Cited by 51Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentSocial Power and Status Dynamics

Learning moral values: Another’s desire to punish enhances one’s own punitive behavior.

Open access
FeldmanHall, Oriel, Otto, A. Ross, Phelps, Elizabeth A.·2018·Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Abstract

There is little consensus about how moral values are learned. Using a novel social learning task, we examine whether vicarious learning impacts moral values-specifically fairness preferences-during decisions to restore justice. In both laboratory and Internet-based experimental settings, we employ a dyadic justice game where participants receive unfair splits of money from another player and respond resoundingly to the fairness violations by exhibiting robust nonpunitive, compensatory behavior (baseline behavior). In a subsequent learning phase, participants are tasked with responding to fairness violations on behalf of another participant (a receiver) and are given explicit trial-by-trial feedback about the receiver's fairness preferences (e.g., whether they prefer punishment as a means of restoring justice). This allows participants to update their decisions in accordance with the receiver's feedback (learning behavior). In a final test phase, participants again directly experience fairness violations. After learning about a receiver who prefers highly punitive measures, participants significantly enhance their own endorsement of punishment during the test phase compared with baseline. Computational learning models illustrate the acquisition of these moral values is governed by a reinforcement mechanism, revealing it takes as little as being exposed to the preferences of a single individual to shift one's own desire for punishment when responding to fairness violations. Together this suggests that even in the absence of explicit social pressure, fairness preferences are highly labile. (PsycINFO Database Record

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/xge0000405

Cites

86 of 86 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Based on extant research, the study aimed to achieve a final sample size of N = 40 for all in-lab experiments.

    “Based on extant research, we aimed to achieve a final sample size of N = 40 for all in-lab experiments 44 .”

    From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [44]

    In Experiment 2, Method (page unavailable), the source describes a laboratory study that aimed to recruit 35 participants and reported results for 37, providing a roughly comparable precedent for the citing authors’ sample-size choice. It does not establish N = 40 as a target for in-lab experiments; that exact target is the citing authors’ own plan. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

1 of the 87 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Haidt J Kesebir S 2010 Handbook of Social Psychology Chapter 22: Morality Hoboken, NJ John Wiley & Sons
  2. Henrich J Boyd R Bowles S Camerer C Fehr E Gintis H McElreath R Alvard M Barr A Ensminger J Henrich NS Hill K Gil-White F Gurven M Marlowe FW Patton JQ Tracer D 2005 Models of decision-making and the coevolution of social preferences Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 6 838 855 16372952
  3. Jones WK 1994 A theory of social norms University of Illinois Law Review 3
  4. Straub PG Murnighan JK 1995 An Experimental Investigation of Ultimatum Games - Information, Fairness, Expectations, and Lowest Acceptable Offers Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 27 3 345 364

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
FeldmanHall, O., Otto, A. R., & Phelps, E. A.
Affiliations
  • Brown University (US)
  • McGill University (CA)
  • New York University (US)
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Published
2018-08
Volume
147
Issue
8
Pages
1211-1224
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
OpenAlex
W2806193542
Cited by
51
References
87
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 6
FWCI
11.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
National Institute on Aging (R01AG039283)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
moral values, moral learning, observational learning, fairness preferences, punishment, restoration of justice, compensatory behavior, reinforcement learning, social learning
MeSH terms
Adult, Empathy, Female, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Male, Middle Aged, Morals, Motivation, Punishment, Social Justice, Feedback, Psychological, Young Adult

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review