Deciding versus Reacting: Conceptions of Moral Judgment and the Reason-Affect Debate
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent approaches to moral judgment have typically pitted emotion against reason. In an effort to move beyond this debate, we propose that authors presenting diverging models are considering quite different prototypical situations: those focusing on the resolution of complex dilemmas conclude that morality involves sophisticated reasoning, whereas those studying reactions to shocking moral violations find that morality involves quick, affect-laden processes. We articulate these diverging dominant approaches and consider three directions for future research (moral temptation, moral self-image, and lay understandings of morality) that we propose have not received sufficient attention as a result of the focus on these two prototypical situations within moral psychology.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Monin, B., Pizarro, D. A., & Beer, J. S.
- Venue
- Review of General Psychology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 99-111
- ISSN
- 1089-2680 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1552
- OpenAlex
- W2048820625
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 4.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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