Cited by 280Neural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesBehavioral Health and InterventionsNeurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior

Habits without values.

Open access
Miller, Kevin J., Shenhav, Amitai, Ludvig, Elliot A.·2019·Psychological Review

Published version of a preprint

Abstract

Habits form a crucial component of behavior. In recent years, key computational models have conceptualized habits as arising from model-free reinforcement learning mechanisms, which typically select between available actions based on the future value expected to result from each. Traditionally, however, habits have been understood as behaviors that can be triggered directly by a stimulus, without requiring the animal to evaluate expected outcomes. Here, we develop a computational model instantiating this traditional view, in which habits develop through the direct strengthening of recently taken actions rather than through the encoding of outcomes. We demonstrate that this model accounts for key behavioral manifestations of habits, including insensitivity to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation, as well as the effects of reinforcement schedule on the rate of habit formation. The model also explains the prevalent observation of perseveration in repeated-choice tasks as an additional behavioral manifestation of the habit system. We suggest that mapping habitual behaviors onto value-free mechanisms provides a parsimonious account of existing behavioral and neural data. This mapping may provide a new foundation for building robust and comprehensive models of the interaction of habits with other, more goal-directed types of behaviors and help to better guide research into the neural mechanisms underlying control of instrumental behavior more generally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper develops a computational model in which habits are value-free stimulus-response associations strengthened by repetition, rather than model-free reinforcement learning. It shows this model reproduces key habit phenomena, including insensitivity to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation, reinforcement-schedule effects on habit formation, lesion-like dissociations, and perseveration.

Key findings

  • A value-free habitual controller, combined with a model-based goal-directed controller and an arbiter, reproduces overtraining-induced inflexibility: after longer training, simulated agents continued lever-pressing under omission and devaluation, whereas shorter training allowed reversal. Training duration was varied from 100 to 2000 trials in intervals of 100 for omission and from 10 to 2000 trials in intervals of 100 for devaluation.
  • Simulated agents trained on variable-interval (VI6: pellets baited every 6 s, on average 10/min) lever-pressed at a moderate rate and habitized early, whereas agents trained on variable-ratio (VR10: 10% chance per press) lever-pressed at a high rate and habitized much later.
  • Simulated lesions reproduced rodent striatal patterns: decreasing goal-directed parameters (DMS-like) produced a low press rate unaffected by omission or devaluation; decreasing habitual parameters (DLS-like) produced a high press rate that adapted to both manipulations. Control agents adapted after limited training (5,000 trials) but not after extensive training (15,000 trials).
  • In a dynamic two-armed bandit task (10,000 trials; 50 model copies; reinforcer probabilities changed by independent Gaussian random walks, SD = 0.15), the model reproduced both reinforcement-seeking and value-free perseveration; replacing the habitual component with model-free RL failed to reproduce the perseverative pattern.

Methods

  • Computational model with three modules: a habitual controller tracking recency-weighted action history \(H\), a goal-directed controller using model-based RL to learn separate reinforcer expectations \(R\) and utilities \(U\), and an arbiter weighting control by action-outcome contingency \(g\) and overall habitization \(h\).
  • Simulated task environments included reversal learning, omission contingency, outcome devaluation, free-operant VR/VI schedules, simulated lesions, and a two-armed bandit. Most simulations used a single state with two actions; free-operant simulations used continuous press rates from 0 to 150 presses/min with function approximation and an effort cost quadratic in press rate.
  • Analyses averaged simulated performance across agents and, for the two-armed bandit, used logistic regression quantifying influences of past actions, reinforcers, and their interaction on future choice.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the model is described at an abstract computational level, limiting engagement with neurobiological detail, and that a neurobiologically detailed implementation is a critical next step.
  • The paper states that the arbiter’s conditions require future research, that the model is agnostic about whether bypassing model-free RL entirely is appropriate, and that the form of value/motivational modulation of habit learning remains unresolved.
  • Evident from the text: the findings come from simulations rather than new empirical experiments, and many simulations use simplified single-state, two-action environments with specific parameter and utility choices, so generality across richer environments is not established.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/rev0000120

Cites

135 of 135 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 99 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingown data

    The computational model accounts for the effects of reinforcement schedule on the rate of habit formation.

    “as well as the effects of reinforcement schedule on the rate of habit formation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Adams, 1982

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    • cites Dickinson, 1985

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    • cites Gremel & Costa, 2013

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    • Rests on an assumption: The simulated task environments capture the essential features of the corresponding animal learning experiments, so that the model's behavior in them can be compared to animal behavior.
  • Findingreasoning

    The computational model accounts for key behavioral manifestations of habits, including insensitivity to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation.

