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The demand for punishment
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Self-citation
Cited by
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
Chaudhuri, A. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 · Cited by 1,445
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
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Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Carpenter, J. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 522-542
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1992442661
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 47.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.