The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deciding versus Reacting: Conceptions of Moral Judgment and the Reason-Affect Debate
Abstract
Recent approaches to moral judgment have typically pitted emotion against reason. In an effort to move beyond this debate, we propose that authors presenting diverging models are considering quite different prototypical situations: those focusing on the resolution of complex dilemmas conclude that morality involves sophisticated reasoning, whereas those studying reactions to shocking moral violations find that morality involves quick, affect-laden processes. We articulate these diverging dominant approaches and consider three directions for future research (moral temptation, moral self-image, and lay understandings of morality) that we propose have not received sufficient attention as a result of the focus on these two prototypical situations within moral psychology.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Lazarus, R. S. (1991) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195069945.001.0001 · Cited by 12,691
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317 · cited 1×
“…where people seem able to articulate the causes of their behavior, arguing that such accounts simply reveal people’s ability to generate narratives for their own behavior in a post hoc fashion, rather than demonstrating any direct access to the real causes of their choices (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).”
BackgroundFeeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 · Cited by 8,094
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 · Cited by 5,955 · cited 1×
“…the recent decision-making literature suggests that they may be guiding decisions when people choose the option that they see as least likely to yield guilt (anticipated emotion), or which generates least discomfort at the time of the dilemma (anticipatory emotion, see Loewenstein et al., 2001).”
BackgroundSchwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513 · Cited by 4,952
The self-importance of moral identity
Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423 · Cited by 3,522 · cited 2×
“Yet there has been a renewal of interest in moral self-image (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002), and studies in the last five years have looked, for example, at how people think they compare morally with others (Epley & Dunning, 2000), how people’s moral confidence can license them to act in morally…”
BackgroundRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Delay of gratification in children.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2658056 · Cited by 3,397
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620
How (and where) does moral judgment work?
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02011-9 · Cited by 1,945
Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.574 · Cited by 1,566
Motivational and emotional controls of cognition
Simon, H. A. (1967) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0024127 · Cited by 1,410 · cited 1×
“For instance, there are a variety of cognitive shortcuts that individuals rely upon when their cognitive capacities are insufficient for the task at hand (e.g., Simon, 1967; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).”
BackgroundTetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. S. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.853 · Cited by 1,400
Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice.
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33 · Cited by 1,086 · cited 2×
“For instance, Nucci (2004) argues that whether an issue is seen by the actor as falling within the moral domain is a critical variable in predicting the impact of moral judgments on moral actions.”
BackgroundSelf-citationMellers, B., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.3.332 · Cited by 839
Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.1.33 · Cited by 811
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Eslinger, P. J., Bramati, I. E., Mourão-Miranda, J., Andreiuolo, P. A., & Pessoa, L. (2002) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.22-07-02730.2002 · Cited by 721 · cited 1×
“…reaction approach has made it easier to study moral judgment in a variety of settings, from the suburbs of Porto Alegre (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993) to the brain scanner (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Moll et al., 2001, 2002a, 2002b).”
BackgroundAgreeable fancy or disagreeable truth? Reconciling self-enhancement and self-verification.
Swann, W. B., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1989) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.5.782 · Cited by 584
Rozin, P., Markwith, M., & Stoess, C. (1997) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00685.x · Cited by 540
Functional Networks in Emotional Moral and Nonmoral Social Judgments
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Bramati, I. E., & Grafman, J. (2002) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1006/nimg.2002.1118 · Cited by 497
The intelligence of the moral intuitions: A comment on Haidt (2001).
Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2003) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.193 · Cited by 345
Self-citation
Cited by
13 Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Smith‐Crowe, K. (2008) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520802211677 · Cited by 687
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
With a Clean Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces the Severity of Moral Judgments
Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02227.x · Cited by 511
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach
Schwartz, M. S. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2886-8 · Cited by 465
Relationships between Authentic Leadership, Moral Courage, and Ethical and Pro-Social Behaviors
Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., & Walumbwa, F. O. (2011) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/beq201121436 · Cited by 434
Metadata
- Authors
- Monin, B., Pizarro, D. A., & Beer, J. S.
- Venue
- Review of General Psychology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 99-111
- ISSN
- 1089-2680 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1552
- OpenAlex
- W2048820625
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 4.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.