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Cited by 1,898Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationCross-Cultural and Social Analysis

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 373 of the 373 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Henrich, Joseph, Boyd, Robert, Bowles, Samuel, Camerer, Colin, Fehr, Ernst, Gintis, Herbert, McElreath, Richard, Alvard, Michael, Barr, Abigail, Ensminger, Jean, Henrich, Natalie Smith, Hill, Kim, Gil-White, Francisco, Gurven, Michael, Marlowe, Frank W., Patton, John Q., Tracer, David·2005·Behavioral and Brain Sciences
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x05000142
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Abstract

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model - based on self-interest - fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life.

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. [13]13. fifteen small-scale societies , ed. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr & H. Gintis, pp. 232-59. Oxford University Press. [aJH, EAS]
  2. [27]27. learning algorithms? Social Choice and Welfare 19:477-88. [DJZ] - (2003a) Empirical evidence on interdependent preferences: Nature or nurture? Cambridge Journal of Economics 27:867-80. [DJZ] - (2003b) You are not in my boat: Common fate and similarity attractors in bargaining settings. Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 167, University of Oxford. Available at: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Research/ wp/pdf/paper167.pdf [DJZ] - (2005) Transfer of knowledge and the similarity function in economic decisionmaking. In: Transfer of knowledge in economic decision making , ed. D. J. Zizzo. Palgrave Macmillan. [DJZ] …(truncated)

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Metadata

Authors
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Henrich, N. S., Hill, K., Gil-White, F., Gurven, M., Marlowe, F. W., Patton, J. Q., & Tracer, D.
Affiliations
  • Emory University (US)
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
  • University of Siena (IT)
  • California Institute of Technology (US)
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • Santa Fe Institute (US)
  • University of California, Davis (US)
  • Texas A&M University (US)
  • University of Oxford (GB)
  • ORC Macro (United States) (US)
  • University of New Mexico (US)
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
  • University of California, Santa Barbara (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
  • California State University, Fullerton (US)
  • University of Colorado Denver (US)
Corresponding author
  • Henrich, Joseph
  • Boyd, Robert
  • Bowles, Samuel
  • Camerer, Colin
  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Gintis, Herbert
  • McElreath, Richard
  • Alvard, Michael
  • Barr, Abigail
  • Ensminger, Jean
  • Henrich, Natalie Smith
  • Hill, Kim
  • Gil-White, Francisco
  • Gurven, Michael
  • Marlowe, Frank W.
  • Patton, John Q.
  • Tracer, David
ORCID
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2005-12
Volume
28
Issue
6
Pages
795-815
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x05000142
OpenAlex
W2125976408
Cited by
1,898
References
373
Citations by year
2026: 53 · 2025: 81 · 2024: 116 · 2023: 79 · 2022: 87 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 158 · 2018: 119 · 2017: 83 · 2016: 92 · 2015: 93 · 2014: 91 · 2013: 99 · 2012: 93
FWCI
172.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 21 d)
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • University of Pennsylvania
  • Emory University
  • California Institute of Technology
  • Harvard University
  • Santa Fe Institute
  • Università degli Studi di Siena
  • University of Oxford
  • Central European University
  • Universität Zürich
  • University of California, Los Angeles
  • University of California, Davis
  • California State University, Fullerton
  • Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Anthropology › Cross-Cultural and Social Analysis
Keywords
homo economicus, self-interest, small-scale societies, ultimatum game, public goods game, dictator game, prosocial behavior, market integration, experimental games, everyday social interaction
MeSH terms
Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Culture, Humans, Psychological Theory, Social Behavior

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