Schizophrenia as a self-disorder due to perceptual incoherence
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The aim of this review is to describe the potential relationship between multisensory disintegration and self-disorders in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Sensory processing impairments affecting multisensory integration have been demonstrated in schizophrenia. From a developmental perspective multisensory integration is considered to be crucial for normal self-experience. An impairment of multisensory integration is called 'perceptual incoherence'. We theorize that perceptual incoherence may evoke incoherent self-experiences including depersonalization, ambivalence, diminished sense of agency, and 'loosening of associations' between thoughts, feelings and actions that lie within the framework of 'self-disorders' as described by Sass and Parnas (2003). We postulate that subconscious attempts to restore perceptual coherence may induce hallucinations and delusions. Increased insight into mechanisms underlying 'self-disorders' may enhance our understanding of schizophrenia, improve recognition of early psychosis, and extend the range of therapeutic possibilities.
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Citations
Cites
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Neuroscience of virtual reality: from virtual exposure to embodied medicine
Riva, G., Wiederhold, B. K., & Mantovani, F. (2019) · Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking · doi:10.1089/cyber.2017.29099.gri · Cited by 608
The spatial self in schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder
Noel, J.-P., Cascio, C. J., Wallace, M. T., & Park, S. (2017) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2016.09.021 · Cited by 120
“, 2008, suggest that alterations in the bottom-up multisensory processing of the PPS surrounding the hand (Rizzolatti et al., 1997; Ferri et al., 2013a, 2013b) are crucial in engendering the RHI.”
Renard, S. B., Huntjens, R. J. C., Lysaker, P. H., Moskowitz, A., Aleman, A., & Pijnenborg, G. H. M. (2017) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbw063 · Cited by 118
“For example, it has been suggested that dissociation increases the vulnerability to psychotic experiences (Allen & Lolafaye, 1995), whereas paranoid ideation (Espirito Santo & Pio-Abreu, 2008) and perceptual abnormalities (Postmes et al., 2014) increases the vulnerability to dissociation.”
BackgroundAnomalous bodily maps of emotions in schizophrenia
Torregrossa, L. J., Snodgress, M. A., Hong, S. J., Nichols, H. S., Glerean, E., Nummenmaa, L., & Park, S. (2019) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sby179 · Cited by 67
Michael, J., & Park, S. (2016) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2016.06.013 · Cited by 63
“A tacit understanding of one’s body as a continuously unified entity with fixed boundaries allows one to distinguish self from other, and this experienced unity of self and body is necessary for adaptive social functioning (Petkova et al., 2011; Postmes et al., 2014; Park and Nasrallah, 2014).”
BackgroundAudio-visual sensory deprivation degrades visuo-tactile peri-personal space
Noel, J.-P., Park, H.-D., Pasqualini, I., Lissek, H., Wallace, M., Blanke, O., & Serino, A. (2018) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2018.04.001 · Cited by 42
Tool-use Extends Peripersonal Space Boundaries in Schizophrenic Patients
Ferroni, F., Ardizzi, M., Magnani, F., Ferri, F., Langiulli, N., Rastelli, F., Lucarini, V., Giustozzi, F., Volpe, R., Marchesi, C., et al. (2022) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbac067 · Cited by 32
Shared multisensory experience affects Others’ boundary: the enfacement illusion in schizophrenia
Ferroni, F., Ardizzi, M., Sestito, M., Lucarini, V., Daniel, B. D., Paraboschi, F., Tonna, M., Marchesi, C., & Gallese, V. (2019) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2018.11.018 · Cited by 31
Schizophrenia in the flesh: Revisiting schizophrenia as a disorder of the bodily self
Park, S., & Baxter, T. (2022) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2021.12.031 · Cited by 30
Szalai, J. (2019) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-017-0371-2 · Cited by 29
Damiani, S., Fusar-Poli, L., Brondino, N., Provenzani, U., Baldwin, H., Fusar-Poli, P., & Politi, P. (2020) · Psychiatry Research Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2020.111068 · Cited by 18
Fielding-Smith, S. F., Hayward, M., Strauss, C., Fowler, D., Paulik, G., & Thomas, N. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01129 · Cited by 17
“…demonstrated association between these phenomenological disturbances and deficits in attention, sensory processing and source monitoring, and it has been suggested that neurocognitive remediation therapies targeting these mechanisms may be beneficial (Nelson et al., 2014a,b; Postmes et al., 2014).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Postmes, L., Sno, H. N., Goedhart, S., van der Stel, J., Heering, H. D., & de Haan, L.
- Venue
- Schizophrenia Research
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-01
- Volume
- 152
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 41-50
- ISSN
- 0920-9964 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1978931165
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 8.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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