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Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-04
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 135-165
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2040407204
- Cited by
- 1,268
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 60.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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