    “We demonstrate that this model accounts for key behavioral manifestations of habits, including insensitivity to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The simulated task environments capture the essential features of the corresponding animal learning experiments, so that the model's behavior in them can be compared to animal behavior.
  • Findingreasoning

    The computational model explains perseveration in repeated-choice tasks as an additional behavioral manifestation of the habit system.

    “The model also explains the prevalent observation of perseveration in repeated-choice tasks as an additional behavioral manifestation of the habit system.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The simulated task environments capture the essential features of the corresponding animal learning experiments, so that the model's behavior in them can be compared to animal behavior.
  • Findingreasoning

    The value-free habit mechanism accounts for key findings in the animal learning literature that dissociate habitual and goal-directed actions, namely contingency degradation and outcome devaluation.

    “This value-free habit mechanism accounts for key findings in the animal learning literature that dissociate habitual and goal-directed actions, namely the tendency for an animal to continue performing a previously learned action when that action is no longer predictive of the reinforcing outcome (contingency degradation; Hammond, 1980) or when the predicted outcome ceases to be desired by the subj”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Hammond, 1980

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    • cites Adams & Dickinson, 1981

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    • Rests on an assumption: The simulated task environments capture the essential features of the corresponding animal learning experiments, so that the model's behavior in them can be compared to animal behavior.
  • Findingreasoning

    When the reversal occurs, the agent continues to select Action A for an extended period, past the point where the goal-directed controller has learned that Action B is more likely to be reinforced.

    “As a result, when the reversal occurs, the agent continues to select Action A for an extended period, past the point where the goal-directed controller has learned that Action B is more likely to be reinforced (compare Figures 3B and 3E).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 21
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 18
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Simulated agents trained on VR schedules lever-pressed at a high rate and habitized much later in training.

    “whereas agents trained on VR schedules lever-pressed at a high rate and habitized much later in training (Figure 4, right).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Simulated agents trained on VI schedules lever-pressed at a moderate rate and habitized early in training.

    “we found that simulated agents trained on VI schedules lever-pressed at a moderate rate and habitized early in training (Figure 4, left)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Model-free algorithms typically operate by learning the expected future reward associated with each possible action or state, relying crucially on these value representations.

    “Model-free algorithms typically operate by learning the expected future reward associated with each possible action or state, relying crucially on these value representations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Goal-directed behaviors are driven by consideration of the outcomes they are likely to bring about (action-outcome representations).

    “Goal-directed behaviors are understood to be driven by consideration of the outcomes that they are likely to bring about (i.e. “action-outcome” representations).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010

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    • cites Dickinson, 1985

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    • cites Dolan & Dayan, 2013

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    This category of value-free habits has been maintained in modern theorizing on habits, referred to as "direct cuing" of behavior, as distinct from value-based forms of habits ("motivated cueing").

    “This category of value-free habits has been maintained in modern theorizing on habits, where it has been referred to as “direct cuing” of behavior, as distinct from value-based forms of habits (“motivated cueing”; Wood & Neal, 2007; Wood & Rünger, 2016).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Wood & Neal, 2007

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    • cites Wood & Rünger, 2016

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    Premisecitation

    Model-free RL algorithms select actions based on cached values learned from previous experience.

    “Modern reinforcement learning (RL) has elaborated this law into a set of computational algorithms, according to which actions are selected based on cached values learned from previous experience (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Sutton & Barto, 1998).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005

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    • cites Dolan & Dayan, 2013

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    • cites Sutton & Barto, 1998

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    Premisereasoning

    Model-free RL focuses only on potential rewards, ignoring all reward-unrelated elements of one's environment.

    “This class of computations focuses only on potential rewards, ignoring all reward-unrelated elements of one’s environment (discussed below); it is therefore referred to as “model-free” RL.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The terms "habit" and "model-free" are now used interchangeably in much of the computational literature.

    “This formulation for habits has become so prevalent that the terms “habit” and “model-free” are now used interchangeably in much of the computational literature (Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Dolan & Dayan, 2013

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    • cites Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012

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    Premisecitation

    Thorndike's Law of Exercise holds that an action that has been taken often in the past is likely to be repeated in the future, independent of its past consequences.

    “This law holds that an action that has been taken often in the past is likely to be repeated in the future, independent of its past consequences; in other words, it describes habits as a form of perseveration.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Thorndike, 1911

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  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Goal-directed and habitual behaviors depend on different sets of computations and distinct underlying neural circuits.

