risk management-to protect device security, data security, and privacy of individuals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe IoT environment deals with a lot of heterogeneous devices, and these devices might be vulnerable to cyber attacks.
“The IoT environment deals with a lot of heterogeneous devices, and these devices might be vulnerable to cyber attacks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenNIST is a widely used framework for risk management, and it is highly suited for disaster and recovery planning in domains involving IoT systems.
“NIST is a widely used framework for risk management, and it is highly suited for disaster and recovery planning in domains involving IoT systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningVulnerabilities drastically increase the risks born due to IoT devices, thereby mandating the need for a structured risk assessment process that is usually part of risk assessment frameworks.
“Vulnerabilities drastically increase the risks born due to IoT devices, thereby mandating the need for a structured risk assessment process that is usually part of risk assessment frameworks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationNIST IR 8228 documents the potential challenges with IoT devices and risk considerations in achieving device and data security.
“NIST IR 8228 [31] documents the potential challenges with IoT devices and risk considerations in achieving device and data security.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31] Katie Boeckl et al, NISTIR 8228, Considerations for managing Internet of Things (IoT) cybersecurity and privacy risks, June 2019 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenLack of firmware validation on a device can lead to CIA triad violation and non-compliance.
“lack of firmware validation on a device can lead to CIA triad violation and non-compliance”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe McAfee Mobile Threat Report 2019 highlights the increasing proliferation of IoT devices leading to possible points of attack at homes.
“The McAfee Mobile Threat Report 2019 [27] highlights the increasing proliferation of IoT devices leading to possible points of attack at homes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [27] McAfee Mobile Threat Report, https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/.../reports/rp-mobile-threat-report-2019.pdf
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationCyber Security Game (CSG) is a method to distinguish digital security hazards quantitatively and use this measurement to decide the ideal use of safety techniques for any specified systems for any predetermined venture level.
“Cyber Security Game (CSG) [23] is a method to distinguish digital security hazards quantitatively and use this measurement to decide the ideal use of safety techniques for any specified systems for any predetermined venture level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [23] Scott Musman et al, A game theoretic approach to cyber security risk management, Journal of DefenseModeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology, 2018, Vol 15(2). source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe IoT environment deals with various connectivity models and devices which may not support the CIA triad.
“The IoT environment deals with various connectivity models and devices which may not support the CIA triad.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningThough IoT devices are flexible and interoperable, they increase the attack surface.
“Though IoT devices are flexible and interoperable, they increase the attack surface.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningIoT systems have to be continuously assessed.
“IoT systems have to be continuously assessed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenQualitative and quantitative methods are combined in a few systems.
“Qualitative and quantitative methods are combined in a few systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenNIST has special considerations for IoT risk management.
“However, NIST has special considerations for IoT risk management.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationOCTAVE is a qualitative risk assessment framework that proposes eight steps.
“OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) is another qualitative risk assessment framework that proposes eight steps [32].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [32] R.A. Caralli, J.F. Stevens, L.R. Young, W.R. Wilson, Introducing OCTAVEAllegro: improving the information security risk assessment process (2007) source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenUse of insecure OS platforms and use of components from a compromised supply chain could allow the device to be compromised.
“use of insecure OS platforms and the use of components from a compromised supply chain could allow the device to be compromised”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationA Core Unified Risk Framework (CURF) compares different existing methods and provides a measure of completeness.
“A Core Unified Risk Framework (CURF) [41] compares different existing methods and provides a measure of completeness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [41] Gaute Wangen, ChristofferHallstensen, and Einar Snekkenes. A framework for estimating information security risk assessment method completeness - Core Unified Risk Framework, 2017, Springer International Journal of Information Security. source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationA new IoT MicroMort model for calculating IoT risk has been introduced which can test and validate IoT-connected devices.
“A new IoT MicroMort model for calculating IoT risk has been introduced [38] which can test and validate IoT-connected devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [38] Petar Radanliev, David Charles De Roure et al, Future developments in cyber risk assessment for the internet of things, Elsevier, Computers in Industry 2018. source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenAssets are treated as values of organizations in traditional risk assessment approaches.
“Assets are treated as values of organizations in traditional risk assessment approaches”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAn IoT security certification methodology for assessing security solutions in an automated way has also been proposed.
