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Cited by 1,209Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic SkillsDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsMemory Processes and Influences

Confidence in judgment: persistence of the illusion of validity

Einhorn, Hillel J., Hogarth, Robin M.·1978·Psychological Review
DOI 10.1037/0033-295x.85.5.395
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Abstract

An accumulating body of research on clinical judgment, decision making, and probability estimation has documented a substantial lack of ability of both ex-perts and nonexperts. However, evidence shows that people have great confi-dence in their fallible judgment. This article examines how this contradiction can be resolved and, in so doing, discusses the relationship between learning and experience. The basic tasks that are considered involve judgments made for the purpose of choosing between actions. At some later time, outcome feedback is used for evaluating the accuracy of judgment. The manner in which judgments of the contingency between predictions and outcomes are made is discussed and is related to the difficulty people have in searching for discommoning informa-tion to test hypotheses. A model for learning and maintaining confidence in one's own judgment is developed that includes the effects of experience and both the frequency and importance of positive and negative feedback. Everyone complains of his memory and no one com-plains of his judgment. (La Rochefoucauld, 1959, p. 49) Although the study and cataloguing of judgmental fallability has had a long history in psychology (see, e.g., Guilford, 1954, chap. 12; Johnson, 1972), an accumulating body of recent research on clinical judgment, decision making, and probability estimation has docu-mented a substantial lack of ability across both individuals and situations (Slovic, Fisch-hoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Slovic &…

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  • Overconfidence may cause fixation and hinder learning and correction, particularly when physicians do not receive systematic feedback.

    “Overconfidence may cause fixation [38] and hinder learning and correction, particularly when physicians do not receive systematic feedback on highly confident yet incorrect judgments [39] .”

    From Enhancing human-AI collaboration: The case of colonoscopy (2024) · cites this paper as [39]

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Authors
Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M.
Affiliations
University of Chicago (US)
ORCID
Hogarth, Robin M.
Venue
Psychological Review
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
1978-09
Volume
85
Issue
5
Pages
395-416
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
DOI
10.1037/0033-295x.85.5.395
OpenAlex
W2030364704
Cited by
1,209
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 26
FWCI
40.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
Keywords
confidence in judgments, clinical judgment, decision-making, probability estimation, outcome feedback, experiential learning, contingency judgment, disconfirming information, hypothesis testing, positive and negative feedback, predictive validity

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