The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Local Enforcement and Better Forests
Abstract
Summary Current studies of local resource management examine many factors thought to be associated with good resource conditions. Despite the number of studies and the importance of such resources to millions of people worldwide, a lack of theory and hypothesis testing beyond the case level limits the lessons empirical studies offer. We argue that regular monitoring and sanctioning of rules—rule enforcement—is a necessary condition for successful resource management. We test our theory using data regarding 178 user groups and by pairing rule enforcement with other important factors: social capital, formal organization, and dependence on forest products.
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Citations
Cites
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
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Ostrom, E. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.641 · Cited by 4,529
Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective
Andersson, K. P., & Ostrom, E. (2008) · Policy Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11077-007-9055-6 · Cited by 775
Self-citationMoving beyond panaceas: a multi-tiered diagnostic approach for social-ecological analysis
OSTROM, E., & COX, M. (2010) · Environmental Conservation · doi:10.1017/s0376892910000834 · Cited by 632
Self-citationNolte, C., Agrawal, A., Silvius, K. M., & Soares-Filho, B. S. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1214786110 · Cited by 592
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Protected Areas under Weak Institutions: Evidence from Colombia
Bonilla-Mejía, L., & Higuera-Mendieta, I. (2019) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.06.019 · Cited by 104
Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons
Schlüter, M., Tavoni, A., & Levin, S. (2016) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2015.2431 · Cited by 68
Changing patterns in deforestation avoidance by different protection types in the Brazilian Amazon
Jusys, T. (2018) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0195900 · Cited by 59
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“…axes: (a) punishment sustains cooperation, but if removed, cooperation declines [32, 35]; (b) cooperation outcomes vary with punishment strength [10] and environmental growth rate; and (c) populations with different levels of altruism [4], defined by their harvest thresholds, show distinct…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Gibson, C. C., Williams, J. T., & Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- World Development
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-02
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 273-284
- ISSN
- 0305-750X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2083158692
- Cited by
- 593
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 16.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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