“An IoT security certification methodology for assessing security solutions in an automated way has also been proposed [39].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [39] Sara N. Matheu-Garcia, José L. Hernández-Ramos, Antonio F. Skarmeta, Risk-based automated assessment and testing for the cybersecurity certification and labelling of IoT devices, GianmarcoBaldini Computer Standards & Interfaces, 2018, DOI : https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2018.08.003 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenLack of hardening of devices leads to vulnerabilities.
“lack of hardening of devices (hardening is the process of securing a system by reducing its surface of vulnerability) lead to vulnerabilities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationISO includes cyber risk standards, and it promotes the standardization of cyber risk.
“ISO (International Standards Organization) includes cyber risk standards, and it promotes the standardization of cyber risk [33].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [33] ISO. ISO - International Organization for Standardization. (2017). https://www.iso.org/home.html.
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenIn all the above frameworks, the risk vectors specific for IoT systems are considered to mitigate and manage the risks materialized by IoT devices.
“In all the above frameworks, the risk vectors specific for IoT systems are considered to mitigate and manage the risks materialized by IoT devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenExisting risk assessment frameworks can be slightly modified to handle the IoT risks.
“But the existing risk assessment frameworks can be slightly modified to handle the IoT risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationGame-theoretic computing is used for quantitative risk assessment in different fields, including information security.
“Indeed, game-theoretic computing is used for quantitative risk assessment in different fields, including information security [22].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [22] Mehmet Sahinoglu, Luis Cueva-Parra and David Ang, Game-theoretic computing in risk analysis, 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenInterconnected assets with the Internet can bring in new risks and device compromise in the IoT environment.
“Interconnected assets with the Internet can bring in new risks and device compromise in the IoT environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRadanliev et al. have built a model to identify and capture IoT cyber risk from the derived risk vectors that offer new design principles for assessing cyber risk.
“Radanliev et al. [36] have built a model to identify and capture IoT cyber risk from the derived risk vectors that offer new design principles for assessing cyber risk.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [36] Petar Radanliev, David C. De Roure et al, Standardisation of cyber risk impact assessment for the Internet of Things, Oxford e-Research Center, University of Oxford, 2018
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationRadanliev et al. performed an empirical analysis of different risk assessment methods to define a target state for companies integrating IoT devices with services.
“They also performed an empirical analysis of different risk assessment methods to define a target state for companies integrating IoT devices with services [37].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [37] Petar Radanliev, David Charles De Roure et al, Cyber risk management for the Internet of Things, Oxford e-Research Center, University of Oxford, 2019, doi:10.20944/preprints201904.0133.v1 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningDevice firmware updates, protocol updates, and the applications lead to increased attack surface that needs to be secured.
“Device firmware updates, protocol updates, and the applications again lead to increased attack surface that needs to be secured.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationNIST's Cybersecurity for IoT program has created and connected norms, rules, and related tools to improve the security of associated gadgets and the conditions where they are.
“NIST's Cybersecurity for IoT program [31] has created and connected norms, rules, and related tools to improve the security of associated gadgets and the conditions where they are.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31] Katie Boeckl et al, NISTIR 8228, Considerations for managing Internet of Things (IoT) cybersecurity and privacy risks, June 2019 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenIn most cases, TARA is used along with the NIST framework and the IoT considerations of NIST are applicable here also.
“In most of the cases, TARA is used along with the NIST framework and the IoT considerations of NIST are applicable here also.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationNIST has come up with three main goals for IoT risk assessment: device protection, data protection, and user privacy.
“NIST has come up with three main goals for IoT risk assessment: (a) device protection, (b) data protection, and (c) user privacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31] Katie Boeckl et al, NISTIR 8228, Considerations for managing Internet of Things (IoT) cybersecurity and privacy risks, June 2019 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAn unsecured network provides no security and exposes all open traffic, and hence, the risk impact would be maximum.
“Type of the network: An unsecured network provides no security and exposes all open traffic, and hence, the risk impact would be maximum.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationDevice protection has four risk mitigation areas: asset management, vulnerability management, access management, and incident detection.
“Device protection has four risk mitigation areas including asset management, vulnerability management, access management, and incident detection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31] Katie Boeckl et al, NISTIR 8228, Considerations for managing Internet of Things (IoT) cybersecurity and privacy risks, June 2019 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIf there is a history of past attacks, then it is more likely that the device gets attacked again.
“Count of past attacks for the device (pat): If there is a history of past attacks, then it is more likely that the device gets attacked again.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenTARA improves the quality of risk and control evaluations and communicates risks and recommendations to the organization.
