Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of trustworthiness. Our model is based on individual differences in the costs and/or benefits of being trustworthy. We argue that individuals for whom trustworthiness is payoff-maximizing will find TPP to be less net costly (for example, because mechanisms that incentivize some individuals to be trustworthy also create benefits for deterring selfishness via TPP). We show that because of this relationship, it can be advantageous for individuals to punish selfishness in order to signal that they are not selfish themselves. We then empirically validate our model using economic game experiments. We show that TPP is indeed a signal of trustworthiness: third-party punishers are trusted more, and actually behave in a more trustworthy way, than non-punishers. Furthermore, as predicted by our model, introducing a more informative signal--the opportunity to help directly--attenuates these signalling effects. When potential punishers have the chance to help, they are less likely to punish, and punishment is perceived as, and actually is, a weaker signal of trustworthiness. Costly helping, in contrast, is a strong and highly used signal even when TPP is also possible. Together, our model and experiments provide a formal reputational account of TPP, and demonstrate how the costs of punishing may be recouped by the long-run benefits of signalling one's trustworthiness.
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“For a population's reputation scheme to be trustworthy, an individual's reputation must be built on costly signals of prosocial intent [16, 58, 59]”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [58]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jordan, J. J., Hoffman, M., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Jordan, Jillian J.
- Rand, David G.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2016-02
- Volume
- 530
- Issue
- 7591
- Pages
- 473-476
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2286696846
- Cited by
- 508
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 63 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 55 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 12
- FWCI
- 130.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- third-party punishment, costly signaling, trustworthiness, reputation, social norms, cooperation, costly helping, signaling games, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Games, Experimental, Humans, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Trust
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