The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pro-social behavior in a natural setting
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Citations
Cites
Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting
Laibson, D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555253 · Cited by 6,122
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825 · cited 2×
“Moreover, if an individual’s utility positively depends on the amount she contributes ( Andreoni, 1989, 1990 ), her donation and”
BackgroundCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-1031(77)90049-x · Cited by 3,139
Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization
Strotz, R. H. (1955) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2295722 · Cited by 2,834 · cited 2×
“‘Self-control’ problems can be understood according to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Laibson (1997), who enhanced a theory by Strotz (1956) of hyperbolic discounting that essentially argues that people discount costs of events in the far distant future with a higher rate than for the same events…”
BackgroundAre people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780 · cited 4×
“…public good when the others contribute more.3 In a recent standard public good experiment, for example, it was identified that, according to this definition, roughly 50 percent of the subjects are conditional cooperators, while a third of the subjects act as free riders (Fischbacher et al., 2001).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialRational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.67 · Cited by 1,391
Becker, G. S. (1996) · doi:10.4159/9780674020658 · Cited by 1,379
Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0081 · Cited by 1,126 · cited 1×
“Eckel and Grossman (1996)show in an anonymous dictator game that contributions are much bigger if the subjects can give money to an established charity rather than to some student who does not need the money urgently.”
BackgroundMotivational bases of choice in experimental games
Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. G. (1968) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-1031(68)90046-2 · Cited by 1,097
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Keser, C., & Van Winden, F. (2000) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00182 · Cited by 800
(2021) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5.6 · Cited by 78
Cited by
Weinstein, N., & Ryan, R. M. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0016984 · Cited by 1,484
Anderson, C. L., & Agarwal, R. (2010) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25750694 · Cited by 713
Tax morale and conditional cooperation
Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006 · Cited by 671
Self-citationDecomposing Trust and Trustworthiness
Ashraf, N., Bohnet, I., & Piankov†, N. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9122-4 · Cited by 643
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Voluntary Sector Review · doi:10.1332/204080511x6087712 · Cited by 457
Metadata
- Authors
- Frey, B. S., & Meier, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-05
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 65-88
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2107919504
- Cited by
- 236
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 34.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.