    “A large and growing body of work indicates that these behaviors depend on different sets of computations and distinct underlying neural circuits, suggesting that separable goal-directed and habitual systems implement fundamentally different strategies for the control of behavior”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010

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    • cites Dickinson, 1985

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    • cites Dolan & Dayan, 2013

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    Value-based mechanisms are not strictly necessary, and a value-free mechanism can account for the major behavioral phenomena that define habits.

    “Here, we have shown computationally that such value-based mechanisms are not strictly necessary, and that a value-free mechanism can account for the major behavioral phenomena that define habits.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Separate goal-directed and habitual controllers exist in the brain, supported by distinct neural circuits, as strongly supported by lesion data from humans and other animals.

    “The idea that separate goal-directed and habitual controllers exist in the brain, supported by distinct neural circuits, is strongly supported by lesion data from both humans and other animals.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The finding that VI schedules result in rapid habit formation has been widely replicated and represents a key element of the experimental toolkit for the study of habits.

    “The finding that VI schedules result in rapid habit formation has been widely replicated and represents a key element of the experimental toolkit for the study of habits (Gremel & Costa, 2013; Tanaka, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2008; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Gremel & Costa, 2013

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    • cites Tanaka, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2008

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    • cites Yin & Knowlton, 2006

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    Premisereasoning

    Habits form slowly over time and often depend on behaviors that are initially taken under goal-directed control.

    “The first of these features is that habits form slowly over time and often depend on behaviors that are initially taken under goal-directed control.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Extensive training in a static environment (overtraining) can render behavior inflexible in the face of changes to that environment.

    “We first test whether our model can capture a central finding from research on habits: that extensive training in a static environment (overtraining) can render behavior inflexible in the face of changes to that environment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Dickinson, 1998

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    • cites Adams, 1982

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    This example validates the predictive abilities of the model and highlights the importance of a value-free habitual controller in explaining habit-like behaviors that cannot be accounted for by a model-free RL-based algorithm alone.

    “This example not only begins to validate the predictive abilities of our particular model, but also highlights the importance of a value-free habitual controller more generally in explaining habit-like behaviors that cannot otherwise be accounted for by a model-free RL-based algorithm alone.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Relative to control rats, rats with lesions to DMS lever-press at a lower rate and are less able to decrease their press rate when reinforcers are omitted or devalued.

    “relative to control rats, rats with lesions to DMS lever-press at a lower rate and are less able to decrease their press rate when reinforcers are omitted or devalued (Yin et al., 2005)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Yin et al., 2005

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Rats with lesions to DLS lever-press at a similar rate to controls and are more successful than controls at adapting their press rate to omitted or devalued reinforcement.

    “rats with lesions to DLS lever-press at a similar rate to controls and are more successful than controls at adapting their press rate to omitted or devalued reinforcement (Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2004, 2006).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2004, 2006

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The computational account in which habits are value-free stimulus-response associations provides a closer match to classic psychological theories of habits, an account for classic behavioral data on habit formation, and a novel framework for understanding additional behavioral phenomena.

    “This computational account in which habits are understood as value-free stimulus-response associations therefore provides a closer match to classic psychological theories of habits, an account for classic behavioral data on habit formation, and a novel framework for understanding additional behavioral phenomena.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Rats performing a dynamic two-armed bandit task exhibited behavioral patterns consistent with both reinforcement-seeking and choice perseveration.

    “In one recent example, rats performing a dynamic two-armed bandit task exhibited behavioral patterns consistent with both reinforcement-seeking (i.e., being more likely to select a recently reinforced action), as well as with choice perseveration (i.e., being more likely to select a recently chosen action).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Miller et al., in prep

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    In Daw et al. (2005), the extra computational complexity of the goal-directed system was a source of uncertainty, leading the arbiter to favor the habitual system in well-learned environments.

    “The extra computational complexity associated with the goal-directed system was a source of uncertainty, leading the arbiter to favor the habitual system in well-learned environments.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Daw et al., 2005

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The arbiter in the model is similar to mechanisms in computational accounts that map habitual/goal-directed control onto model-free/model-based reinforcement learning.

    “This arbiter is similar to mechanisms found in computational accounts mapping habitual/goal-directed control onto model-free/model-based reinforcement learning.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Daw et al., 2005

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    • cites S. W. Lee et al., 2014

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    • cites Keramati et al., 2011

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    A large body of computational work assumes that habitual control arises from model-free reinforcement learning algorithms.