“It improves the quality of risk and control evaluations and communicates risks and recommendations to the organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenAll layers of IoT undergo cyber attacks and whichever layer undergoes more attacks gets more weight.
“IoT layer that undergoes lots of attacks (lyr): As discussed earlier, all layers of IoT undergo the cyber attacks and whichever layer undergoes more attacks gets more weight.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenA side-channel attack is a network attack (lyr = 10).
“A side-channel attack is a network attack (lyr = 10)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningControl of the pacemaker remotely by attackers can be fatal, and hence, it is classified under the high-risk factor (drf = 10) in the healthcare sector (scr = 8).
“Control of the pacemaker remotely by attackers can be fatal, and hence, it is classified under the high-risk factor (drf = 10) in the healthcare sector (scr = 8).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis rank comes under high priority since the chances of unauthorized access and tampering through credential misuse are more.
“This rank comes under high priority since the chances of unauthorized access and tampering through credential misuse are more.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenTARA does not promote the defense against vulnerability.
“and does not promote the defense against vulnerability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenIoT is used widely in industries, financial sectors, and healthcare sectors.
“Type of sector using IoT (scr): IoT is used widely in industries, financial sectors, and healthcare sectors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIf there are more intermediate systems involved, the impact of the risk would be huge.
“If there are more intermediate systems involved, the impact of the risk would be huge.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenTARA can enhance outcomes, decrease the general effort of risk analysis, and help to make better decisions.
“It can enhance outcomes, decrease the general effort of risk analysis, and help to make better decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenTARA was developed for a big, highly precious, and diverse environment within Intel (R) in response to a need to assess the security risks of a very complicated, quickly evolving threat landscape.
“It was developed for a big, highly precious, and diverse environment within Intel (R) in response to a need to assess the security risks of a very complicated, quickly evolving threat landscape.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIf there is going to be a replay attack (confidentiality and integrity are affected) and DoS attack (affects availability), then the impact of the risk is high and this could happen in the network layer of the implantable devices.
“If there is going to be a replay attack (confidentiality and integrity are affected) and DoS attack (affects availability), then the impact of the risk is high and this could happen in the network layer of the implantable devices [77].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [77] S. Shiva et al, Security and privacy in the Internet of Medical Things: taxonomy and risk assessment, 2017, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/LCN.Workshops.2017.72 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenQuantifying risk assessment of IoT security enables an accurate and credible risk assessment process.
“Quantifying risk assessment of IoT security enables an accurate and credible risk assessment process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAll security controls in CPS systems may be easily extended to IoT systems.
“Furthermore, all the security controls in CPS systems may be easily extended to the IoT systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIf an attack affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability, then this will create a huge risk impact.
“If an attack affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability, then this will create a huge risk impact.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenIoT requires lightweight protocols such as 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4.
“IoT requires lightweight protocols such as 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenOCTAVE uses a standardized questionnaire for categorizing recovery impact portions.
“OCTAVE uses a standardized questionnaire for categorizing recovery impact portions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenRanking can be calculated for risk in any category including data security and privacy.
“Like this example, ranking can be calculated for risk in any category including data security and privacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenTARA breaks down prospective attacks to a manageable list of probable attacks.
“It breaks down prospective attacks to a manageable list of probable attacks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenTARA does not quantify the impact of risks.
“TARA does not quantify the impact of risks”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenTARA is a predictive framework for the most crucial exposures.
“TARA is a predictive framework for the most crucial exposures.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
There are no standard IoT risk frameworks currently available.
“There are no standard IoT risk frameworks that are currently available.”
The paper relies on this without support.
IoT systems can undergo drastic changes in a short period due to the interoperability of IoT devices.
“IoT systems can undergo drastic changes in a short period due to the interoperability of IoT devices”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The pacemaker has undergone side-channel attacks in the past (pat = 10).
“we assume that the pacemaker has undergone such attacks in the past (pat = 10)”
The paper relies on this without support.
It is not possible to build a perfect risk assessment system for IoT devices unless the risk vectors or risk attributes are identified.
“It is indeed evident that it is not possible to build a perfect risk assessment system for IoT devices unless the risk vectors or risk attributes are identified.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Pacemaker and insulin pumps can cause death to patients if they are controlled remotely by attackers.
“pacemaker and insulin pumps can cause death to patients if they are controlled remotely by attackers.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Regular assessments of IoT systems have limitations due to the drastic changes that can take place in such a system in a short period.
