Cited by 125China's Socioeconomic Reforms and GovernanceCorruption and Economic DevelopmentPolitical Conflict and Governance

Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances

PAN, JENNIFER, CHEN, KAIPING·2018·American Political Science Review

Abstract

A prerequisite for the durability of authoritarian regimes as well as their effective governance is the regime’s ability to gather reliable information about the actions of lower-tier officials. Allowing public participation in the form of online complaints is one approach authoritarian regimes have taken to improve monitoring of lower-tier officials. In this paper, we gain rare access to internal communications between a monitoring agency and upper-level officials in China. We show that citizen grievances posted publicly online that contain complaints of corruption are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or falsification, suggesting that even in the digital age, in a highly determined and capable regime where reports of corruption are actively and publicly voiced, monitoring the behavior of regime agents remains a challenge.

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0003055418000205

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71 of 71 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Lower-level Chinese officials are often effective at limiting the flow of grassroots grievances to higher officials.

    “That said, lower-level Chinese officials are often effective at limiting the flow of grassroots grievances to higher officials (88).”

    From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [88]

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Authors
PAN, J., & CHEN, K.
Affiliations
Stanford University (US)
Corresponding author
  • PAN, JENNIFER
  • CHEN, KAIPING
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2018-06-06
Volume
112
Issue
3
Pages
602-620
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2805967013
Cited by
125
References
72
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2
FWCI
33.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
Keywords
citizen complaints, patronage networks, information manipulation, omission, censorship, Chinese officials, citizen participation

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