Beliefs about bad people are volatile
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
People form moral impressions rapidly, effortlessly, and from a remarkably young age. Putatively “bad” agents command more attention and are identified more quickly and accurately than benign or friendly agents. Such vigilance is adaptive, but can also be costly in environments where people sometimes make mistakes, because incorrectly attributing bad character to good people damages existing relationships and discourages forming new ones. The ability to accurately infer others’ moral character is critical for healthy social functioning, but the computational processes that support this ability are not well understood. Here we show that moral inference is explained by an asymmetric Bayesian updating mechanism where beliefs about the morality of bad agents are more uncertain (and thus more volatile) than beliefs about the morality of good agents. This asymmetry appears to be a property of learning about immoral agents in general, as we also find greater uncertainty for beliefs about bad agents’ non-moral traits. Our model and data reveal a cognitive mechanism that permits flexible updating of beliefs about potentially threatening others, a mechanism that could facilitate forgiveness when initial bad impressions turn out to be inaccurate. Our findings suggest that negative moral impressions destabilize beliefs about others, promoting cognitive flexibility in the service of cooperative but cautious behavior.
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Cites
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Cited by
Brady, W. J., Crockett, M. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620917336 · Cited by 417
“…formation has consistently found that signs of bad behavior immediately capture our attention when forming character judgments (Fiske, 1980; Pratto & John, 1991; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) and increase rates of learning about the traits of others (Siegel, Mathys, Rutledge, & Crockett, 2018).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDeconstructing moral character judgments
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., & Gray, K. (2022) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.008 · Cited by 41
Yu, H., Chen, J., Dardaine, B., & Yang, F. (2023) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105476 · Cited by 13
White, C. J. M., Norenzayan, A., & Schaller, M. (2020) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0244144 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Siegel, J. Z., Mathys, C., Rutledge, R. B., & Crockett, M. J.
- Venue
- Nature Human Behaviour
- Published
- 2018-09-17
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 750-756
- ISSN
- 2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2890593794
- Cited by
- 140
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 8.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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