Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks
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Abstract
Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies. Observational data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social networks, but subjects in such studies can choose to befriend people with similar behaviors, posing difficulty for causal inference. Here, we exploit a seminal set of laboratory experiments that originally showed that voluntary costly punishment can help sustain cooperation. In these experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to a sequence of different groups to play a series of single-shot public goods games with strangers; this feature allowed us to draw networks of interactions to explore how cooperative and uncooperative behaviors spread from person to person to person. We show that, in both an ordinary public goods game and in a public goods game with punishment, focal individuals are influenced by fellow group members’ contribution behavior in future interactions with other individuals who were not a party to the initial interaction. Furthermore, this influence persists for multiple periods and spreads up to three degrees of separation (from person to person to person to person). The results suggest that each additional contribution a subject makes to the public good in the first period is tripled over the course of the experiment by other subjects who are directly or indirectly influenced to contribute more as a consequence. These results show experimentally that cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks.
Overview
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TL;DR
Reanalyzing Fehr-Gächter public goods experiments, Fowler and Christakis find that cooperative and uncooperative contributions spread causally from person to person to person, up to three degrees of separation, and persist over multiple periods. Each additional 1 MU contributed in period 1 approximately triples over the experiment through direct and indirect network effects.
Key findings
- Direct influence: each 1 MU contributed by an alter increased ego’s next-period contribution by 0.19 MUs (95% CI 0.14–0.24, p<0.0001) in the basic public goods game and 0.18 MUs (0.14–0.21, p<0.0001) in the punishment version.
- Indirect influence: each 1 MU contributed by an alter’s alter increased ego’s contribution two periods later by 0.07 MUs (0.03–0.10, p=0.0005) in the basic game and 0.05 MUs (0.03–0.08, p=0.0001) with punishment; in the punishment game, alter’s alter’s alter increased ego’s contribution by 0.06 MUs (0.02–0.09, p=0.001) three periods later.
- Cascade size: an extra 1 MU in period 1 caused 3 other subjects to increase total contributions by 1.8 MUs over the next 4 periods in the basic game or 2.1 MUs over the next 5 periods with punishment, plus indirect increases of 1.2 or 0.9 MUs, totaling 3 MUs (95% CI 2.4–3.6) in both versions.
- Punishment: each punishment point an alter’s alter gave to an alter increased ego’s contribution two rounds later by 0.13 MUs (0.02–0.23, p=0.02), but this did not spread further (p=0.25); punishment behavior itself did not spread (p=0.83).
Methods
- Reanalysis of previously published Fehr-Gächter public goods game experiments with 240 subjects; groups of four, 20 MUs, six periods, random assignment, strict anonymity, and no subject paired with another more than once; the punishment version allowed spending up to 10 MUs to reduce a target’s income by 3 MUs per 1 MU.
- Interaction networks were constructed from group assignments, with ties defined by the ability to observe another subject’s contribution in the preceding period; direct and indirect effects were estimated up to three degrees of separation.
- Interval (Tobit) regression with Huber-White clustered standard errors on ego and alter, controlling for ego’s prior contribution and period fixed effects; robustness checks included group-level models, additional lags, ego fixed effects, and Sobel mediation tests.
Limitations
- Paper-stated: results come from a particular experimentally controlled network structure, and whether “pay it forward” behavior spreads more widely in natural human networks remains an open question; interval regression coefficients apply to the latent outcome, group-level models are downwardly biased due to censoring, and fixed-effects models are biased toward zero.
- Evident from the text: anonymous, single-shot stranger groups with no reputations or repeated ties may not capture real-world social ties; per-MU effects are small, and cascade estimates rely on effects with p<0.05.
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In the paper
“However, it is worth reiterating that most of our subjects violated this supposition: since all interactions are single-shot, the equilibrium prediction is to contribute nothing and to pay nothing to punish noncontributors, yet this was not what the subjects did ( 36 ).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [36] 36. Fehr E, Gachter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137-140. source
Fehr & Gächter (2002) state the selfish benchmark explicitly — 'it was always in the material self-interest of any subject to keep all MUs privately' and 'purely selfish subjects will never cooperate or punish others, because cooperation and punishment are costly and yield no pecuniary benefits' (p. 1) — with groups randomly recomposed so no subject met another twice, i.e. single-shot interactions. Their results then show most subjects acted against that benchmark: 84.3% of subjects punished at least once out of 1,270 punishment acts (Altruistic punishment and cooperation, p. 1), and cooperation rose in the punishment treatment with 94.2%/91.4% of subjects investing more under punishment than without (Results, p. 2). Together these support the paraphrase that most subjects violated the selfish-payoff-maximising supposition in both contributing and punishing. (LLM, conf=0.88)
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“A summary of the raw data (Fig. 2) shows that, indeed, future contributions by focal individuals ('egos') are significantly related to the amount contributed by each group member with whom the ego interacted in the previous period ('alters') in both the basic public goods game and the public goods game with punishment.”
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“Remarkably, even though egos do not observe the contributions of their alters' alters (two degrees of separation), they too significantly affect ego's contribution decisions.”
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In the paper
“For each 1MU contributed by an alter, ego contributes an additional 0.19 MUs (95% C.I. 0.14 to 0.24, p <0.0001) in the next period in the basic public goods game and an additional 0.18MUs (0.14 to 0.21, p <0.0001) in the public goods game with punishment.”
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“Furthermore, this influence persists for multiple periods and spreads up to three degrees of separation (from person to person to person to person).”
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“Furthermore, recent evidence from both lab and field studies suggests that people behave more prosocially after observing others engaging in behaviors such as cooperation and generosity 8 – 10 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [8]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A.
- Affiliations
- University of California San Diego (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2010-03-08
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 5334-5338
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC2851803
- OpenAlex
- W2111394372
- Cited by
- 767
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 39 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 50 · 2018: 47 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 50 · 2014: 66 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 49
- FWCI
- 155.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
- John Templeton Foundation
- University of Notre Dame
- National Institutes of Health
- National Institute on Aging (P30AG034420, P01AG031093)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, social networks, costly punishment, public goods game, costly cooperation, indirect influence, costly signaling
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Social Support, Models, Economic
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