    “A large and influential body of computational work is built on the assumption that habitual control arises from model-free reinforcement learning algorithms (Dolan & Dayan, 2013; O’Doherty, Lee, & McNamee, 2015).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Dolan & Dayan, 2013

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    • cites O’Doherty, Lee, & McNamee, 2015

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Subsequent accounts have developed arbiters that consider proxies for uncertainty or other advantages of habitual over goal-directed control, such as response time.

    “Subsequent accounts have developed arbiters that consider proxies for this uncertainty (S. W. Lee et al., 2014), or other possible advantages of habitual over goal-directed control, such as response time (Keramati et al., 2011).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites S. W. Lee et al., 2014

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    • cites Keramati et al., 2011

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    Premisecitation

    In rodents, goal-directed behavior results in greater activity in OFC and DMS, while habitual behavior results in greater activity in DLS.

    “In rodents, goal-directed behavior results in greater activity in OFC and DMS, while habitual behavior results in greater activity in DLS (Gremel & Costa, 2013).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gremel & Costa, 2013

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The value-free mechanisms proposed for habits do not preclude a role for value or motivational state (e.g., hunger or satiety) in habit learning.

    “the value-free mechanisms we have proposed for habits by no means preclude a role for value or motivational state (e.g., hunger or satiety) in habit learning.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: In the model, control of behavior is allocated on each trial to either the habitual or the goal-directed system by an arbiter.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Value or motivational state may modulate the strengthening of habit associations either directly (e.g., through a feedback mechanism influencing the S-R association) or indirectly (e.g., by influencing action vigor, which increases associative strengths).

    “These may modulate the strengthening of habit associations either directly (e.g., through a feedback mechanism that influences the S-R association) or indirectly (e.g., by influencing the vigor of an action, which in turn results in greater associative strengths).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: In the model, control of behavior is allocated on each trial to either the habitual or the goal-directed system by an arbiter.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In human subjects, goal-directed value signals during outcome devaluation have been identified in vmPFC, and similar signals during contingency degradation have been identified both in vmPFC and in the caudate nucleus.

    “In human subjects, goal-directed value signals during outcome devaluation have been identified in vmPFC (Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007), and similar signals during contingency degradation have been identified both in vmPFC and in the caudate nucleus, a homolog of DMS (Tanaka et al., 2008).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007

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    • cites Tanaka et al., 2008

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    Interpretationreasoning

    The authors' proposed framework re-maps habits to the perseveration kernel and provides an account of how that kernel might operate with a goal-directed controller.

    “Our proposed framework re-maps habits to the perseveration kernel and provides an account of how that kernel might plausibly operate in tandem with a goal-directed controller so as to account for behaviors that have previously been described by RL models.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Dopamine neurons are unlikely to play a role in a uniquely model-free control system, but instead have access to model-based information and play a role in model-based control.

    “These data indicate that dopamine neurons are unlikely to play a role in a uniquely model-free control system, but instead have access to model-based information and play a role in model-based control.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The model-free component of some previous formalizations might not be necessary, and an elaboration of the perseveration kernel serves as a better model of habits.

    “In effect, we are showing that the model-free component of some of these previous formalizations might not be necessary and that an elaboration of this perseveration kernel actually serves as a better model of habits.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Considerable evidence supports the idea that anatomically separate goal-directed and habitual controllers exist in the brain, and that either controller can be responsible for a given action.

    “In sum, considerable evidence supports the idea that anatomically separate goal-directed and habitual controllers exist in the brain, and that either controller can be responsible for a given action.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Habits are promoted in situations where the contingencies between actions and outcomes are weak.

    “habits are promoted in situations where the contingencies between actions and outcomes are weak (Dickinson, 1985).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dickinson, 1985

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The proposed revised framework severs the tie between habits and model-free RL, defining value-free behaviors distinct from RL computations.

    “We first propose severing the tie between habits and model-free RL, and instead defining a category of behaviors that are “value-free” and therefore distinct from either type of RL computation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    In Daw et al. (2005), each system determined the uncertainty in its value estimates, and the arbiter selected the system with less overall uncertainty.

    “In the initial formalization of this idea (Daw et al., 2005), each system determined the uncertainty in its value estimates, and the arbiter selected the system with less overall uncertainty.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Daw et al., 2005

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    Interpretationreasoning

    The authors' model differs from corticostriatal models in the level of analysis, which limits neurobiological detail but facilitates engagement with a wide variety of behaviors.

