The DOI matches its Crossref record; 100 of the 100 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The case for motivated reasoning.
Abstract
It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“When people try to reason through an issue, they often work hard to find evidence that confirms their initial perspective 55-58 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [58]
In the citing paper
“Khatun et al. (2022) and Ahsan et al. (2022) identify involuntary non-migrants in Bangladesh using retrospective, self-reported survey data, which run the risk of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990).”
From Trapped by climate change? (In)voluntary immobility in Bangladesh (2025) · cites this paper as Kunda 1990
In the citing paper
“People may process information in a manner that is consistent with their partisan identities, prior beliefs, and motivations, a process known as motivated cognition (34–37).”
From Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media (2021) · cites this paper as [35]
In the citing paper
“The processing of false information is likely to be motivated by a confirmation bias (e.g., Hameleers et al., 2024): People are more likely to uncritically accept information when it reassures their worldviews and political attitudes, and critically scrutinize information when it does not confirm their existing worldviews (e.g., Kunda, 1990).”
From How persuasive are political cheapfakes disseminated via social media? The effects of out-of-context visual disinformation on message credibility and issue agreement (2025) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“Based on various theories, such as the theory of motivated reasoning, which explains that decisions are often based on pre-determined goals and desirability rather than an accurate reflection of the evidence (Kunda, 1990), researchers have identified a few individual variables that may motivate the person to believe misinformation they are exposed to.These include political orientation (Chen et al”
From Deepfakes, Democracy, and the Ethics of Synthetic Media: A Synthesis of the SOLARIS Project (2026) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“the reason being people's motivated reasoning (Grossman, 2014; Kunda, 1990)-the tendency to interpret reality in a self-serving way.”
From The Consequences of Participating in the Sharing Economy: A Transparency-Based Sharing Framework (2021) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“It is proposed that there are two distinct but coexisting human motivations that account for citizens' choice and consumption of political information: directional vs. accuracy (Kunda, 1990, or defensive vs. accuracy in Hart et al., 2009, or cognitive consistency vs. understanding in Holbert et al., 2013).”
From Do Search Algorithms Endanger Democracy? An Experimental Investigation of Algorithm Effects on Political Polarization (2020) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“The underlying reason for the reinforcing tendency of algorithms is that algorithms are naturally designed to operate with, not against, human tendencies, one of which is that people feel more comfortable with consistency and confirmation (Kunda, 1990).”
From Do Search Algorithms Endanger Democracy? An Experimental Investigation of Algorithm Effects on Political Polarization (2020) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“Yet, given the human tendency toward psychological consistency (Kunda, 1990), cognitive salience of counter-attitudinal ideas in the user mind would not be strong enough to drive routine searches online.”
From Do Search Algorithms Endanger Democracy? An Experimental Investigation of Algorithm Effects on Political Polarization (2020) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“The self has a powerful need to see itself as having integrity, but it must do so within the constraints of reality (Adler 2012, Kunda 1990, Pennebaker & Chung 2011, Wilson 2011).”
From The Psychology of Change: Self-Affirmation and Social Psychological Intervention (2014) · cites this paper as Kunda 1990
In the citing paper
“One kind of less epistemically rational but more epistemically committal belief in AI consciousness may manifest when AI users continue to attribute consciousness to chatbots even when strong evidence suggests otherwise, because their reasoning processes are distorted by cognitive or motivational biases.”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“many motivationally biased beliefs aren't yet fully insulated from counterevidence but depend on what has been called an”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“These mechanisms are best characterized as cognitive–motivational, insofar as they involve the goal-directed (motivational) use of information processing (cognition), as described in several classic social psychological theories88,96,97.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [97]
In the citing paper
“It is also important to emphasize that many of these top-down influences occur automatically and without awareness (Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Brekke, 1994).”
From Biased and biasing: the hidden bias cascade and bias snowball effects (2025) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
In the citing paper
“Thus, such use of reference materials causes motivation and expectations that then can bias the observations and interpretation of the actual evidence”
From Biased and biasing: the hidden bias cascade and bias snowball effects (2025) · cites this paper as Kunda, 1990
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Morvan, C., & O’Connor, A. (2017) · Macat Library eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781912282432 · Cited by 18,284
The psychology of interpersonal relations
Heider, F. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089062 · Cited by 17,189
The Handbook of Social Psychology
Gravatt, A. E., Lindzey, G. E., & Aronson, F. (1969) · The Family Coordinator · doi:10.2307/582242 · Cited by 12,518
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 2×
“In several studies, incentives or admonitions to be accurate did not eliminate bias ( Fischhoff, 1977 ; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972a ; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984 ; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973 ).”