“Kandasamy et al. [54] warn that regular assessments of IoT systems have their limitations due to the drastic changes that can take place in such a system in a short period.”
From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [54]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rank 56 is labeled medium rather than high
MinorTable 5 labels rank 56 as medium, although Table 4 places ranks 51-80 in the high category.
“| The IoT device does not support the concealment of displayed | 80 | 0.7 | 56 | Increases the likelihood of credential theft | | password characters | | | (medium) | |”
“| High | 80-95 | 0.8 | 90 × 0.8=72 | 51-80 | Risk is of high concern |”
Pacemaker device-risk factor differs between the worked example and its weights table
MinorThe worked pacemaker example uses a device-risk factor of 10, but Table 7 assigns pacemakers a weight of 9. The example presents this factor as an input to its conclusion-bearing risk score.
“Control of the pacemaker remotely by attackers can be fatal, and hence, it is classified under the high-risk factor (drf = 10) in the healthcare sector (scr = 8).”
“| 4 | Device risk factor (drf) | Pacemaker, insulin pump | 9 |”
Rank 60 is labeled medium rather than high
MinorTable 5 labels rank 60 as medium, although Table 4 places ranks 51-80 in the high category.
“| IoT device does not have a unique built-in identifier | 75 | 0.8 | 60 | Remote access and vulnerability | | | | | (medium) | management are affected |”
“| High | 80-95 | 0.8 | 90 × 0.8=72 | 51-80 | Risk is of high concern |”
Rank 85 is labeled high rather than very high
MinorTable 5 labels rank 85 as high, although Table 4 places ranks 81-100 in the very-high category.
“| The IoT device does not support strong credentials | 95 | 0.9 | 85 (high) Tampering through credential misuse is | |”
“| Very high | 96-100 | 1.0 | 97 × 1.0=97 | 81-100 | Risk is of very high concern; severe |”
Very-low risk threshold conflicts with Table 4
MinorThe text assigns every rank of 10 or less to the very-low level. Table 4 instead assigns ranks 5-20 to the low level, so ranks 5-10 fall into both descriptions.
“There are risks with rank ≤ 10 and these risks come under a very low level since they are not worthy to be considered.”
“| Low | 11-30 | 0.2 | 25 × 0.2=5 | 5-20 | Risk is of low concern |”
Rank 72 is labeled medium rather than high
MinorTable 5 labels rank 72 as medium, although Table 4 places ranks 51-80 in the high category.
“| The IoT device does not support enterprise user authentication | 90 | 0.8 | 72 | Each user needs more credentials | | system | | | (medium) | |”
“| High | 80-95 | 0.8 | 90 × 0.8=72 | 51-80 | Risk is of high concern |”
Rank 30 is labeled low rather than medium
MinorTable 5 labels rank 30 as low, although Table 4 places ranks 21-50 in the medium category.
“| Patches or upgrades for the IoT device are not released by the | 50 | 0.6 | 30 (low) Known vulnerabilities cannot be removed | |”
“| Medium | 31-79 | 0.5 | 50 × 0.5=25 | 21-50 | Risk is of moderate concern |”
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Flagged first, then by citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
A Review of Anomaly Detection Strategies to Detect Threats to Cyber-Physical Systems
Jeffrey, N., Tan, Q., & Villar, J. R. (2023) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics12153283 · Cited by 160 · see citing works
Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards
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“Kandasamy et al. [54] warn that regular assessments of IoT systems have their limitations due to the drastic changes that can take place in such a system in a short period.”
- Authors
- Kandasamy, K., Srinivas, S., Achuthan, K., & Rangan, V. P.
- Affiliations
- Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham (IN)
- IBM (United States) (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kandasamy, Kamalanathan
- Srinivas, Sethuraman
- Achuthan, Krishnashree
- Rangan, Venkat P.
- Venue
- EURASIP Journal on Information Security
- Published
- 2020-05-26
- Volume
- 2020
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 1687-4161 (ISSN-L)
- 2510-523X
- OpenAlex
- W3032033268
- Semantic Scholar
- c974e373fb3b34f47c1e82605cd05ee367b09799
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 56
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 4
- FWCI
- 15.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- EURASIP Journal on Information Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Internet of Things and AI
- Keywords
- Internet of Things, cybersecurity risk assessment, risk assessment framework, risk prioritization, Internet of Medical Things, NIST framework, Octave, ISO 31000, fintech, health care, risk mitigation, IoT vulnerabilities
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