Myopic Social Prediction and the Solo Comparison Effect.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Four experiments explored the psychological processes by which people make comparative social judgments. Each participant chose how much money to wager on beating an opponent on either a difficult or a simple trivia quiz. Quiz difficulty did not influence the average person's probability of winning, yet participants bet more on a simple quiz than on a difficult quiz in the first 3 experiments. The results suggest that this effect results from a tendency to attend more closely to a focal actor than to others. Experiment 4 directly manipulated focusing; when participants were led to focus on the opponent instead of themselves, the effect was reversed. The discussion relates the results to other literatures including overly optimistic self-evaluation, false consensus, overconfidence, and social comparison.
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Citations
Cites
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On the psychology of prediction.
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The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process
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“In addition, people are more sensitive to situational influences on their own behavior than on the behavior of others (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Ross, 1977).”
BackgroundThe “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes
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“This assumed similarity is consistent with false consensus and the supposition that others will perform similarly to oneself (Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross et al., 1977).”
ResultConfirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
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“…that people routinely give special consideration to a focal hypothesis, evaluating evidence in its light, and failing to give adequate attention to alternative hypotheses or disconfirming evidence (Brenner, Koehler, & Tversky, 1996; Gilovich, 1991; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Tversky & Koehler, 1994).”
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“…1 and 2 is the result of the " inside view, " in which people tend to ignore relevant contextual variables such as base rates when they are thinking about themselves (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993), then betting on someone else should highlight the " outside view " and reduce or eliminate the effect.”
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“Such simple perspective-taking manipulations can be sufficient to get people to take on others' points of view and make decisions that focus on others as they normally would focus on themselves (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Taylor & Fiske, 1975; Thompson, 1995).”
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“Heath and Tversky (1991) have shown that people prefer to bet in areas where they feel confident and have more knowledge of the uncertainties involved.”
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“Therefore, it would be somewhat ironic if people made myopic judgments in competitions, given the importance of accurate interpersonal comparison in competitive contexts, and given prior research showing that people attend closely, even obsessively, to comparative social information in other domains (Blount & Bazerman…”
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Cited by
The trouble with overconfidence.
Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.115.2.502 · Cited by 2,358
Self-citationFlawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education, and the Workplace
Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J. M. (2004) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2004.00018.x · Cited by 1,865
“I think I can, I think I can”: Overconfidence and entrepreneurial behavior
Koellinger, P., Minniti, M., & Schade, C. (2007) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.11.002 · Cited by 895
Self-enhancement and self-protection: What they are and what they do
Alicke, M. D., & Sedikides, C. (2009) · European Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/10463280802613866 · Cited by 874
CEO Overconfidence and Innovation
Galasso, A., & Simcoe, T. S. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1374 · Cited by 867
Metadata
- Authors
- Moore, D. A., & Kim, T. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1121-1135
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2124393642
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 7.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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