BackgroundThe Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60214-2 · Cited by 8,822
Illusion and well‐being: A social psychological perspective on mental health
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.103.2.193 · Cited by 7,814
Bem, D. J. (1972) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60024-6 · Cited by 5,241 · cited 2×
“Bem (1972) argued that the findings could also result from self-perception: The subjects, who have limited direct ac-”
BackgroundUnrealistic optimism about future life events
Weinstein, N. D. (1980) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.806 · Cited by 4,999
Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness
Kahneman, D. J., & Tversky, A. (1972) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 · Cited by 4,996
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 8,101–8,200 of 9,025
Guhin, J. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190244743.005.0001
Guhin, J. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190244743.002.0003
Guhin, J. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190244743.002.0006
Doris, J. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198719601.002.0005
Doris, J. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198719601.002.0003
Doris, J. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198719601.002.0004
Mazepus, H. (2024) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/tcgq6
Ritter, F. E. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678722.002.0008
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678722.002.0009
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678722.002.0005
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678722.002.0004
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678722.002.0007
Ritter, F. E. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678715.002.0008
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678715.002.0005
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678715.002.0007
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678715.002.0004
Marietta, M., & Barker, D. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677176.002.0008
Marietta, M., & Barker, D. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677176.005.0001
Marietta, M., & Barker, D. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677176.002.0003
Marietta, M., & Barker, D. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677176.002.0004
Marietta, M., & Barker, D. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677176.002.0006
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.002.0007
Ritter, F. E. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.002.0011
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678715.002.0080
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.002.0005
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.002.0004
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.002.0008
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0010
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0008
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.005.0001
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0004
Moshman, D. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0006
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0003
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0007
A Note to the Reader about the Book’s Cover
Ballantyne, N. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190847289.002.0008
Ballantyne, N. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190847289.002.0003
Ballantyne, N. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190847289.002.0005
Ballantyne, N. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190847289.002.0004
Herda, D. (2024) · South African Review of Sociology · doi:10.1080/21528586.2024.2349102
Rousis, G. J., & Swann, W. B. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009408165.006
Tanasoca, A. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851479.002.0003
A goal systemic approach to risk taking
Köpetz, C., Starnes, W., Woerner, J. I., Leander, N. P., & Johnson, M. B. (2024) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2024.04.001
Ketelaar, T. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197544754.013.53
Tanesini, A. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198858836.002.0003
Tanesini, A. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198858836.002.0004
Narrative AbductionPreprint
van Gelder, T., & Wilcox, J. E. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4790721
Beliefs Identified by the Qualitative Analysis
Dornschneider, S. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190693916.005.0002
Dornschneider, S. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190693916.005.0001
Dornschneider, S. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190693916.002.0004
Dornschneider, S. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190693916.005.0003
Dornschneider, S. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190693916.002.0005
Dornschneider, S. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190693916.005.0004
(2024) · Journal of Interpersonal Relations Intergroup Relations and Identity · doi:10.33921/jljs3748 · Cited by 1
Overconfidence Due to a Self-Reliance DilemmaPreprint
Hajdú, G., & Frollová, N. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4854794
Spinozian Civic Virtues and Epistemic Democracy
Kuschel, G. B., & Brasi, L. D. (2024) · History of Philosophy Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521026.41.2.01
Nachhaltigkeit und Service als Chance gegen das Showrooming im stationären Einzelhandel
Schneider, A. (2024) · Forum Dienstleistungsmanagement · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-45148-6_21
Montez, D., & Harwood, J. (2024) · Western journal of communication · doi:10.1080/10570314.2024.2369780 · Cited by 1