    “In addition to utilizing different mechanisms for value-based control and for arbitrating between the value-based and value-free controllers, our model also differs from these corticostriatal models in the level of analysis at which it is described. While this limits the level of detail with which our model can engage neurobiological data, it greatly facilitates engagement with a wide variety of”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Frank, 2015

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    • cites Frank & Badre, 2015

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    Interpretationreasoning

    Such a realignment may provide a more parsimonious account of previous behavioral results.

    “Beyond providing a potentially more parsimonious account of previous behavioral results”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: In the model, control of behavior is allocated on each trial to either the habitual or the goal-directed system by an arbiter.
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Such a realignment may offer a better account of extant neural findings, including the fact that structures associated with model-free and model-based computations (i.e., value-based computations) tend to overlap, whereas lesion/inactivation studies have revealed clear dissociations between structures associated with goal-directed behavior versus (potentially value-free) habits.

    “such a realignment may offer a better account of extant neural findings, including the fact that structures associated with model-free and model-based computations (i.e., value-based computations) tend to overlap, whereas lesion/inactivation studies have revealed clear dissociations between structures associated with goal-directed behavior versus (potentially value-free) habits.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: In the model, control of behavior is allocated on each trial to either the habitual or the goal-directed system by an arbiter.
38 of 38
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The simulated task environments capture the essential features of the corresponding animal learning experiments, so that the model's behavior in them can be compared to animal behavior.

    “To illustrate the behavior of the model and the dynamics of its various internal variables, we simulated behavior in a probabilistic reversal learning task (Fig 3).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The model's goal-directed controller corresponds to the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) and its habitual controller corresponds to the dorsolateral striatum (DLS).

    “We lesioned the goal-directed controller (DMS) or habitual controller (DLS) in our model”
    “Lesions to our model’s goal-directed and habitual controllers thus reproduce behavioral patterns typical of DMS and DLS lesioned rats”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    In the model, control of behavior is allocated on each trial to either the habitual or the goal-directed system by an arbiter.

    “In our model, control of behavior is allocated on each trial to either the habitual or the goal-directed system by an arbiter.”
3 of 3

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Two parallel forms of reinforcement learning, model-based and model-free (or value-free), correspond to goal-directed and habitual strategies and develop concurrently during behavior acquisition.

    “Supporting this, computational studies have proposed two parallel forms of reinforcement learning, model-based and model-free (or value-free) learning corresponding to goal-directed and habitual strategies, respectively, that develop concurrently during behavior acquisition2,41,42.”

    From Dissociable roles of prefrontal plasticity in decision-making strategy and execution of habitual behavior (2026) · cites this paper as [42]

    The Results describe parallel goal-directed and habitual controllers whose learning develops together during a task; the Discussion describes an earlier framework pairing model-based learning with goal-directed behavior and model-free learning with habits. But this paper’s own model replaces the model-free habitual controller with value-free perseveration, which it says is not reinforcement learning. Thus “model-free (or value-free)” incorrectly treats the two as interchangeable. Page numbers were not supplied. (LLM, conf=0.89)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The habitual system simplifies decision-making by shifting to a stimulus-response mode of behavior, making decisions potentially value-less and inflexible but less cognitively demanding.

    “With overtraining, the habitual system simplifies decision-making by shifting to a stimulus-response mode of behavior51, making decisions potentially value-less and inflexible but less cognitively demanding52.”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Training reinforcement probability differs between Methods and Results

    Major

    The Methods specify a 25% pellet probability during omission training, and say devaluation training was identical. The Results describe a 50% pellet probability for both training phases.

  • Habit-weight update uses a different basis function

    Minor

    The habit-strength function uses basis functions γi, so its derivative with respect to weight ci is γi. The stated weight-update equation instead substitutes χi, which is not the defined habit basis function.

2 of 2

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Authors
Miller, K. J., Shenhav, A., & Ludvig, E. A.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2019-03
Volume
126
Issue
2
Pages
292-311
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2949941589
Cited by
280
References
136
Citations by year
2026: 32 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 41 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3
FWCI
17.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
  • Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health (T-32 MH065214)
  • Princeton University
  • Sponsor name not included
  • National Institute of General Medical Sciences (P20GM103645)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience › Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior
Keywords
habit, stimulus-response learning, model-free reinforcement learning, outcome devaluation, contingency degradation, reinforcement schedules, perseveration, instrumental behavior, habit formation
MeSH terms
Animals, Behavior, Animal, Decision Making, Goals, Habits, Humans, Models, Psychological, Reinforcement, Psychology, Prefrontal Cortex

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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