The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deciding versus Reacting: Conceptions of Moral Judgment and the Reason-Affect Debate
Abstract
Recent approaches to moral judgment have typically pitted emotion against reason. In an effort to move beyond this debate, we propose that authors presenting diverging models are considering quite different prototypical situations: those focusing on the resolution of complex dilemmas conclude that morality involves sophisticated reasoning, whereas those studying reactions to shocking moral violations find that morality involves quick, affect-laden processes. We articulate these diverging dominant approaches and consider three directions for future research (moral temptation, moral self-image, and lay understandings of morality) that we propose have not received sufficient attention as a result of the focus on these two prototypical situations within moral psychology.
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Cites
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BackgroundFeeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
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13 Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Smith‐Crowe, K. (2008) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520802211677 · Cited by 687
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach
Schwartz, M. S. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2886-8 · Cited by 465
Relationships between Authentic Leadership, Moral Courage, and Ethical and Pro-Social Behaviors
Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., & Walumbwa, F. O. (2011) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/beq201121436 · Cited by 434
Moral Maturation and Moral Conation: A Capacity Approach to Explaining Moral Thought and Action
Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., & May, D. R. (2011) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2010.0128 · Cited by 398
Metadata
- Authors
- Monin, B., Pizarro, D. A., & Beer, J. S.
- Venue
- Review of General Psychology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 99-111
- ISSN
- 1089-2680 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1552
- OpenAlex
- W2048820625
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 4.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Monin, B., Pizarro, D. A., & Beer, J. S. (2007). Deciding versus Reacting: Conceptions of Moral Judgment and the Reason-Affect Debate. Review of General Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.99
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