Verzerrungen in der Bewertung, Verarbeitung und Weitergabe von Wissen
Quabis, R. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-68383-5_7
Motivated Reasoning in the Social DomainPreprint
Jiao, P., Li, J., Zhu, X., & Zong, J. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4886632
When Thinking About Themselves and God, People Believe Truth Matters More Than Control
Nakkawita, E., Heiphetz, L., & Higgins, E. T. (2026) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.2026.44.2.193
Origin Story Part II: Change in Anti-Intellectual Attitude Endorsement
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0006
Anti-Intellectualism and Its Pernicious Policy Consequences
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0008 · Cited by 1
The Prevalence of Anti-Intellectual Attitudes
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0004
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0003
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0009
The Bidirectionality Thesis: Hofstadter’s Forgotten Prediction
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0007
Origin Story Part I: Explaining Between-Person Differences in Anti-Intellectual Attitude Endorsement
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0005
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.005.0001
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0001
The Nature and Origins of Anti-Intellectualism
Motta, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197788844.003.0002
König, P. D., & Siewert, M. Β. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198896388.003.0011
Levy, N. L. (2024) · doi:10.21428/e2759450.dd89f27c
Racionalnost i (svjetonazorska) polarizacija uvjerenja
Maglić, M., & Vranić, A. (2024) · Psihologijske teme · doi:10.31820/pt.33.2.8
Rohde, J. A., Muro, A., & D’Angelo, H. M. (2024) · Tobacco Control · doi:10.1136/tc-2023-058533
Motivated Social Cognition About Social Justice
Hennes, E. P., Dang, L., & Jost, J. T. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197763414.013.37
Dunning, D. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197763414.013.23 · Cited by 1
User Reputation Indicators to Reduce the Spread of False News on Social Media
Jagayat, A. (2024) · doi:10.32920/26866507 · Cited by 1
Political Effects of Exposure to Evidence about Racial Discrimination
Bergan, D. E., Spates, S. A., Teinowitz, L., & Gonzalez, C. (2024) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2024.2397674
Bhattacharya, P., Simons, J. J., Yuen, C. T. H., & Quek, B. (2024) · SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/r8fhm
Acceptable finger pointing: How evaluators judge the ethicality of blame shifting
Antonetti, P., & Baghi, I. (2024) · European Management Review · doi:10.1111/emre.12678
Favre, D. (2024) · Ecopsychology · doi:10.1089/eco.2024.0023
Manager political preferences and company investor bases
Feng, H., Huang, Y., Simkins, B. J., & Wang, J. (2024) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/fire.12413
Fogal, D. (2024) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12265
Kunda (1990): Motiviertes Denken
Einwiller, S. A. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-45292-6_36
Partisan bias in public perception of elections polls: experimental evidence from Mexico
Cornejo, R. C. (2024) · Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2024.2409642
Cognitive support for political partisans’ understanding of policy data
Yu, S., & Opfer, J. E. (2024) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0312088 · Cited by 1
Farkas, E., & Szabó, G. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-67023-7_9
The promise of European blame games
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.003.0006
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.002.0009
The policy implementation hypothesis
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.003.0005 · Cited by 1
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.003.0004
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.003.0001
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.003.0003
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.002.0004
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.005.0001
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.003.0002
Heinkelmann‐Wild, T., Rittberger, B., Zangl, B., & Kriegmair, L. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192870636.002.0008
Jiang, X., Ding, Z., Mou, Y., Liu, Y., & Shen, M. (2024) · Resources Conservation and Recycling · doi:10.1016/j.resconrec.2024.107991
Ideology, motivation, and consistency between beliefs and behaviors
Laurin, K., & Chua, K. Q. (2024) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2024.10.001
Metadata
- Authors
- Kunda, Z.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kunda, Ziva
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 1990
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 480-498
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2149893809
- Cited by
- 9,022
- References
- 100
- Citations by year
- 2026: 542 · 2025: 609 · 2024: 519 · 2023: 583 · 2022: 640 · 2021: 606 · 2020: 642 · 2019: 631 · 2018: 483 · 2017: 372 · 2016: 331 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 299 · 2013: 231 · 2012: 258
- FWCI
- 23.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institutes of Health (5r01mh042239-03)
- National Institute of Mental Health (1 RO1 MH42239-01A1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Psychology of Social Influence
- Keywords
- motivated reasoning, motivation, belief evaluation, cognitive strategies, accuracy motivation, confirmation bias, justification
- MeSH terms
- Attitude, Concept Formation, Humans, Motivation, Problem Solving, Social Perception
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
