Affective Polarization and the Populist Radical Right: Creating the Hating?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Do populist radical right (PRR) parties fuel affective polarization? If so, how and under which circumstances? Based on a comparative cross-country analysis covering 103 elections in 28 European countries and an examination of longitudinal data from the Netherlands, we show that PRR parties occupy a particular position in the affective political landscape because they both radiate and receive high levels of dislike. In other words, supporters of PRR parties are uniquely (and homogeneously) negative about (supporters of) mainstream parties and vice versa. Our analyses suggest that these high levels of antipathy are most likely due to the combination of these parties' nativism and populism – two different forms of ingroup–outgroup thinking. Our findings also suggest that greater electoral success by PRR parties reduces dislike towards them, while government participation appears threatening to all voters except coalition partners.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
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Affective polarization in Europe
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Camps, not just parties. The dynamic foundations of affective polarization in multi‐party systems
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Polarisation, identity and affect - conceptualising affective polarisation in multi-party systems
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“We measure our dependent variable, partisan affect, using the out-party feeling thermometer: “the workhorse survey item” for scholars of affective polarization in the United States (Iyengar et al., 2019, 131) and in comparative research (Boxell et al., 2020; Wagner, 2021).”
BackgroundInfluentialPolítica, uso de medios y polarización afectiva en España
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Establishing the construct and predictive validity of brief measures of affective polarization
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Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures
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“…polarization paves the way for the emergence and electoral success of populist parties, and at the same time, populist parties, once on this stage, fuel and receive high levels of affective polarization against and from (mainstream) political opponents (Harteveld et al., 2022; Davis et al., 2024).”
Rojo-Martínez, J. M., Crespo-Martínez, I., & Mora-Rodríguez, A. (2023) · Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas · doi:10.5477/cis/reis.184.105 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Harteveld, E., Mendoza, P., & Rooduijn, M.
- Venue
- Government and Opposition
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2021-10-07
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 703-727
- ISSN
- 0017-257X (ISSN-L)
- 1477-7053
- OpenAlex
- W3205308555
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 67.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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